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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

EnterpriseG0016GroupObject v6.2 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

APT29 is a high-priority threat group profile because ATT&CK ties it to long-running espionage activity, government and research targeting, and the SolarWinds supply-chain compromise. For leaders, the decision value is not the name alone; it is whether identity systems, software supply chains, email defenses, endpoint monitoring, and incident response playbooks can withstand stealthy access, credential theft, API abuse, and use of legitimate administrative tools.

Executive priority

Treat this object as a strategic readiness benchmark for advanced intrusion scenarios. The supplied relationships point to risk areas that materially affect business continuity and audit defensibility: third-party software trust, build/update integrity, Windows credential exposure, privileged remote execution, cloud or API activity review, and phishing-driven initial access. Executives should ask whether the organization can prove coverage across identity, endpoint, email, network egress, and software supply-chain monitoring rather than relying on attribution labels after an incident.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not provide a detection section, platforms, or tactics for the group itself, so defenders should validate coverage through the related campaigns and software. The relationships show use of credential dumping tooling such as Mimikatz, remote execution and administration utilities such as PsExec and Net, discovery utilities such as Tasklist, Systeminfo, and ipconfig, multiple APT29-associated Windows backdoors, and cross-platform tools or anonymization components including Cobalt Strike, Tor, and meek. The SolarWinds campaign relationship also highlights password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and compromise of a software build/update process as areas for defensive validation.

Likely telemetry

  • Identity provider and directory authentication logs, especially failed login patterns consistent with password spraying and successful use after failures.
  • Token, session, OAuth/API, and cloud or SaaS audit logs where available, because the SolarWinds relationship includes token theft and API abuse.
  • Endpoint process creation, command-line, module load, credential access, service creation, and remote execution telemetry on Windows systems.
  • EDR/AV detections and file/process evidence for named malware and tools related to this group, including Mimikatz, PsExec, Cobalt Strike, and APT29-associated backdoors.
  • Email security, attachment, macro, and user-reporting telemetry relevant to spear phishing and document-based delivery noted in related software descriptions.

Detection direction

  • Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this group, build detections from the related behaviors and tools rather than from the group name alone.
  • Correlate identity anomalies with endpoint execution and network egress; password spraying, token misuse, and API abuse may not be visible in endpoint-only monitoring.
  • Tune carefully for dual-use tools such as PsExec, Net, Tasklist, Systeminfo, ipconfig, SDelete, Cobalt Strike, Tor, and meek. Baseline legitimate administrative use, then alert on abnormal users, hosts, timing, destinations, or privilege context.
  • Prioritize credential-theft visibility around Windows endpoints and privileged accounts because Mimikatz is a related software object.
  • Validate detections for remote execution and lateral administration, especially service creation, SMB/admin share activity, and command execution patterns associated with legitimate tools used outside approved workflows.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with identity controls: enforce strong authentication for privileged and remote access, monitor password spraying indicators, and reduce token/session exposure where feasible.
  • Harden privileged Windows environments by limiting credential material exposure, restricting administrative tool use, and monitoring remote execution paths.
  • Control and monitor email-based delivery paths, including document attachments and macro-enabled content where business policy allows.
  • Strengthen egress governance and logging so unusual HTTPS tunneling, anonymization, or web-service-based command-and-control patterns can be investigated.
  • Improve software supply-chain assurance for critical products and internal build systems, including access control, change control, signing governance, and artifact integrity review.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on the official ATT&CK APT29 group object, its aliases, external references, and supplied relationships to campaigns and software. The most decision-relevant relationship is the SolarWinds Compromise, which links this group to supply-chain compromise and identity/API-related activity. The software relationships also show a mix of custom malware, credential theft, discovery utilities, administrative tools, anonymization software, and post-exploitation tooling.

