T1621: Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
Adversaries in possession of credentials to Valid Accounts may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).[1]
In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”[2][3][4]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
This technique matters because MFA can become a decision point for an attacker rather than a barrier. If an adversary already has a valid password, repeated push, SMS, phone, or SSPR-triggered MFA requests may pressure a user into approving access. For leaders, the issue is not whether MFA exists, but whether identity controls, user reporting paths, and SOC monitoring can distinguish legitimate sign-in friction from coercive request generation.
Executive priority
Prioritize this as an identity-resilience and incident-readiness control gap. MFA request abuse can affect Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS, SaaS, Office Suite, and Identity Provider environments, so ownership often spans IAM, cloud, endpoint, help desk, and SOC teams. Executives should ask: are MFA and SSPR events centrally logged, are repeated prompts investigated quickly, are users trained to report unexpected prompts, and do account-use policies limit repeated authentication attempts? This is also relevant audit evidence for proving MFA is operationally monitored, not merely deployed.
Technical view
T1621 is a credential-access technique focused on generating MFA requests to bypass the second factor after credentials are obtained, or by abusing automatic push generation in self-service password reset configurations. ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object, but a related detection strategy, DET0160, is listed. SOC and detection teams should validate coverage around anomalous MFA challenge volume, repeated denied or ignored prompts, eventual approval after multiple requests, suspicious SSPR-triggered MFA activity, and sign-in attempts against valid accounts across identity providers, SaaS, office suites, IaaS, and supported operating system contexts. Relationship context shows ATT&CK has associated this behavior with C0027 and groups including APT29, LAPSUS$, and Scattered Spider; use that as threat-intelligence prioritization context, not as proof of local exposure.
Likely telemetry
- Identity provider authentication logs, including successful and failed sign-ins
- MFA challenge generation, approval, denial, timeout, SMS, phone, and push notification events
- Self-service password reset logs and related MFA prompt activity
- Valid account usage records tied to unusual authentication sequences
- Account lockout, failed login, and repeated authentication attempt events
Detection direction
- Confirm that MFA request events are collected with enough detail to link user, device, source, application, result, timestamp, and request type.
- Tune analytics for repeated MFA prompts over short periods, especially where multiple denials, timeouts, or ignored prompts precede an approval.
- Correlate MFA prompt spikes with valid-account sign-in attempts and SSPR activity rather than treating MFA approvals as inherently benign.
- Establish triage logic for expected false positives such as user lockouts, device migrations, travel, enrollment changes, or legitimate SSPR use.
- Use DET0160 as the ATT&CK-linked detection-strategy reference, but validate locally because the supplied ATT&CK object does not include official detection guidance.
Mitigation priorities
- Strengthen MFA implementation and configuration under M1032 so MFA is consistently required for critical systems and services and resistant to automatic request abuse where supported by local technology.
- Apply M1036 account-use policies such as lockout mechanisms, restrictions on account use, and session/inactivity controls to reduce repeated authentication opportunities.
- Review SSPR configurations because the ATT&CK description specifically notes abuse of automatic push notification generation when SSPR is configured.
- Implement M1017 user training focused on recognizing unexpected MFA prompts, not approving them, and reporting them through a clear channel.
- Make MFA prompt abuse part of incident response playbooks: reset credentials, review recent sign-ins, inspect SSPR activity, and verify whether access was granted after repeated prompts.
Analyst notes and limits
The key defensive lesson is that MFA deployment alone is not sufficient evidence of identity security. Coverage depends on prompt-level telemetry, correlation with sign-in and SSPR events, user reporting behavior, and enforceable account-use policies. This technique is especially material for organizations heavily dependent on SaaS, Office Suite, IaaS, and centralized identity providers.
The official ATT&CK object does not provide detection text, and the supplied relationship context includes only a named detection strategy without its detailed logic. Specific thresholds, MFA configuration options, and platform-native controls must be validated against the organization’s identity provider, SaaS, IaaS, and logging architecture. Group and campaign relationships indicate ATT&CK-documented use, not current activity or local targeting.
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
Adversaries in possession of credentials to Valid Accounts may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).[1]
In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”[2][3][4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0016: APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]
G1015: Scattered Spider
Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]
G1004: LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.[1][2][3]
C0027: C0027
C0027 was a financially-motivated campaign linked to Scattered Spider that targeted telecommunications and business process outsourcing (BPO) companies from at least June through December of 2022. During C0027 Scattered Spider used various forms of social engineering, performed SIM swapping, and attempted to leverage access from victim environments to mobile carrier networks.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 13cc63dc98d9… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023
Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
Open source URL -
[2]
Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu
Catalin Cimpanu. (2021, December 9). Russian hackers bypass 2FA by annoying victims with repeated push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022.
Open source URL -
[3]
MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger
Jessica Haworth. (2022, February 16). MFA fatigue attacks: Users tricked into allowing device access due to overload of push notifications. Retrieved March 31, 2022.
Open source URL -
[4]
Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe
Luke Jenkins, Sarah Hawley, Parnian Najafi, Doug Bienstock. (2021, December 6). Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe. Retrieved April 15, 2022.
Open source URL -
[5]
mitre-attack T1621Open source URL
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