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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1608.001: Upload Malware

Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.

Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.[1][2][3][4]

Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM).[5] By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typosquatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.

EnterpriseT1608.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.3 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Upload Malware is a pre-compromise behavior: adversaries stage payloads, droppers, backdoors, or backdoored packages somewhere victims or victim systems can later reach them. The business issue is that the first visible sign may not be malware creation, but a user, server, build process, or cloud/container workflow pulling content from public infrastructure, software repositories, IPFS, blockchain-hosted content, or attacker-controlled web servers.

Executive priority

Treat this as an early-warning and resilience problem, not only an endpoint malware problem. Leaders should ask whether the organization can identify risky externally hosted payloads before execution, govern downloads from public repositories and marketplaces, and produce audit evidence for pre-compromise monitoring. The ATT&CK relationships show this behavior across espionage and financially motivated groups and campaigns, including sectors such as energy, government, defense, aviation, healthcare, education, finance, hospitality, and cloud/container environments, so prioritization should reflect sector exposure and dependency on third-party software sources.

Technical view

This sub-technique sits under Stage Capabilities in the Resource Development tactic and has platform PRE, meaning much of the behavior may occur outside enterprise-owned infrastructure. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility where staged malware becomes observable: user downloads, command-line or application retrieval from Internet-accessible servers, access to public code/package repositories, container or VM image pulls, extension marketplace installs, DNS/proxy connections to staging locations, and downstream Ingress Tool Transfer context. ATT&CK provides no official detection text here; the related DET0824 detection strategy indicates a detection relationship exists, but its details were not supplied.

Likely telemetry

  • DNS and web proxy logs for access to newly observed or suspicious staging domains, URLs, IPFS gateways, paste sites, code repositories, and package indexes
  • Endpoint and EDR records for downloaded files, script interpreters, archive extraction, installer execution, and follow-on payload retrieval
  • Email, collaboration, and browser telemetry for links or attachments that lead users to externally staged malware
  • Developer and supply-chain logs for package installs, dependency updates, repository clones, container image pulls, VM image usage, and extension installs
  • Cloud and container control-plane logs where public images, community images, or external artifacts are introduced

Detection direction

  • Separate pre-compromise staging from internal execution: detection often depends on observing retrieval, installation, or user execution rather than the adversary’s original upload.
  • Tune for unusual external artifact sources used by business processes, especially public package libraries, software stores, repositories, container registries, community VM images, paste services, IPFS, and blockchain-hosted content referenced in the ATT&CK description.
  • Correlate downloads with subsequent execution, script activity, persistence, or ingress tool transfer to reduce false positives from legitimate developer and administrative activity.
  • Maintain allowlists and baselines for approved repositories, package namespaces, images, and update channels; alert on typosquatting-like names, unexpected maintainers, or first-seen sources when local telemetry supports it.
  • Account for blind spots: decentralized storage and blockchain-hosted content may resist takedown, and uploads to third-party infrastructure may not be visible in internal logs until a user, endpoint, workload, or build pipeline retrieves the content.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize M1056 Pre-compromise measures: reduce exposed attack paths, monitor adversarial preparation indicators, and make staged payload delivery harder before intrusion occurs.
  • Establish policy and technical controls for approved software sources, public package repositories, extension marketplaces, container images, VM images, and developer dependencies.
  • Use web, DNS, endpoint, and cloud controls to restrict or scrutinize retrieval from untrusted staging locations while preserving documented business exceptions.
  • Add supply-chain validation for packages, binaries, images, and repositories before production use, especially where automated builds or cloud/container deployments pull public artifacts.
  • Prepare response playbooks for staged-malware discoveries: scope who accessed the content, what executed, whether credentials or build systems were exposed, and whether third-party reporting or takedown is appropriate.
Analyst notes and limits

This object is valuable because it bridges threat intelligence, SOC monitoring, vulnerability/supply-chain governance, cloud security, and incident response readiness. Its PRE platform means local detection coverage is usually indirect and depends on whether the enterprise can observe retrieval paths and software-source trust decisions. Relationship context includes many campaigns and groups, so it should inform risk modeling, but those relationships should not be interpreted as evidence of current targeting of any specific organization.