The group object has no official ATT&CK detection text, no listed tactics, and no group-level platforms. Platform references in this take come only from related software objects and should not be interpreted as complete platform coverage. Local telemetry, architecture, cloud providers, identity design, and administrative practices are required to determine real exposure or detection maturity.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

48 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

APT29 has used repeated MFA requests to gain access to victim accounts.CitationSuspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the GlobeCitationNCSC et al APT29 2024
Enterprise T1003.002 Security Account Manager Sub-technique

APT29 has used the `reg save` command to save registry hives.CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1588.002 Tool Sub-technique

APT29 has obtained and used a variety of tools including Mimikatz, SDelete, Tor, meek, and Cobalt Strike.CitationMandiant No Easy BreachCitationF-Secure The DukesCitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1090.004 Domain Fronting Sub-technique

APT29 has used the meek domain fronting plugin for Tor to hide the destination of C2 traffic.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach
Enterprise T1528 Steal Application Access Token

APT29 uses stolen tokens to access victim accounts, without needing a password.CitationNCSC et al APT29 2024
Enterprise T1568 Dynamic Resolution

APT29 has used Dynamic DNS providers for their malware C2 infrastructure.CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

APT29 has exploited CVE-2021-36934 to escalate privileges on a compromised host.CitationESET T3 Threat Report 2021
Enterprise T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Sub-technique

APT29 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach
Enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique

APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach
Enterprise T1136.003 Cloud Account Sub-technique

APT29 can create new users through Azure AD.CitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021
Enterprise T1098.005 Device Registration Sub-technique

APT29 has enrolled their own devices into compromised cloud tenants, including enrolling a device in MFA to an Azure AD environment following a successful password guessing attack against a dormant account.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022CitationNCSC et al APT29 2024
Enterprise T1587.003 Digital Certificates Sub-technique

APT29 has created self-signed digital certificates to enable mutual TLS authentication for malware.CitationPWC WellMess July 2020CitationPWC WellMess C2 August 2020
Enterprise T1005 Data from Local System

APT29 has stolen data from compromised hosts.CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

APT29 has downloaded additional tools and malware onto compromised networks.CitationMandiant No Easy BreachCitationPWC WellMess July 2020CitationF-Secure The DukesCitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1651 Cloud Administration Command

APT29 has used Azure Run Command and Azure Admin-on-Behalf-of (AOBO) to execute code on virtual machines.CitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

APT29 has used spearphishing emails with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.CitationF-Secure The DukesCitationMSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021CitationESET T3 Threat Report 2021CitationSecureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile
Enterprise T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Sub-technique

APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD and has used `Service Principal` credentials in Exchange.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1053.005 Scheduled Task Sub-technique

APT29 has used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach
Enterprise T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery Sub-technique

APT29 has ensured web servers in a victim environment are Internet accessible before copying tools or malware to it.CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1587.001 Malware Sub-technique

APT29 has used unique malware in many of their operations.CitationF-Secure The DukesCitationMandiant No Easy BreachCitationMSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1583.006 Web Services Sub-technique

APT29 has registered algorithmically generated Twitter handles that are used for C2 by malware, such as HAMMERTOSS. APT29 has also used legitimate web services such as Dropbox and Constant Contact in their operations.CitationFireEye APT29CitationMSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021
Enterprise T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy Sub-technique

A backdoor used by APT29 created a Tor hidden service to forward traffic from the Tor client to local ports 3389 (RDP), 139 (Netbios), and 445 (SMB) enabling full remote access from outside the network and has also used TOR.CitationMandiant No Easy BreachCitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021
Enterprise T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

APT29 has hijacked legitimate application-specific startup scripts to enable malware to execute on system startup.CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1027.006 HTML Smuggling Sub-technique

APT29 has embedded an ISO file within an HTML attachment that contained JavaScript code to initiate malware execution.CitationESET T3 Threat Report 2021
Enterprise T1070.004 File Deletion Sub-technique

APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach
Enterprise T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

APT29 has used multiple software exploits for common client software, like Microsoft Word, Exchange, and Adobe Reader, to gain code execution.CitationF-Secure The DukesCitationCybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021CitationMSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021
Enterprise T1550.003 Pass the Ticket Sub-technique

