A0003: Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)

A PLC is the embedded controller that runs customized logic for an operational process. In practical risk terms, it is often where cyber access can become a physical or production-impacting event. The related ATT&CK techniques show why PLC coverage matters: adversaries may monitor process state, upload or download programs, modify tasking, parameters, alarms, or I/O behavior, force restart/shutdown, or disrupt device functionality.

Executive priority

Treat PLCs as critical operational assets, not just network endpoints. Leadership should ask whether the organization has a current inventory of PLCs, approved logic/configuration baselines, controlled engineering access, recoverable backups, and evidence that unauthorized program, mode, parameter, alarm, and I/O changes would be noticed. This is material for business continuity, OT incident response readiness, vulnerability prioritization, and compliance evidence around change control and safety-relevant operations.

Technical view

SOC, OT engineering, and IR teams should validate visibility around the PLC lifecycle: engineering workstation access, vendor programming activity, program upload/download events, online edits, program append activity, controller mode changes, firmware update mode activation, restart/shutdown events, parameter and alarm changes, and unusual I/O point changes. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection for this asset, coverage should be proven locally against the specific PLC models, programming tools, control protocols, historian/OPC sources, and network paths in use.

Likely telemetry

PLC asset inventory, firmware/software version, operating mode, and role in the process
Engineering workstation and jump host authentication, process execution, and vendor programming software usage logs
PLC program upload, download, online edit, program append, tasking, and configuration change records where available
Network traffic to and from PLCs, including native control protocol activity and OPC-related collection where present
Historian, OPC tag, and process state data used to detect unexpected reads or value changes

Detection direction

Build detections around deviations from approved maintenance windows, known engineering hosts, and authorized users rather than treating all PLC programming activity as malicious.
Compare running PLC logic, task associations, parameters, alarm settings, and configuration against approved baselines after maintenance and during investigations.
Alert on program download/upload, online edit, program append, mode changes, firmware update mode, restart/shutdown, and repeated I/O value changes when they occur outside expected procedures.
Correlate network discovery, port scan, broadcast discovery, sniffing indicators, and process-state monitoring with later PLC programming or configuration activity.
Account for false positives from legitimate engineering work, commissioning, testing, and emergency maintenance; require operational context before escalation decisions.

Mitigation priorities

Maintain an authoritative PLC inventory mapped to process criticality and recovery priority.
Restrict and monitor access to engineering workstations, jump hosts, vendor programming software, and interfaces capable of PLC program or configuration changes.
Enforce formal change control for PLC logic, tasking, parameters, alarm settings, firmware update mode, operating mode, and I/O overrides.
Keep offline, tested backups of PLC programs and configurations to support rapid validation and recovery.
Segment and monitor PLC network paths so discovery, collection, and programming activity are limited to expected systems and procedures.

Additional notes and limits

This take is based on the ATT&CK ICS asset A0003 and its relationships to PLC-targeting techniques including program upload/download, online edit, program append, modify controller tasking, manipulate I/O image, modify parameter, modify alarm settings, process-state monitoring, discovery, DoS, restart/shutdown, firmware update mode, and exploitation for evasion. The IEC 61131-3 reference supports the importance of tasks, programs, and programming languages in PLC logic governance.

MITRE does not provide an official detection section for this asset, and the supplied object does not specify particular vendors, protocols beyond examples in related descriptions, tactics, or active threat activity. Local PLC models, engineering workflows, logging capabilities, network architecture, and safety/process context are required to determine actual detection and control coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)

