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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1693.001: System Firmware

System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.

An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.[1]

ICST1693.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1693.001: System Firmware describes System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upl...

Executive priority

T1693.001: System Firmware is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1693.001: System Firmware by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence, inhibit-response-function, impair-process-control), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1693.001: System Firmware appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

System Firmware

System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.

An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
ICST1693Modify FirmwareThis object subtechnique of Modify Firmware.
ICST0857System FirmwareSystem Firmware revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

CampaignICS

C0041: FrostyGoop Incident

FrostyGoop Incident took place in January 2024 against a municipal district heating company in Ukraine. Following initial access via likely exploitation of external facing services, FrostyGoop was used to manipulate ENCO control systems via legitimate Modbus commands to impact the delivery of heating services to Ukrainian civilians.[1][2]

CampaignICS

C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · CampaignC0041: FrostyGoop IncidentICSuses · CampaignC0028: 2015 Ukraine Electric Power AttackICSuses · CampaignC0063: 2025 Poland Wiper AttacksICSmitigates · MitigationM0937: Filter Network TrafficICSmitigates · MitigationM0930: Network SegmentationICSmitigates · MitigationM0801: Access ManagementICSmitigates · MitigationM0804: Human User AuthenticationICSmitigates · MitigationM0945: Code SigningICSmitigates · MitigationM0813: Software Process and Device AuthenticationICSmitigates · MitigationM0808: Encrypt Network TrafficICSmitigates · MitigationM0946: Boot IntegrityICSmitigates · MitigationM0951: Update SoftwareICSmitigates · MitigationM0941: Encrypt Sensitive InformationICSmitigates · MitigationM0807: Network AllowlistsICSmitigates · MitigationM0947: AuditICSmitigates · MitigationM0802: Communication AuthenticityICSuses · MalwareS1009: TritonICSsubtechnique of · TechniqueT1693: Modify FirmwareICStargets · ICS AssetA0017: Distributed Control System (DCS) ControllerICStargets · ICS AssetA0011: Virtual Private Network (VPN) ServerICStargets · ICS AssetA0009: Data GatewayICStargets · ICS AssetA0016: FirewallICStargets · ICS AssetA0003: Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)ICStargets · ICS AssetA0010: Safety ControllerICS
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationICS

M0937: Filter Network Traffic

Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]

MitigationICS

M0930: Network Segmentation

Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]

MitigationICS

M0801: Access Management

Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provide sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]

MitigationICS

M0804: Human User Authentication

Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and User Account Control.

MitigationICS

M0945: Code Signing

Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.

MitigationICS

M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication

Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.

MitigationICS

M0946: Boot Integrity

Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
55244e7df8cfaf3e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle55244e7df8cf…
19.11.0Older bundle55244e7df8cf…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Basnight, Zachry, et al.

    Basnight, Zachry, et al. 2013 Retrieved. 2017/10/17

  2. [2]
    mitre-attackT1693.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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