T1005: Data from Local System
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries may do this using a Command and Scripting Interpreter, such as cmd as well as a Network Device CLI, which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information.[1] Adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Data from Local System is the point in an intrusion where an adversary looks across a compromised host or device for valuable local content before exfiltration. For leaders, the business issue is not just “file access”; it is whether sensitive documents, configuration data, local databases, virtual machine files, process memory, or network device configurations can be found, staged, and removed before the organization notices.
Executive priority
Prioritize this technique where regulated data, intellectual property, operational technology support data, executive files, source code, financial records, or network device configurations reside on endpoints, servers, ESXi hosts, macOS/Linux/Windows systems, or network devices. It is especially relevant to incident response scoping and audit evidence: teams should be able to show what sensitive data exists locally, who or what accessed it, and whether controls such as Data Loss Prevention are monitoring movement from those systems.
Technical view
ATT&CK places T1005 in the Collection tactic and describes local searches across file systems, configuration files, local databases, VM files, and process memory, potentially using command and scripting interpreters, cmd, network device CLI, or automated collection. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility for local file discovery and access patterns across the listed platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, and Windows. Because official detection text is not provided, detection engineering should reference the related DET0380 strategy and build environment-specific analytics around unusual access to sensitive local data sources, especially when preceded by interpreter use or followed by staging or exfiltration-related behavior.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint process execution telemetry for command interpreters and scripting activity
- File access, file enumeration, and sensitive directory access logs where available
- Operating system audit logs from Windows, Linux, and macOS hosts
- Network device command/accounting logs, including configuration-viewing activity such as running configuration access
- ESXi and virtualization platform logs for access to virtual machine files
Detection direction
- Confirm whether logging captures both the access mechanism and the data target; process telemetry without file/object context may miss the business impact.
- Tune detections for unusual local collection behavior by account, host role, time, volume, and data sensitivity rather than simple file reads alone, which can be noisy.
- Correlate local collection with related behaviors named in the ATT&CK description, including command and scripting interpreter use and automated collection.
- Include network devices in coverage reviews; configuration file access through device CLI can be high value but is often outside endpoint-centric monitoring.
- Use the related DET0380 detection strategy as a starting point, but require local validation because the ATT&CK object does not provide official detection logic.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with data classification and location mapping so defenders know which local stores require monitoring and protection.
- Apply Data Loss Prevention controls consistent with related mitigation M1057 to identify, categorize, monitor, and control sensitive data movement across endpoint, network, and cloud-adjacent paths.
- Reduce unnecessary local copies of sensitive data and restrict access to local databases, configuration files, VM files, and administrative directories based on role.
- Harden and monitor administrative access to network devices and virtualization infrastructure because local configuration and VM data may be business-critical.
- Ensure incident response playbooks include collection-scope analysis, not only malware removal, so legal, compliance, and business owners can make informed decisions.
Analyst notes and limits
Relationship context shows this technique has been used across many ATT&CK campaigns and groups, including espionage, ransomware, supply chain, and infrastructure-focused activity. That breadth supports treating T1005 as a common collection behavior, but it does not by itself prove current exposure or active targeting of any specific organization.
The supplied ATT&CK object provides no official detection text and no procedure-level details in this prompt. Any detection or control assessment must be validated against local data locations, logging coverage, endpoint and device platforms, retention, and DLP configuration.
Data from Local System
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries may do this using a Command and Scripting Interpreter, such as cmd as well as a Network Device CLI, which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information.[1] Adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
G0060: BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]
G1004: LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.[1][2][3]
G0087: APT39
APT39 is one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. APT39 has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.[1][2][3][4][5]
G0125: HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.[1][2][3]
G0001: Axiom
Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G1022: ToddyCat
G0124: Windigo
G0117: Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.[1][2][3][4]
G0138: Andariel
Andariel is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. Andariel has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. Andariel's notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.[1][2][3][4][5]
Andariel is considered a sub-set of Lazarus Group, and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.[6]
North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.
G1039: RedCurl
RedCurl is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks.[1] RedCurl is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor.[1][2] The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers.
S1196: Troll Stealer
Troll Stealer is an information stealer written in Go associated with Kimsuky operations. Troll Stealer has typically been delivered through a dropper disguised as a legitimate security program installation file. Troll Stealer features code similar to AppleSeed, also uniquely associated with Kimsuky operations.[1][2]
S0238: Proxysvc
Proxysvc is a malicious DLL used by Lazarus Group in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of Proxysvc is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process. [1]
S0502: Drovorub
S0498: Cryptoistic
Cryptoistic is a backdoor, written in Swift, that has been used by Lazarus Group.[1]
S0653: xCaon
S0650: QakBot
S1043: ccf32
ccf32 is data collection malware that has been used since at least February 2019, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign; there is also a similar x64 version.[1]
S0567: Dtrack
S0239: Bankshot
Bankshot is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first reported by the Department of Homeland Security in December of 2017. In 2018, Lazarus Group used the Bankshot implant in attacks against the Turkish financial sector. [1]
S0128: BADNEWS
S1064: SVCReady
S0448: Rising Sun
Rising Sun is a modular backdoor that was used extensively in Operation Sharpshooter between 2017 and 2019. Rising Sun infected at least 87 organizations around the world, including nuclear, defense, energy, and financial service companies. Security researchers assessed Rising Sun included some source code from Lazarus Group's Trojan Duuzer.[1]
C0048: Operation MidnightEclipse
Operation MidnightEclipse was a campaign conducted in March and April 2024 that involved initial exploit of zero-day vulnerability CVE-2024-3400, a critical command injection vulnerability in the GlobalProtect feature of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS.[1][2]
C0002: Night Dragon
Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China.[1]
C0014: Operation Wocao
Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]
Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]
C0015: C0015
C0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.8 | Current bundle | 4c85bbbbab00… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
show_run_config_cmd_cisco
Cisco. (2022, August 16). show running-config - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference . Retrieved July 13, 2022.
Open source URL -
[2]
Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion
Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022.
Open source URL -
[3]
US-CERT-TA18-106A
US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
Open source URL -
[4]
mitre-attack T1005Open source URL
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