APT29 used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach
Enterprise T1204.001 Malicious Link Sub-technique

APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to click on a malicious link.CitationMSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021CitationSecureworks IRON RITUAL USAID Phish May 2021
Enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique

APT29 has renamed malicious DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign; they have also created an Azure AD certificate with a Common Name that matched the display name of the compromised service principal.CitationSentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
Enterprise T1110.003 Password Spraying Sub-technique

APT29 has conducted brute force password spray attacks.CitationMSRC Nobelium June 2021CitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021CitationNCSC et al APT29 2024
Enterprise T1114.002 Remote Email Collection Sub-technique

APT29 has collected emails from targeted mailboxes within a compromised Azure AD tenant and compromised Exchange servers, including via Exchange Web Services (EWS) API requests.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1027.001 Binary Padding Sub-technique

APT29 used large size files to avoid detection by security solutions with hardcoded size limits.CitationSentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021
Enterprise T1556.007 Hybrid Identity Sub-technique

APT29 has edited the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost.exe.config` file to load a malicious DLL into the AD FS process, thereby enabling persistent access to any service federated with AD FS for a user with a specified User Principal Name.CitationMagicWeb
Enterprise T1059.001 PowerShell Sub-technique

APT29 has used encoded PowerShell scripts uploaded to CozyCar installations to download and install SeaDuke.CitationSymantec Seaduke 2015CitationMandiant No Easy BreachCitationESET T3 Threat Report 2021CitationSecureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile
Enterprise T1133 External Remote Services

APT29 has used compromised identities to access networks via VPNs and Citrix.CitationNCSC APT29 July 2020CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
Enterprise T1037.004 RC Scripts Sub-technique

APT29 has installed a run command on a compromised system to enable malware execution on system startup.CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1021.007 Cloud Services Sub-technique

APT29 has leveraged compromised high-privileged on-premises accounts synced to Office 365 to move laterally into a cloud environment, including through the use of Azure AD PowerShell.CitationMandiant Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365
Enterprise T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning Sub-technique

APT29 has conducted widespread scanning of target environments to identify vulnerabilities for exploit.CitationCybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021
Enterprise T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Sub-technique

APT29 has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files.CitationMandiant No Easy BreachCitationMSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021CitationSecureworks IRON RITUAL USAID Phish May 2021
Enterprise T1070.006 Timestomp Sub-technique

APT29 has used timestomping to alter the Standard Information timestamps on their web shells to match other files in the same directory.CitationMandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22
Enterprise T1586.003 Cloud Accounts Sub-technique

APT29 has used residential proxies, including Azure Virtual Machines, to obfuscate their access to victim environments.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
Enterprise T1090.002 External Proxy Sub-technique

APT29 uses compromised residential endpoints as proxies for defense evasion and network access.CitationNCSC et al APT29 2024
Enterprise T1573 Encrypted Channel

APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication.CitationSecureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile
Enterprise T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

APT29 used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.CitationMandiant No Easy Breach
Enterprise T1110.001 Password Guessing Sub-technique

APT29 has successfully conducted password guessing attacks against a list of mailboxes.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
Enterprise T1199 Trusted Relationship

APT29 has compromised IT, cloud services, and managed services providers to gain broad access to multiple customers for subsequent operations.CitationMSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021
Enterprise T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service Sub-technique

APT29 has used the legitimate mailing service Constant Contact to send phishing e-mails.CitationMSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021
Enterprise T1078 Valid Accounts

APT29 has used a compromised account to access an organization's VPN infrastructure.CitationMandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0118: UNC2452

UNC2452 is a suspected Russian state-sponsored threat group responsible for the 2020 SolarWinds software supply chain intrusion.[1] Victims of this campaign include government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.[1] The group also compromised at least one think tank by late 2019.[2]

Revoked/deprecated
Tool Enterprise

S0684: ROADTools

ROADTools is a framework for enumerating Azure Active Directory environments. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.[1]

Identity Provider
Malware Enterprise

S0046: CozyCar

CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. [1]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0175: meek

meek is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.

