M0937: Filter Network Traffic
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
Security context for executives and security teams
M0937: Filter Network Traffic describes Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable commun...
Executive priority
M0937: Filter Network Traffic is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate M0937: Filter Network Traffic by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether M0937: Filter Network Traffic appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Filter Network Traffic
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T1693.002 | Module FirmwareSub-technique | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. |
| ICS | T0843.003 | Program AppendSub-technique | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with program download activity to prevent unauthorized device configurations. |
| ICS | T0843 | Program Download | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with program download activity to prevent unauthorized device configurations. |
| ICS | T0848 | Rogue Master | Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid reporting messages. |
| ICS | T0859 | Valid Accounts | Consider using IP allowlisting along with user account management to ensure that data access is restricted not only to valid users but only from expected IP ranges to mitigate the use of stolen credentials to access data. |
| ICS | T0843.001 | Download AllSub-technique | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with program download activity to prevent unauthorized device configurations. |
| ICS | T0868 | Detect Operating Mode | Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid messages. |
| ICS | T0861 | Point & Tag Identification | Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid messages. |
| ICS | T1692.002 | Reporting MessageSub-technique | Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid reporting messages. |
| ICS | T0884 | Connection Proxy | Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques likeDomain Fronting. |
| ICS | T1693.001 | System FirmwareSub-technique | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. |
| ICS | T0806 | Brute Force I/O | Allow/denylists can be used to block access when excessive I/O connections are detected from a system or device during a specified time period. |
| ICS | T0845 | Program Upload | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with program upload activity to prevent unauthorized access to device configurations. |
| ICS | T0843.002 | Online EditSub-technique | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with program download activity to prevent unauthorized device configurations. |
| ICS | T0816 | Device Restart/Shutdown | Application denylists can be used to block automation protocol functions used to initiate device shutdowns or restarts, such as DNP3's 0x0D function code, or vulnerabilities that can be used to trigger device shutdowns (e.g., CVE-2014-9195, CVE-2015-5374). |
| ICS | T1692 | Unauthorized Message | Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid messages. |
| ICS | T0800 | Activate Firmware Update Mode | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. |
| ICS | T0886 | Remote Services | Filter application-layer protocol messages for remote services to block any unauthorized activity. |
| ICS | T1693 | Modify Firmware | Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. |
| ICS | T1692.001 | Command MessageSub-technique | Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid messages. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 02ff6d188879… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 02ff6d188879… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure February 2005
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackM0937Open source URL
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