A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is an embedded programmable control device. PLCs typically utilize a modular architecture with separate modules used to support its processing capabilities, communication mediums, and I/O interfaces. PLCs allow for the deployment of customized programs/logic to control or monitor an operational process. This logic is defined using industry specific programming languages, such as IEC 61131 [1], which define the set of tasks and program organizational units (POUs) included in the device’s programs. PLCs also typically have distinct operating modes (e.g., Remote, Run, Program, Stop) which are used to determine when the device can be programmed or whether it should execute the custom logic.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques61 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
ICS	T0846.003	Multicast DiscoverySub-technique	Multicast Discovery targets this object.
ICS	T0890	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation targets this object.
ICS	T0846	Remote System Discovery	Remote System Discovery targets this object.
ICS	T1695	Block Communications	Block Communications targets this object.
ICS	T1693.002	Module FirmwareSub-technique	Module Firmware targets this object.
ICS	T1691	Block Operational Technology Message	Block Operational Technology Message targets this object.
ICS	T1694	Insecure Credentials	Insecure Credentials targets this object.
ICS	T0874	Hooking	Hooking targets this object.
ICS	T0868	Detect Operating Mode	Detect Operating Mode targets this object.
ICS	T0869	Standard Application Layer Protocol	Standard Application Layer Protocol targets this object.
ICS	T1695.003	Wi-FiSub-technique	Wi-Fi targets this object.
ICS	T1692	Unauthorized Message	Unauthorized Message targets this object.
ICS	T0871	Execution through API	Execution through API targets this object.
ICS	T0843.002	Online EditSub-technique	Online Edit targets this object.
ICS	T1693	Modify Firmware	Modify Firmware targets this object.
ICS	T0843	Program Download	Program Download targets this object.
ICS	T1691.001	Command MessageSub-technique	Command Message targets this object.
ICS	T0845	Program Upload	Program Upload targets this object.
ICS	T0848	Rogue Master	Rogue Master targets this object.
ICS	T0885	Commonly Used Port	Commonly Used Port targets this object.
ICS	T0888	Remote System Information Discovery	Remote System Information Discovery targets this object.
ICS	T0846.002	Broadcast DiscoverySub-technique	Broadcast Discovery targets this object.
ICS	T1693.001	System FirmwareSub-technique	System Firmware targets this object.
ICS	T1691.002	Reporting MessageSub-technique	Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS	T0802	Automated Collection	Automated Collection targets this object.
ICS	T0859	Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts targets this object.
ICS	T0838	Modify Alarm Settings	Modify Alarm Settings targets this object.
ICS	T0851	Rootkit	Rootkit targets this object.
ICS	T0892	Change Credential	Change Credential targets this object.
ICS	T0842	Network Sniffing	Network Sniffing targets this object.
ICS	T0872	Indicator Removal on Host	Indicator Removal on Host targets this object.
ICS	T0843.003	Program AppendSub-technique	Program Append targets this object.
ICS	T0801	Monitor Process State	Monitor Process State targets this object.
ICS	T0847	Replication Through Removable Media	Replication Through Removable Media targets this object.
ICS	T0843.001	Download AllSub-technique	Download All targets this object.
ICS	T1695.002	EthernetSub-technique	Ethernet targets this object.
ICS	T0806	Brute Force I/O	Brute Force I/O targets this object.
ICS	T0840	Network Connection Enumeration	Network Connection Enumeration targets this object.
ICS	T0878	Alarm Suppression	Alarm Suppression targets this object.
ICS	T0862	Supply Chain Compromise	Supply Chain Compromise targets this object.
ICS	T0866	Exploitation of Remote Services	Exploitation of Remote Services targets this object.
ICS	T0814	Denial of Service	Denial of Service targets this object.
ICS	T1694.001	Default CredentialsSub-technique	Default Credentials targets this object.
ICS	T0820	Exploitation for Evasion	Exploitation for Evasion targets this object.
ICS	T0846.001	Port ScanSub-technique	Port Scan targets this object.
ICS	T1692.002	Reporting MessageSub-technique	Reporting Message targets this object.
ICS	T0836	Modify Parameter	Modify Parameter targets this object.
ICS	T1695.001	Serial COMSub-technique	Serial COM targets this object.
ICS	T0816	Device Restart/Shutdown	Device Restart/Shutdown targets this object.
ICS	T0884	Connection Proxy	Connection Proxy targets this object.
ICS	T0835	Manipulate I/O Image	Manipulate I/O Image targets this object.
ICS	T0809	Data Destruction	Data Destruction targets this object.
ICS	T0834	Native API	Native API targets this object.
ICS	T0830	Adversary-in-the-Middle	Adversary-in-the-Middle targets this object.
ICS	T0858	Change Operating Mode	Change Operating Mode targets this object.
ICS	T0877	I/O Image	I/O Image targets this object.
ICS	T0821	Modify Controller Tasking	Modify Controller Tasking targets this object.
ICS	T0800	Activate Firmware Update Mode	Activate Firmware Update Mode targets this object.
ICS	T1692.001	Command MessageSub-technique	Command Message targets this object.
ICS	T0861	Point & Tag Identification	Point & Tag Identification targets this object.
ICS	T0889	Modify Program	Modify Program targets this object.

Relationship explorer

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Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.1
Created: Sep 28, 2023, 14:43 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: May 12, 2026, 15:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 4f64d12e9fb06229...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	May 12, 2026, 15:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`4f64d12e9fb0…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

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Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
IEC February 2013
IEC 2013, February 20 IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages Retrieved. 2019/10/22
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackA0003
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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