MITRE does not provide official detection text for T1608.001 in the supplied fields. The related DET0824 strategy is named but not described here. No claim is made that any listed actor is currently using this technique against a specific sector or organization. Effective detection and mitigation require local baselines for allowed repositories, web destinations, developer workflows, cloud images, and user execution patterns.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Upload Malware

Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.

Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.[1][2][3][4]

Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM).[5] By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typosquatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1608 Stage Capabilities This object subtechnique of Stage Capabilities.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0034: Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]

In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]

Group Enterprise

G1018: TA2541

TA2541 is a cybercriminal group that has been targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries since at least 2017. TA2541 campaigns are typically high volume and involve the use of commodity remote access tools obfuscated by crypters and themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel.[1][2]

Group Enterprise

G1006: Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. Earth Lusca has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some Earth Lusca operations may be financially motivated.[1]

Earth Lusca has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including APT41 and the Winnti Group cluster, however security researchers assess Earth Lusca's techniques and infrastructure are separate.[1]

Group Enterprise

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Group Enterprise

G1014: LuminousMoth

LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.[1][2]

Group Enterprise

G0090: WIRTE

WIRTE is a cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang, that has been active since at least August 2018. WIRTE has targeted diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations across the Middle East, North Africa, and in Europe to gather intelligence. WIRTE has remained persistently active despite the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and has expanded their operations to include wiper malware attacks against Israeli targets.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G0094: Kimsuky

Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]

DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.

Group Enterprise

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Group Enterprise

G0139: TeamTNT

TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

Group Enterprise

G0047: Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.[1][2][3][4][5]

In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. [6][5]

Malware Enterprise

S9008: Shai-Hulud

Shai-Hulud is a supply chain worm, first reported in September 2025, that spreads through code repositories, including GitHub and NPM packages. It exploits CI/CD pipeline dependencies to propagate to victims and poisons the supply chain by publishing malicious packages. Once inside a victim environment, Shai-Hulud steals credentials and access tokens from compromised repository accounts and exfiltrates them to attacker-controlled servers via encoded GitHub Actions workflows.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

LinuxSaaSWindows
Campaign Enterprise

C0022: Operation Dream Job

Operation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.[1][2][3][4]

Campaign Enterprise

C0002: Night Dragon

Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0011: C0011

C0011 was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by Transparent Tribe that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from Transparent Tribe's historic targeting Indian government, military, and think tank personnel, and assessed it was still ongoing as of July 2022.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0005: Operation Spalax

Operation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0010: C0010

C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0013: Operation Sharpshooter

Operation Sharpshooter was a global cyber espionage campaign that targeted nuclear, defense, government, energy, and financial companies, with many located in Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Security researchers noted the campaign shared many similarities with previous Lazarus Group operations, including fake job recruitment lures and shared malware code.[1][2][3]

Campaign Enterprise

C0021: C0021

C0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
5e003833572b46d2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.3 Current bundle 5e003833572b…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020

    Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Talos IPFS 2022

    Edmund Brumaghin. (2022, November 9). Threat Spotlight: Cyber Criminal Adoption of IPFS for Phishing, Malware Campaigns. Retrieved March 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Guardio Etherhiding 2023

    Nati Tal and Oleg Zaytsev. (2023, October 13). “EtherHiding” — Hiding Web2 Malicious Code in Web3 Smart Contracts. Retrieved May 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Bleeping Computer Binance Smart Chain 2023

    Bill Toulas. (2023, October 13). Hackers use Binance Smart Chain contracts to store malicious scripts. Retrieved May 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 2024

    Sebastian Obregoso and Christophe Tafani-Dereeper. (2024, May 23). Malicious PyPI packages targeting highly specific MacOS machines. Retrieved May 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attack T1608.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.