T1587.001: Malware
Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.[1][2][3][4]
During malware development, adversaries may intentionally include indicators aligned with other known actors in order to mislead attribution by defenders.[5][6][7]
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.
Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of Web Services.[8]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Malware development matters because it is the adversary investment that often happens before your organization sees an intrusion. ATT&CK places this in Resource Development on the PRE platform: payloads, droppers, backdoors, packers, C2 protocols, infected removable media, and even misleading indicators can be built before targeting. For leaders, the key point is that this behavior is not fully controllable inside the perimeter; readiness depends on threat intelligence, malware analysis, exposure reduction, and incident response playbooks that can handle new or customized tooling.
Executive priority
Treat this as a preparedness and resilience issue rather than a single alerting problem. The relationship context links this technique to multiple espionage and intrusion campaigns, including supply-chain, network-device, financial, government, energy, aviation, healthcare, and safety-system contexts. Executives should ask whether the organization can rapidly assess unfamiliar malware, preserve evidence, make containment decisions, and prove due diligence through pre-compromise controls and intelligence-driven monitoring. Attribution should be handled cautiously because ATT&CK notes adversaries may intentionally include indicators meant to mislead defenders.
Technical view
This is sub-technique T1587.001 under Develop Capabilities and is mapped to Resource Development / PRE, so much of the activity occurs outside the defender’s environment. SOC and IR teams should not expect complete visibility from internal logs alone. Validate the full chain: external intelligence intake, malware sample handling, sandbox or reverse-engineering workflow, endpoint and network detections once malware is delivered or executed, C2-related monitoring, and procedures for removable-media scenarios where applicable. The supplied relationship DET0872 indicates a detection strategy for malware, but the ATT&CK object provides no official detection text, so local detection logic must be derived from observed samples, behaviors, and infrastructure indicators.
Likely telemetry
- Threat intelligence reporting on malware families, custom tools, C2 infrastructure, and actor tradecraft
- Malware samples, hashes, static and dynamic analysis results, and sandbox artifacts when available
- Endpoint security telemetry showing payload execution, droppers, backdoors, packers, or post-compromise tool behavior after delivery
- Network telemetry for suspected C2 protocols, unusual web service use, and outbound communications associated with malware behavior
- Email, web, and removable-media security evidence when malware is delivered through those paths
Detection direction
- Because this is PRE-stage resource development, validate that coverage is not measured only by internal alert volume; many signals may come from threat intelligence and malware analysis before direct exposure.
- Tune detections around malware behaviors and infrastructure patterns rather than relying only on names, hashes, or assumed attribution, since ATT&CK notes adversaries may plant misleading indicators.
- Confirm that unknown or custom malware can be escalated for analysis and converted into durable detections for endpoint, network, and incident response workflows.
- Review blind spots around network devices, managed service provider dependencies, cloud or web-service based C2 paths, and removable media where those are relevant to the environment.
- Use campaign and group relationships as prioritization context, not proof of local exposure or attribution.
Mitigation priorities
- Apply the related M1056 Pre-compromise mitigation concept: reduce attack surface, identify adversarial preparation activity where possible, and increase the cost of successful operations.
- Prioritize intelligence-led exposure management for sectors, technologies, and business processes that match known campaign contexts in ATT&CK relationships.
- Maintain malware analysis and incident response readiness so unfamiliar payloads can be triaged, contained, and translated into detection content quickly.
- Harden delivery and execution paths likely to matter locally, including endpoint controls, network egress governance, removable-media handling, and monitoring of externally exposed or managed infrastructure.
- For organizations with operational technology or safety implications, include malware-driven scenarios in cyber-physical response planning and executive decision exercises.
Analyst notes and limits
This technique is broadly applicable and relationship-rich: ATT&CK links it to multiple campaigns and groups using custom or developed malware capabilities. The most important defender takeaway is preparation for novelty: custom malware may not initially match known signatures, and misleading artifacts can distort attribution. Glexia would use this object to drive questions about intelligence collection, malware triage capacity, detection engineering feedback loops, and executive incident decision-making.
The official ATT&CK object provides no detection text and identifies the platform as PRE, meaning direct enterprise telemetry may be limited until malware is delivered, executed, or observed externally. The relationship list supports broad relevance but does not establish that any specific organization is targeted or exposed. Local architecture, sector, suppliers, remote access paths, and available telemetry are required to determine practical coverage.
Malware
Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.[1][2][3][4]
During malware development, adversaries may intentionally include indicators aligned with other known actors in order to mislead attribution by defenders.[5][6][7]
As with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.
