T1087.001: Local Account
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the Net utility and id and groups on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups.[1][2][3] On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS, the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts. On ESXi servers, the `esxcli system account list` command can list local user accounts.[4]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Local account enumeration is early-stage discovery that helps an intruder understand which usernames and groups exist on a host before choosing follow-on actions. It matters because it often blends into normal administration on Windows, Linux, macOS, and ESXi, yet can precede credential abuse, lateral movement planning, or targeting of privileged local accounts.
Executive priority
Treat this as a coverage and readiness question, not a standalone crisis signal. Leaders should ask whether SOC telemetry can distinguish routine administration from unexpected account discovery on servers, workstations, and ESXi hosts; whether local accounts are governed and reviewed; and whether evidence exists for audit, incident response, and operating system hardening decisions. ESXi inclusion makes this especially relevant where virtualization supports business-critical operations.
Technical view
This is an ATT&CK Discovery sub-technique under Account Discovery for ESXi, Linux, macOS, and Windows. Validate monitoring for built-in account and group listing activity such as Windows Net utility usage, Linux/macOS identity and group queries, macOS directory service enumeration, Linux local account file access, and ESXi local account listing. MITRE provides no official detection text, but the related DET0303 strategy indicates detection should focus on local account enumeration across host platforms. IR teams should correlate enumeration with the initiating user, parent process, remote session context, host role, and subsequent authentication or privilege activity.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint process creation with command line and parent/child process context
- Windows local user and group enumeration activity involving built-in administration utilities
- Linux/macOS shell command telemetry and process execution for identity, group, and directory service queries
- File access or command activity involving local account stores such as /etc/passwd on Linux
- ESXi shell, host management, or administrative command audit records for local account listing
Detection direction
- Baseline legitimate administrative account inventory activity by platform and host role before alerting broadly.
- Prioritize unexpected enumeration on servers, ESXi hosts, privileged workstations, and systems where the initiating account is not normally used for administration.
- Tune for context: account listing commands alone can be benign, but become higher value when followed by login attempts, privilege changes, lateral movement indicators, or access to sensitive hosts.
- Check blind spots in ESXi and non-Windows telemetry; many environments collect Windows process events but have weaker shell and host-management visibility on hypervisors and Unix-like systems.
- Use the relationship to Account Discovery to hunt for broader account enumeration patterns, not only the specific local-account commands listed by MITRE.
Mitigation priorities
- Apply the related M1028 Operating System Configuration mitigation by hardening default OS settings and reducing unnecessary local account exposure.
- Review and disable or remove unused local accounts where operationally feasible, especially on servers and ESXi hosts.
- Restrict who can perform local administration and ensure privileged local account use is accountable and logged.
- Standardize secure configuration baselines across Windows, Linux, macOS, and ESXi so local account inventory is expected, documented, and auditable.
- Pair configuration hardening with monitoring validation; prevention alone will not show whether discovery occurred before an incident.
Analyst notes and limits
The broad set of related groups, campaigns, and software indicates this behavior is common across espionage and intrusion tradecraft, but the object should not be treated as attribution evidence. In triage, local account enumeration is most meaningful when combined with host criticality, user role, session origin, and nearby activity in the intrusion timeline.
MITRE does not provide official detection guidance for this object. This take uses the official description, platforms, tactics, external references, the DET0303 detection-strategy relationship, and the M1028 mitigation relationship. Local environment baselines are required to separate normal administration from suspicious discovery.
Local Account
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.
Commands such as net user and net localgroup of the Net utility and id and groups on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups.[1][2][3] On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the /etc/passwd file. On macOS, the dscl . list /Users command can be used to enumerate local accounts. On ESXi servers, the `esxcli system account list` command can list local user accounts.[4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1087 | Account Discovery | This object subtechnique of Account Discovery. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0004: Ke3chang
G1009: Moses Staff
Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand.[1]
Security researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.[2]
G1051: Medusa Group
Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” [1] [2] Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. [3] For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. [4]
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G0096: APT41
APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.[1] Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.[2][3]
G0030: Lotus Blossom
Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.[1][2][3]
G0050: APT32
APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]
G1017: Volt Typhoon
Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].
Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]
G1044: APT42
APT42 is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance.[1] The group primarily focuses on targets in the Middle East region, but has targeted a variety of industries and countries since at least 2015.[1] APT42 starts cyber operations through spearphishing emails and/or the PINEFLOWER Android malware, then monitors and collects information from the compromised systems and devices.[1] Finally, APT42 exfiltrates data using native features and open-source tools.[2]
APT42 activities have been linked to Magic Hound by other commercial vendors. While there are behavior and software overlaps between Magic Hound and APT42, they appear to be distinct entities and are tracked as separate entities by their originating vendor.
G1039: RedCurl
RedCurl is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks.[1] RedCurl is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor.[1][2] The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers.
G0114: Chimera
G0010: Turla
Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]
S0452: USBferry
USBferry is an information stealing malware and has been used by Tropic Trooper in targeted attacks against Taiwanese and Philippine air-gapped military environments. USBferry shares an overlapping codebase with YAHOYAH, though it has several features which makes it a distinct piece of malware.[1]
S0331: Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla is a spyware Trojan written for the .NET framework that has been observed since at least 2014.[1][2][3]
S0236: Kwampirs
S0039: Net
The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]
Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.
S9001: SystemBC
SystemBC is a malware family offered as a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) that is used to establish command and control and facilitate follow-on activity, including ransomware deployment.SystemBC executes a variety of tasks including setting up SOCKS5 proxies, maintaining persistence, ingesting malicious files, and handing C2 communication. SystemBC was first detected in 2018, and has been used by Wizard Spider since at least 2020, and by FIN7 since at least 2022.[1][2][3][4][5]
S0196: PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY is a backdoor malware used by FIN8 that has been observed targeting POS networks in the hospitality industry. [1][2] [3]
S1146: MgBot
S0223: POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by MuddyWater. [1]
S0038: Duqu
S0049: GeminiDuke
GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012. [1]
S1242: Qilin
Qilin is a ransomware family operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022. It includes variants written in Go and Rust capable of targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments. Qilin shares functionality overlaps with Black Basta, REvil, and BlackCat ransomware. Qilin affiliates have targeted multiple entities worldwide with the majority of victims in the US, France, Canada, and the UK, primarily in the manufacturing, technology, financial services, and healthcare sectors.[1][2][3][4][5]
S0165: OSInfo
C0061: Operation Digital Eye
Operation Digital Eye was conducted in June and July of 2024 by suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus threat actors targeting business-to-business IT service providers in Southern Europe. Operation Digital Eye activity included the use of Visual Studio Code tunnels for command and control (C2) and custom lateral movement capabilities. Overlaps in tooling between Digital Eye and previous China-nexus campaigns, Operation Soft Cell and Operation Tainted Love, indicate the potential use of shared vendors or digital quartermasters.[1]
C0012: Operation CuckooBees
Operation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.5 | Current bundle | 4d8b5218e79c… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Mandiant APT1
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
Open source URL -
[2]
id man page
MacKenzie, D. and Robbins, A. (n.d.). id(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved January 11, 2024.
Open source URL -
[3]
groups man page
MacKenzie, D. and Youngman, J. (n.d.). groups(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved January 11, 2024.
Open source URL -
[4]
Crowdstrike Hypervisor Jackpotting Pt 2 2021
Michael Dawson. (2021, August 30). Hypervisor Jackpotting, Part 2: eCrime Actors Increase Targeting of ESXi Servers with Ransomware. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
Open source URL -
[5]
Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL
Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL -
[6]
mitre-attack T1087.001Open source URL
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