M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
Security context for executives and security teams
M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication describes Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
Executive priority
M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Software Process and Device Authentication
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | T0843 | Program Download | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0845 | Program Upload | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0848 | Rogue Master | Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
| ICS | T0868 | Detect Operating Mode | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0843.003 | Program AppendSub-technique | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0860 | Wireless Compromise | Ensure wireless networks require the authentication of all devices, and that all wireless devices also authenticate network infrastructure devices (i.e., mutual authentication). For defense-in-depth purposes, utilize VPNs or ensure that application-layer protocols also authenticate the system or device. Use protocols that provide strong authentication (e.g., IEEE 802.1X), and enforce basic protections, such as MAC filtering, when stronger cryptographic techniques are not available. |
| ICS | T0886 | Remote Services | All communication sessions to remote services should be authenticated to prevent unauthorized access. |
| ICS | T0838 | Modify Alarm Settings | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0830 | Adversary-in-the-Middle | To protect against AiTM, authentication mechanisms should not send credentials across the network in plaintext and should also implement mechanisms to prevent replay attacks (such as nonces or timestamps). Challenge-response based authentication techniques that do not directly send credentials over the network provide better protection from AiTM. |
| ICS | T0800 | Activate Firmware Update Mode | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0858 | Change Operating Mode | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T1693.001 | System FirmwareSub-technique | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0861 | Point & Tag Identification | Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
| ICS | T1692 | Unauthorized Message | Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
| ICS | T1693 | Modify Firmware | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0843.001 | Download AllSub-technique | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T0806 | Brute Force I/O | Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
| ICS | T0843.002 | Online EditSub-technique | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T1692.002 | Reporting MessageSub-technique | Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
| ICS | T0816 | Device Restart/Shutdown | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T1693.002 | Module FirmwareSub-technique | Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ICS | T1692.001 | Command MessageSub-technique | Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 0b2f0c787d05… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 0b2f0c787d05… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackM0813Open source URL
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