Some aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of Web Services.[8]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1587 | Develop Capabilities | This object subtechnique of Develop Capabilities. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
G1016: FIN13
G1036: Moonstone Sleet
Moonstone Sleet is a North Korean-linked threat actor executing both financially motivated attacks and espionage operations. The group previously overlapped significantly with another North Korean-linked entity, Lazarus Group, but has differentiated its tradecraft since 2023. Moonstone Sleet is notable for creating fake companies and personas to interact with victim entities, as well as developing unique malware such as a variant delivered via a fully functioning game.[1]
G0119: Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. Indrik Spider initially started with the Dridex banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, Indrik Spider changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.[1][2][3]
G0032: Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]
G1052: Contagious Interview
Contagious Interview is a North Korea–aligned threat group active since 2023. The group conducts both cyberespionage and financially motivated operations, including the theft of cryptocurrency and user credentials. Contagious Interview targets Windows, Linux, and macOS systems, with a particular focus on individuals engaged in software development and cryptocurrency-related activities. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G1048: UNC3886
UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.[1][2]
G1014: LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.[1][2]
G1054: MirrorFace
MirrorFace is a People's Republic of China (PRC)-aligned cyberespionage actor believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools, and infrastructure overlaps. MirrorFace has been active since at least 2019, at first exclusively targeting Japanese organizations across the media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing, and academic sectors. Subsequent MirrorFace operations included targets in Central Europe and featured use of LODEINFO, HiddenFace, and UPPERCUT malware.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
G1045: Salt Typhoon
Salt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-backed actor that has been active since at least 2019 and responsible for numerous compromises of network infrastructure at major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers (ISP).[1][2]
C0014: Operation Wocao
Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]
Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]
C0056: RedPenguin
The RedPenguin project was launched by Juniper in July 2024 to investigate reported malware infections of Juniper MX Series routers. RedPenguin activity was separately attributed to UNC3886 and included the deployment of multiple custom versions of the publicly-available TINYSHELL backdoor on Juniper routers.[1][2]
C0060: Operation AkaiRyū
Operation AkaiRyū (Japanese for RedDragon) was a cyberespionage spearphishing campaign conducted by MirrorFace between June and September 2024 against entities in Japan and Central Europe. Operation AkaiRyū notably included the first reported targeting of a European entity by MirrorFace, as well as their use of UPPERCUT, which was thought to be exclusive to menuPass.[1][2]
C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks
2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]
C0024: SolarWinds Compromise
The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]
C0059: Salesforce Data Exfiltration
The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as "The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.[1][2]
C0023: Operation Ghost
Operation Ghost was an APT29 campaign starting in 2013 that included operations against ministries of foreign affairs in Europe and the Washington, D.C. embassy of a European Union country. During Operation Ghost, APT29 used new families of malware and leveraged web services, steganography, and unique C2 infrastructure for each victim.[1]
C0030: Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack
Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack was a campaign employed by TEMP.Veles which leveraged the Triton malware framework against a petrochemical organization.[1] The malware and techniques used within this campaign targeted specific Triconex Safety Controllers within the environment.[2] The incident was eventually discovered due to a safety trip that occurred as a result of an issue in the malware.[3]
C0046: ArcaneDoor
ArcaneDoor is a campaign targeting networking devices from Cisco and other vendors between July 2023 and April 2024, primarily focused on government and critical infrastructure networks. ArcaneDoor is associated with the deployment of the custom backdoors Line Runner and Line Dancer. ArcaneDoor is attributed to a group referred to as UAT4356 or STORM-1849, and is assessed to be a state-sponsored campaign.[1][2]
C0010: C0010
C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.[1]
C0044: Juicy Mix
C0004: CostaRicto
CostaRicto was a suspected hacker-for-hire cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries worldwide, with a large number being financial institutions. CostaRicto actors targeted organizations in Europe, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Africa, with a large concentration in South Asia (especially India, Bangladesh, and Singapore), using custom malware, open source tools, and a complex network of proxies and SSH tunnels.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.3 | Current bundle | 47ecb0e812a3… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
Mandiant APT1
Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
Open source URL -
[2]
Kaspersky Sofacy
Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
Open source URL -
[3]
ActiveMalwareEnergy
Dan Goodin. (2014, June 30). Active malware operation let attackers sabotage US energy industry. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
Open source URL -
[4]
FBI Flash FIN7 USB
The Record. (2022, January 7). FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies with BadUSB devices to install ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.
Open source URL -
[5]
Olympic Destroyer
Paul Rascagneres, Martin Lee. (2018, February 26). Who Wasn’t Responsible for Olympic Destroyer?. Retrieved June 14, 2025.
Open source URL -
[6]
Risky Bulletin Threat actor impersonates FSB APT
Catalin Cimpanu. (2025, January 22). Risky Bulletin: Threat actor impersonates FSB APT for months to target Russian orgs. Retrieved June 14, 2025.
Open source URL -
[7]
GamaCopy organization
Knownsec 404 Advanced Threat Intelligence team. (2025, January 21). Love and hate under war: The GamaCopy organization, which imitates the Russian Gamaredon, uses military — related bait to launch attacks on Russia. Retrieved June 14, 2025.
Open source URL -
[8]
FireEye APT29
FireEye Labs. (2015, July). HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat Group. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL -
[9]
mitre-attack T1587.001Open source URL
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