T1027.001: Binary Padding
Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.
Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.[1] The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.[2] Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.[3]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Binary Padding matters because it can make malicious files look different on disk without changing how they run. That weakens defenses that rely too heavily on file hashes, static signatures, or tools with file-size scanning limits. For leaders, the issue is not just malware detection; it is whether the organization can still collect, scan, triage, and preserve oversized or altered binaries during an incident.
Executive priority
Prioritize validation of endpoint, email, web, and malware-analysis controls that handle large files across Windows, macOS, and Linux. Ask whether hash-based blocklists are treated as one layer rather than the primary control, whether oversized suspicious files are still retained for investigation, and whether SOC evidence can prove that file-size limits are understood and governed. This supports incident readiness, audit evidence, and resilience against stealth techniques under ATT&CK T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information.
Technical view
Binary Padding is a stealth sub-technique of Obfuscated Files or Information affecting Linux, macOS, and Windows. Defenders should validate that security tooling does not skip or truncate analysis of unusually large executables or files with appended junk data. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for this object, detection engineering should use relationship context, especially DET0553, and test whether endpoint, sandbox, static analysis, and collection workflows still process padded binaries. Related ATT&CK relationships show this technique has been associated with multiple groups and malware families, so it should be treated as a cross-platform evasion behavior rather than a single-tool indicator.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint file creation and modification events, including file size and path
- Executable metadata, file hashes, and hash changes across versions
- Malware scanning, EDR, sandbox, and static-analysis verdict logs
- Security-tool events showing skipped, truncated, or size-limited scans
- File collection and quarantine records from incident response workflows
Detection direction
- Inventory file-size limits across EDR, AV, sandboxing, email security, web security, and public/private malware-analysis workflows.
- Alert or hunt for suspicious executables with abnormal size growth, appended data, or repeated checksum changes where functionality appears unchanged.
- Avoid depending only on hash blocklists or static signatures; validate behavioral and metadata-based detections as compensating coverage.
- Tune carefully for legitimate large binaries, installers, archives, and software updates to reduce false positives.
- Use DET0553 as the ATT&CK-provided detection-strategy relationship, but confirm the local telemetry and analytic logic before claiming coverage.
Mitigation priorities
- Reduce reliance on hash-only blocking by combining reputation, behavioral inspection, and controlled execution policies where appropriate.
- Configure security tools to scan, retain, or escalate large files rather than silently skipping them.
- Ensure incident response playbooks preserve oversized suspicious files for analysis when safe and policy-compliant.
- Review endpoint and gateway control limits across Linux, macOS, and Windows estates.
- Document file-size scanning limits and exceptions as compliance and operational-risk evidence.
Analyst notes and limits
The most important defensive question is whether padded files fall into a blind spot between collection, scanning, and analysis. This technique is especially relevant for SOC and IR readiness because it can interfere with triage and file reputation workflows even when the malware behavior itself is unchanged. ATT&CK relationships list multiple groups and software using this object, including Windows malware families, but those relationships should be used for context rather than assumptions about current exposure.
MITRE does not provide official detection guidance for this technique in the supplied object. The supplied platforms are Linux, macOS, and Windows, but many related software examples are Windows-specific. Any claim of detection coverage requires local validation of tool limits, telemetry retention, and analysis workflows.
Binary Padding
Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.
Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.[1] The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.[2] Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.[3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1009 | Binary Padding | Binary Padding revoked by this object. |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | This object subtechnique of Obfuscated Files or Information. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0065: Leviathan
Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.[1] Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.[1][2][3][4]
G0016: APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
G0002: Moafee
G0126: Higaisa
Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.[1][2][3]
G0040: Patchwork
Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.[1] [2][3][4]
G0060: BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]
G1024: Akira
Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.[1] Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement.[1][2] Akira operations are associated with "double extortion" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.[3][4][5]
S0586: TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE is a fully-featured beaconing implant integrated with command modules used by Lazarus Group. It was first reported in May 2020.[1]
S0367: Emotet
S0528: Javali
S0650: QakBot
S0433: Rifdoor
Rifdoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that shares numerous code similarities with HotCroissant.[1]
S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP
CHIMNEYSWEEP is a backdoor malware that was deployed during HomeLand Justice along with ROADSWEEP ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.[1]
S0531: Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Grandoreiro has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.[1][2]
S9016: Caminho
S0614: CostaBricks
CostaBricks is a loader that was used to deploy 32-bit backdoors in the CostaRicto campaign.[1]
S1185: LightSpy
First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.[1]
S0268: Bisonal
Bisonal is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Tonto Team against public and private sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan since at least December 2010.[1][2]
S0236: Kwampirs
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Current bundle | fdb49031ba89… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
ESET OceanLotus
Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.
Open source URL -
[2]
Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017
Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.
Open source URL -
[3]
VirusTotal FAQ
VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.
Open source URL -
[4]
mitre-attack T1027.001Open source URL
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