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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1027.001: Binary Padding

Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.

Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.[1] The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.[2] Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.[3]

EnterpriseT1027.001Sub-techniqueObject v2.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Binary Padding matters because it can make malicious files look different on disk without changing how they run. That weakens defenses that rely too heavily on file hashes, static signatures, or tools with file-size scanning limits. For leaders, the issue is not just malware detection; it is whether the organization can still collect, scan, triage, and preserve oversized or altered binaries during an incident.

Executive priority

Prioritize validation of endpoint, email, web, and malware-analysis controls that handle large files across Windows, macOS, and Linux. Ask whether hash-based blocklists are treated as one layer rather than the primary control, whether oversized suspicious files are still retained for investigation, and whether SOC evidence can prove that file-size limits are understood and governed. This supports incident readiness, audit evidence, and resilience against stealth techniques under ATT&CK T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information.

Technical view

Binary Padding is a stealth sub-technique of Obfuscated Files or Information affecting Linux, macOS, and Windows. Defenders should validate that security tooling does not skip or truncate analysis of unusually large executables or files with appended junk data. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for this object, detection engineering should use relationship context, especially DET0553, and test whether endpoint, sandbox, static analysis, and collection workflows still process padded binaries. Related ATT&CK relationships show this technique has been associated with multiple groups and malware families, so it should be treated as a cross-platform evasion behavior rather than a single-tool indicator.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint file creation and modification events, including file size and path
  • Executable metadata, file hashes, and hash changes across versions
  • Malware scanning, EDR, sandbox, and static-analysis verdict logs
  • Security-tool events showing skipped, truncated, or size-limited scans
  • File collection and quarantine records from incident response workflows

Detection direction

  • Inventory file-size limits across EDR, AV, sandboxing, email security, web security, and public/private malware-analysis workflows.
  • Alert or hunt for suspicious executables with abnormal size growth, appended data, or repeated checksum changes where functionality appears unchanged.
  • Avoid depending only on hash blocklists or static signatures; validate behavioral and metadata-based detections as compensating coverage.
  • Tune carefully for legitimate large binaries, installers, archives, and software updates to reduce false positives.
  • Use DET0553 as the ATT&CK-provided detection-strategy relationship, but confirm the local telemetry and analytic logic before claiming coverage.

Mitigation priorities

  • Reduce reliance on hash-only blocking by combining reputation, behavioral inspection, and controlled execution policies where appropriate.
  • Configure security tools to scan, retain, or escalate large files rather than silently skipping them.
  • Ensure incident response playbooks preserve oversized suspicious files for analysis when safe and policy-compliant.
  • Review endpoint and gateway control limits across Linux, macOS, and Windows estates.
  • Document file-size scanning limits and exceptions as compliance and operational-risk evidence.
Analyst notes and limits

The most important defensive question is whether padded files fall into a blind spot between collection, scanning, and analysis. This technique is especially relevant for SOC and IR readiness because it can interfere with triage and file reputation workflows even when the malware behavior itself is unchanged. ATT&CK relationships list multiple groups and software using this object, including Windows malware families, but those relationships should be used for context rather than assumptions about current exposure.

MITRE does not provide official detection guidance for this technique in the supplied object. The supplied platforms are Linux, macOS, and Windows, but many related software examples are Windows-specific. Any claim of detection coverage requires local validation of tool limits, telemetry retention, and analysis workflows.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Binary Padding

Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.

Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.[1] The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.[2] Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.[3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1009 Binary Padding Binary Padding revoked by this object.
Enterprise T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information This object subtechnique of Obfuscated Files or Information.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0065: Leviathan

Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.[1] Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

Group Enterprise

G0094: Kimsuky

Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]

DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.

Group Enterprise

G0002: Moafee

Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. [1]

Group Enterprise

G0126: Higaisa

Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0040: Patchwork

Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.[1] [2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G0060: BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G1024: Akira

Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.[1] Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement.[1][2] Akira operations are associated with "double extortion" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.[3][4][5]

Malware Enterprise

S0367: Emotet

Emotet is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as TrickBot and IcedID. Emotet first emerged in June 2014, initially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to multiple verticals over time.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0528: Javali

Javali is a banking trojan that has targeted Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries since 2017, primarily focusing on customers of financial institutions in Brazil and Mexico.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0650: QakBot

QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably ProLock and Egregor.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0531: Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Grandoreiro has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S9016: Caminho

Caminho is a downloader that has been used by threat actors since at least 2025 to deliver various strains of malware such as XWorm.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1185: LightSpy

First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.[1]

AndroidWindowsiOS
Malware Enterprise

S0268: Bisonal

Bisonal is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Tonto Team against public and private sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan since at least December 2010.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0236: Kwampirs

Kwampirs is a backdoor Trojan used by Orangeworm. Kwampirs has been found on machines which had software installed for the use and control of high-tech imaging devices such as X-Ray and MRI machines.[1] Kwampirs has multiple technical overlaps with Shamoon based on reverse engineering analysis.[2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
fdb49031ba89c172...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.0 Current bundle fdb49031ba89…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET OceanLotus

    Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017

    Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    VirusTotal FAQ

    VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attack T1027.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.