M0947: Audit
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
Security context for executives and security teams
M0947: Audit describes Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
Executive priority
M0947: Audit is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate M0947: Audit by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether M0947: Audit appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Audit
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0862 | Supply Chain Compromise | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts. |
| ICS | T0843 | Program Download | Provide the ability to verify the integrity of programs downloaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically secure and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-2, SHA-3) should be used.CitationIEC February 2019 |
| ICS | T0843.001 | Download AllSub-technique | Provide the ability to verify the integrity of programs downloaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically secure and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-2, SHA-3) should be used.CitationIEC February 2019 |
| ICS | T0889 | Modify Program | Provide the ability to verify the integrity of control logic or programs loaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically strong and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-2, SHA-3) should be used. CitationIEC February 2019 |
| ICS | T0864 | Transient Cyber Asset | Integrity checking of transient assets can include performing the validation of the booted operating system and programs using TPM-based technologies, such as Secure Boot and Trusted Boot. CitationEmerson Exchange It can also include verifying filesystem changes, such as programs and configuration files stored on the system, executing processes, libraries, accounts, and open ports. CitationNational Security Agency February 2016 |
| ICS | T0836 | Modify Parameter | Provide the ability to verify the integrity and authenticity of changes to parameter values. |
| ICS | T0851 | Rootkit | Audit the integrity of PLC system and application code functionality, such as the manipulation of standard function blocks (e.g., Organizational Blocks) that manage the execution of application logic programs. CitationIEC February 2019 |
| ICS | T0821 | Modify Controller Tasking | Provide the ability to verify the integrity of controller tasking. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically secure and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-2, SHA-3) should be used. CitationIEC February 2019 |
| ICS | T1693 | Modify Firmware | Perform integrity checks of firmware before uploading it on a device. Utilize cryptographic hashes to verify the firmware has not been tampered with by comparing it to a trusted hash of the firmware. This could be from trusted data sources (e.g., vendor site) or through a third-party verification service. |
| ICS | T1693.001 | System FirmwareSub-technique | Perform integrity checks of firmware before uploading it on a device. Utilize cryptographic hashes to verify the firmware has not been tampered with by comparing it to a trusted hash of the firmware. This could be from trusted data sources (e.g., vendor site) or through a third-party verification service. |
| ICS | T0843.003 | Program AppendSub-technique | Provide the ability to verify the integrity of programs downloaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically secure and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-2, SHA-3) should be used.CitationIEC February 2019 |
| ICS | T0830 | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Limit access to network infrastructure and resources that can be used to reshape traffic or otherwise produce AiTM conditions. |
| ICS | T1693.002 | Module FirmwareSub-technique | Perform integrity checks of firmware before uploading it on a device. Utilize cryptographic hashes to verify the firmware has not been tampered with by comparing it to a trusted hash of the firmware. This could be from trusted data sources (e.g., vendor site) or through a third-party verification service. |
| ICS | T0874 | Hooking | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts. |
| ICS | T0859 | Valid Accounts | Routinely audit source code, application configuration files, open repositories, and public cloud storage for insecure use and storage of credentials. |
| ICS | T0843.002 | Online EditSub-technique | Provide the ability to verify the integrity of programs downloaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically secure and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-2, SHA-3) should be used.CitationIEC February 2019 |
| ICS | T0873.001 | Siemens Project File FormatSub-technique | Review the integrity of project files to verify they have not been modified by adversary behavior. Verify a cryptographic hash for the file with a known trusted version, or look for other indicators of modification (e.g., timestamps). |
| ICS | T0873 | Project File Infection | Review the integrity of project files to verify they have not been modified by adversary behavior. Verify a cryptographic hash for the file with a known trusted version, or look for other indicators of modification (e.g., timestamps). |
| ICS | T0811 | Data from Information Repositories | Consider periodic reviews of accounts and privileges for critical and sensitive repositories. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 47c65bb5d8ca… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 47c65bb5d8ca… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackM0947Open source URL
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