M0926: Privileged Account Management
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
Security context for executives and security teams
M0926: Privileged Account Management describes Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
Executive priority
M0926: Privileged Account Management is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate M0926: Privileged Account Management by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether M0926: Privileged Account Management appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Privileged Account Management
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0859 | Valid Accounts | Audit domain and local accounts and their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain system wide access with stolen privileged account credentials. CitationMicrosoft May 2017 CitationMicrosoft August 2018These audits should also identify if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. CitationMicrosoft February 2019 |
| ICS | T0842 | Network Sniffing | Restrict root or administrator access on user accounts to limit the ability to capture promiscuous traffic on a network through common packet capture tools. CitationNational Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013 |
| ICS | T0866 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation. CitationKeith Stouffer May 2015 |
| ICS | T0819 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Use least privilege for service accounts. CitationKeith Stouffer May 2015 CitationNational Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013 |
| ICS | T0809 | Data Destruction | Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit the information that may be impacted by malicious users or software. CitationNational Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013 |
| ICS | T0811 | Data from Information Repositories | Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit the information that may be exposed or collected by malicious users or software. CitationNational Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013 |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 21cb4f6d7a80… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 21cb4f6d7a80… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackM0926Open source URL
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