A0011: Virtual Private Network (VPN) Server
A VPN server is a device that is used to establish a secure network tunnel between itself and other remote VPN devices, including field VPNs. VPN servers can be used to establish a secure connection with a single remote device, or to securely bridge all traffic between two separate networks together by encapsulating all data between those networks. VPN servers typically support remote network services that are used by field VPNs to initiate the establishment of the secure VPN tunnel between the field device and server.
Security context for executives and security teams
A0011: Virtual Private Network (VPN) Server describes A VPN server is a device that is used to establish a secure network tunnel between itself and other remote VPN devices, including field VPNs. VPN servers can be used to establish a secure connection with a single remote device, or to securely bridge all traffic between two separate networks together by encapsulating all data between those networks. VPN servers typically support remote network services that are used by field VPNs to initiate the establishment of the secure VPN tunnel between the field device and ser...
Executive priority
A0011: Virtual Private Network (VPN) Server is an official MITRE ATT&CK ICS asset. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate A0011: Virtual Private Network (VPN) Server by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Embedded, Linux, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether A0011: Virtual Private Network (VPN) Server appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Server
A VPN server is a device that is used to establish a secure network tunnel between itself and other remote VPN devices, including field VPNs. VPN servers can be used to establish a secure connection with a single remote device, or to securely bridge all traffic between two separate networks together by encapsulating all data between those networks. VPN servers typically support remote network services that are used by field VPNs to initiate the establishment of the secure VPN tunnel between the field device and server.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0881 | Service Stop | Service Stop targets this object. |
| ICS | T0816 | Device Restart/Shutdown | Device Restart/Shutdown targets this object. |
| ICS | T0888 | Remote System Information Discovery | Remote System Information Discovery targets this object. |
| ICS | T0819 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Exploit Public-Facing Application targets this object. |
| ICS | T0842 | Network Sniffing | Network Sniffing targets this object. |
| ICS | T0851 | Rootkit | Rootkit targets this object. |
| ICS | T1694 | Insecure Credentials | Insecure Credentials targets this object. |
| ICS | T0809 | Data Destruction | Data Destruction targets this object. |
| ICS | T0872 | Indicator Removal on Host | Indicator Removal on Host targets this object. |
| ICS | T1695.001 | Serial COMSub-technique | Serial COM targets this object. |
| ICS | T1694.001 | Default CredentialsSub-technique | Default Credentials targets this object. |
| ICS | T0846.001 | Port ScanSub-technique | Port Scan targets this object. |
| ICS | T0862 | Supply Chain Compromise | Supply Chain Compromise targets this object. |
| ICS | T1695.002 | EthernetSub-technique | Ethernet targets this object. |
| ICS | T0846.003 | Multicast DiscoverySub-technique | Multicast Discovery targets this object. |
| ICS | T1693.001 | System FirmwareSub-technique | System Firmware targets this object. |
| ICS | T1695.003 | Wi-FiSub-technique | Wi-Fi targets this object. |
| ICS | T0866 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Exploitation of Remote Services targets this object. |
| ICS | T0822 | External Remote Services | External Remote Services targets this object. |
| ICS | T0830 | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Adversary-in-the-Middle targets this object. |
| ICS | T0820 | Exploitation for Evasion | Exploitation for Evasion targets this object. |
| ICS | T0874 | Hooking | Hooking targets this object. |
| ICS | T0834 | Native API | Native API targets this object. |
| ICS | T0847 | Replication Through Removable Media | Replication Through Removable Media targets this object. |
| ICS | T0846.002 | Broadcast DiscoverySub-technique | Broadcast Discovery targets this object. |
| ICS | T0859 | Valid Accounts | Valid Accounts targets this object. |
| ICS | T0890 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation targets this object. |
| ICS | T0846 | Remote System Discovery | Remote System Discovery targets this object. |
| ICS | T0884 | Connection Proxy | Connection Proxy targets this object. |
| ICS | T0869 | Standard Application Layer Protocol | Standard Application Layer Protocol targets this object. |
| ICS | T0886 | Remote Services | Remote Services targets this object. |
| ICS | T0885 | Commonly Used Port | Commonly Used Port targets this object. |
| ICS | T0840 | Network Connection Enumeration | Network Connection Enumeration targets this object. |
| ICS | T0867 | Lateral Tool Transfer | Lateral Tool Transfer targets this object. |
| ICS | T0883 | Internet Accessible Device | Internet Accessible Device targets this object. |
| ICS | T0892 | Change Credential | Change Credential targets this object. |
| ICS | T1695 | Block Communications | Block Communications targets this object. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 42648591e555… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 42648591e555… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]IEC February 2019
IEC 2019, February Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components Retrieved. 2020/09/25
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackA0011Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
