T1189: Drive-by Compromise
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:
* A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code * Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising) * Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting)
Browser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via User Execution. By clicking "allow" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.[1][2][3]
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.[4]
Typical drive-by compromise process:
1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Drive-by Compromise matters because normal web browsing can become an initial-access path into internal Windows, macOS, Linux, or identity-provider environments. The business issue is not just “bad websites”; trusted or industry-relevant sites, ad networks, cloud-hosted scripts, user-controllable web content, and browser push notifications can all become delivery paths. This makes patching, browser hardening, web controls, and user decision points material to resilience.
Executive priority
Leaders should treat this as a control-validation problem across endpoint, web, identity, and SOC readiness. Ask whether browsers and plugins are updated quickly, whether risky web content and downloads are restricted, whether browser isolation or exploit protection is used for higher-risk users, and whether the SOC can investigate suspicious web-to-endpoint execution. The ATT&CK relationships to many campaigns and groups show this technique is broadly relevant, but local priority should be based on workforce browsing patterns, high-value user exposure, and patch/control maturity.
Technical view
ATT&CK places T1189 in Initial Access for Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, and Windows. Detection text is not provided in the technique record, but the related DET0176 detection strategy indicates behavior-based, multi-platform detection is the relevant direction. SOC and IR teams should validate coverage for the chain described by ATT&CK: user visits a site, scripts execute or request permissions, browser/plugin versions may be profiled, exploit code or malicious script behavior follows, and successful exploitation may lead to code execution. Distinguish this from Exploit Public-Facing Application: the client endpoint is the target, not an exposed server application.
Likely telemetry
- Web proxy, secure web gateway, DNS, and browser request logs for visited domains, redirects, ad-network paths, script sources, and download events
- Endpoint telemetry for browser child processes, exploit-like behavior, new files, and code execution following web activity
- Browser and endpoint configuration state, including update levels, extension policy, scripting controls, notification permissions, and plugin exposure where applicable
- Identity-provider and authentication logs when browser-originated compromise leads to unusual sign-ins, session activity, or access from affected users
- Alert and investigation records from behavior-based multi-platform detection content related to DET0176
Detection direction
- Validate whether monitoring can correlate web navigation to subsequent endpoint execution or suspicious browser process behavior.
- Tune for high-risk patterns such as unexpected browser-spawned processes, unusual downloads after redirects, abused push-notification permissions, and script activity from compromised legitimate sites or publicly writable cloud-hosted content.
- Expect false positives from normal advertising, content delivery networks, software updaters, and legitimate web applications; triage should use sequence, reputation, user context, and endpoint behavior rather than URL alone.
- Review coverage for strategic web compromise scenarios where the site appears legitimate and may be specific to a sector, region, or community of interest.
- Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1189, require local validation through telemetry review, detection testing, and incident retrospectives rather than assuming coverage.
Mitigation priorities
- Prioritize M1051 Update Software for browsers, operating systems, plugins, and related client software to reduce exposure to known exploit paths.
- Apply M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content with web filtering, download restrictions, script controls, extension control, and policy around unsafe browser behaviors.
- Use M1050 Exploit Protection and M1048 Application Isolation and Sandboxing where feasible, especially for high-risk users and systems that frequently access external or industry-specific websites.
- Implement M1017 User Training focused on reporting suspicious browser prompts, push-notification abuse, warning dialogs, and unexpected downloads without relying on training as the only control.
- Measure effectiveness with audit evidence: patch compliance, browser policy enforcement, web-control exceptions, endpoint alert triage results, and incident response playbooks for suspected web-originated compromise.
Analyst notes and limits
The relationship context includes multiple campaigns and groups using this technique, including strategic web compromise and watering-hole style activity. Use that as threat-intelligence context, not as proof of current targeting. For Glexia-style readiness, the key questions are whether high-value users have stronger browsing controls, whether SOC telemetry preserves enough web-to-endpoint sequence data, and whether IR can quickly identify affected users after a compromised site is discovered.
The official ATT&CK object does not provide detection guidance, and the supplied relationship descriptions are partial for some related objects. This take does not assert active exploitation, local exposure, or guaranteed detection. Environment-specific evidence is required to determine risk, coverage, and control gaps.
Drive-by Compromise
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:
* A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code * Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising) * Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting)
Browser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via User Execution. By clicking "allow" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.[1][2][3]
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.[4]
Typical drive-by compromise process:
1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0134: Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]
G0048: RTM
G0068: PLATINUM
G0112: Windshift
G1006: Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. Earth Lusca has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some Earth Lusca operations may be financially motivated.[1]
Earth Lusca has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including APT41 and the Winnti Group cluster, however security researchers assess Earth Lusca's techniques and infrastructure are separate.[1]
G0082: APT38
APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
G0001: Axiom
Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]
G0073: APT19
APT19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. [1] Some analysts track APT19 and Deep Panda as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. [2] [3] [4]
G0012: Darkhotel
Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]
G0138: Andariel
Andariel is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. Andariel has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. Andariel's notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.[1][2][3][4][5]
Andariel is considered a sub-set of Lazarus Group, and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.[6]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
G0007: APT28
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.
G0035: Dragonfly
Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.[1][2] Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
S0215: KARAE
S0483: IcedID
S0482: Bundlore
S0606: Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. Bad Rabbit has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia. [1][2][3]
S0451: LoudMiner
S1124: SocGholish
SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.[1][2][3][4]
S0496: REvil
REvil is a ransomware family that has been linked to the GOLD SOUTHFIELD group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. REvil, which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.[1][2][3]
S0531: Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Grandoreiro has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.[1][2]
S1086: Snip3
Snip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.[1][2]
S0216: POORAIM
C0057: 3CX Supply Chain Attack
The 3CX Supply Chain Attack was the first publicly reported case of one supply chain compromise triggering another, leading to a cascading, two-stage intrusion. The initial supply chain attack began when a 3CX employee downloaded and executed a trojanized, end-of-life version of the X_Trader trading software from Trading Technologies. This provided UNC4736, a threat cluster associated with AppleJeus, access to the 3CX environment. From there UNC4736 compromised the Windows and macOS build environments used to distribute the 3CX desktop application to their customers.[1] While 3CX serves more than 600,000 customers and 12 million users, only a subset of systems were affected. Subsequent targeting focused on victims in the defense and cryptocurrency sectors, where attackers deployed secondary payloads such as Gopuram for credential theft and persistence.[2] The campaign began in late 2022 and was disrupted after security vendors publicly reported the compromise in March 2023.[3][4]
C0016: Operation Dust Storm
Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]
Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]
C0010: C0010
C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.7 | Current bundle | 21eb6d481c70… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Push notifications - viruspositive
Gaurav Sethi. (2021, December 14). The Dark Side of Web Push Notifications. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
Open source URL -
[2]
push notification -mcafee
Craig Schmugar. (2021, May 17). Scammers Impersonating Windows Defender to Push Malicious Windows Apps. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
Open source URL -
[3]
push notifications - malwarebytes
Pieter Arntz. (2019, January 22). Browser push notifications: a feature asking to be abused. Retrieved March 14, 2025.
Open source URL -
[4]
Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise
Adair, S., Moran, N. (2012, May 15). Cyber Espionage & Strategic Web Compromises – Trusted Websites Serving Dangerous Results. Retrieved March 13, 2018.
Open source URL -
[5]
mitre-attack T1189Open source URL
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