LinuxWindowsmacOS
Tool Enterprise

S0057: Tasklist

The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. [1]

Malware Enterprise

S0150: POSHSPY

POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. [1]

Windows
Campaign Enterprise

C0024: SolarWinds Compromise

The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]

Campaign Enterprise

C0023: Operation Ghost

Operation Ghost was an APT29 campaign starting in 2013 that included operations against ministries of foreign affairs in Europe and the Washington, D.C. embassy of a European Union country. During Operation Ghost, APT29 used new families of malware and leveraged web services, steganography, and unique C2 infrastructure for each victim.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Malware S0048: PinchDuke Enterprise uses · Tool S0684: ROADTools Enterprise uses · Malware S0515: WellMail Enterprise uses · Malware S0046: CozyCar Enterprise uses · Tool S0002: Mimikatz Enterprise uses · Technique T1621: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Enterprise uses · Tool S0175: meek Enterprise uses · Malware S0682: TrailBlazer Enterprise uses · Tool S0057: Tasklist Enterprise uses · Malware S0052: OnionDuke Enterprise uses · Technique T1003.002: Security Account Manager Enterprise uses · Technique T1588.002: Tool Enterprise uses · Malware S0512: FatDuke Enterprise uses · Technique T1090.004: Domain Fronting Enterprise uses · Technique T1528: Steal Application Access Token Enterprise uses · Technique T1568: Dynamic Resolution Enterprise uses · Technique T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Enterprise uses · Malware S0150: POSHSPY Enterprise uses · Malware S0634: EnvyScout Enterprise uses · Technique T1546.003: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Enterprise uses · Technique T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Enterprise uses · Malware S0516: SoreFang Enterprise uses · Technique T1136.003: Cloud Account Enterprise uses · Malware S0049: GeminiDuke Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
6.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
66bfb5ded9ef751f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 6.2 Current bundle 66bfb5ded9ef…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021

    White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021

    UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    F-Secure The Dukes

    F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR

    Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Crowdstrike DNC June 2016

    Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021

    UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021

    NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021

    UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020

    FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021

    Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021

    CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Volexity SolarWinds

    Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021

    NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020

    Unit 42. (2020, December 23). SolarStorm Supply Chain Attack Timeline. Retrieved March 24, 2023.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    APT29

    (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)

  16. [16]
    Blue Kitsune

    (Citation: PWC WellMess July 2020)(Citation: PWC WellMess C2 August 2020)

  17. [17]
    Cozy Bear

    (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

  18. [18]
    CozyDuke

    (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)

  19. [19]
    CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022

    CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Dark Halo

    (Citation: Volexity SolarWinds)

  21. [21]
    ESET Dukes October 2019

    Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    FireEye APT29 Nov 2018

    Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    IRON HEMLOCK

    (Citation: Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile)

  24. [24]
    IRON RITUAL

    (Citation: Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile)

  25. [25]
    MSRC Nobelium June 2021

    MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021

    MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22

    Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023

    Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018

    Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Midnight Blizzard

    (Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)

  32. [32]
    NCSC APT29 July 2020

    National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    NOBELIUM

    (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021)

  34. [34]
    NobleBaron

    (Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)

  35. [35]
    PWC WellMess C2 August 2020

    PWC. (2020, August 17). WellMess malware: analysis of its Command and Control (C2) server. Retrieved September 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    PWC WellMess July 2020

    PWC. (2020, July 16). How WellMess malware has been used to target COVID-19 vaccines. Retrieved September 24, 2020.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile

    Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON HEMLOCK. Retrieved February 22, 2022.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile

    Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON RITUAL. Retrieved February 24, 2022.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021

    Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    SolarStorm

    (Citation: Unit 42 SolarStorm December 2020)

  41. [41]
    The Dukes

    (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)

  42. [42]
    UNC2452

    (Citation: FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020)

  43. [43]
    UNC3524

    (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)

  44. [44]
    YTTRIUM

    (Citation: Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018)

  45. [45]
    mitre-attack G0016
    Open source URL
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