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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1552: Unsecured Credentials

Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).[1]

EnterpriseT1552TechniqueObject v1.5Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Unsecured Credentials matters because it turns ordinary misconfiguration and user convenience into a credential-access path across endpoints, cloud, SaaS, identity providers, containers, network devices, and office platforms. The business risk is not just password theft; it is that misplaced secrets in files, registries, shell history, private keys, metadata services, container APIs, Group Policy Preferences, or chat messages can let an intruder reuse trusted access and expand an incident faster than teams can contain it.

Executive priority

Treat this as a control-assurance issue spanning IAM, endpoint hardening, cloud security, collaboration governance, and audit readiness. Leaders should ask whether the organization can prove where secrets are allowed to live, who can read them, whether privileged and cloud credentials are centrally managed, and whether SOC/IR teams can find evidence of credential searching across Windows, Linux, macOS, IaaS, SaaS, containers, office suites, network devices, and identity platforms. This technique is especially material for resilience because recovered credentials can support privilege escalation and lateral movement, as reflected by the related campaign/group/software context, but local exposure must be validated in the customer environment.

Technical view

MITRE provides no native detection text for T1552, but relationship context includes DET0412: Detect Access or Search for Unsecured Credentials Across Platforms. Detection engineering should map coverage to the sub-technique surfaces: files, Windows Registry, shell history, private keys, cloud instance metadata APIs, Group Policy Preferences/SYSVOL, container APIs, and chat or collaboration messages. IR teams should prioritize evidence of unusual searching, reading, exporting, or access attempts against sensitive credential locations and correlate that with account usage, privilege changes, and lateral access indicators.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint file access and command/process telemetry for searches or reads of files likely to contain credentials, keys, configuration secrets, or shell history
  • Windows Registry query/access telemetry for credential-bearing keys and automatic logon-related locations
  • Authentication and account activity logs for use of credentials found after suspected access
  • Cloud IaaS logs related to instance metadata access and cloud credential use
  • Container platform/API logs, including Docker or Kubernetes API access where available

Detection direction

  • Build detections around access or search behavior, not only successful credential use, because the official ATT&CK object focuses on adversaries searching compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.
  • Tune by platform and repository: Windows Registry and SYSVOL/GPP, Linux/macOS shell history and private key paths, IaaS metadata APIs, container APIs, SaaS/office chat content, and network device configuration stores.
  • Correlate suspicious access to credential locations with subsequent authentication, privilege, or lateral movement events to reduce false positives from legitimate administration and backup activity.
  • Validate blind spots where logs are often missing: file read telemetry, shell history access, SaaS content auditing, metadata API access, container control-plane logs, and network device admin audit trails.
  • Use the related DET0412 strategy as the ATT&CK-supported detection direction, while recognizing that MITRE did not provide detailed detection logic in the object.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with discovery and audit: identify where credentials, private keys, tokens, configuration secrets, and chat-shared secrets are stored, and review access permissions.
  • Restrict file and directory permissions and limit access to network resources so credential-bearing files, shares, SYSVOL content, and configuration repositories are readable only by required users or services.
  • Strengthen privileged account management, Active Directory configuration, and password policies to reduce the value and spread of recovered credentials.
  • Encrypt sensitive information where storage is required, and prefer managed secret storage over plaintext, ad hoc files, shell history, chat messages, or embedded configuration values.
  • Harden operating system, cloud, container, and network configurations; filter network traffic where appropriate to reduce unnecessary access paths to sensitive services and APIs.
Additional notes and limits

The broad platform list makes this a cross-domain exposure pattern rather than a single endpoint-only issue. The sub-techniques provide the practical scoping model: files, Registry, shell history, private keys, cloud metadata, Group Policy Preferences, container APIs, and chat messages. Related mitigations support a layered program of audit, permission control, privileged account management, password policy, encryption, OS/AD hardening, network restriction/filtering, software updates, and user training.

The official ATT&CK object does not include detection text, so detection guidance is derived from the object description, platforms, sub-technique relationships, DET0412, and mitigation relationships. This take does not assert active exploitation or local exposure. Actual risk and coverage depend on the organization’s secret storage practices, logging depth, cloud/container/SaaS audit configuration, and identity governance.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Unsecured Credentials

Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

8 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1552.006Group Policy PreferencesSub-techniqueGroup Policy Preferences subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1552.004Private KeysSub-techniquePrivate Keys subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1552.007Container APISub-techniqueContainer API subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1552.001Credentials In FilesSub-techniqueCredentials In Files subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1552.002Credentials in RegistrySub-techniqueCredentials in Registry subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1552.003Shell HistorySub-techniqueShell History subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1552.008Chat MessagesSub-techniqueChat Messages subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata APISub-techniqueCloud Instance Metadata API subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1017: Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].

Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]

MalwareEnterprise

S1111: DarkGate

DarkGate first emerged in 2018 and has evolved into an initial access and data gathering tool associated with various criminal cyber operations. Written in Delphi and named "DarkGate" by its author, DarkGate is associated with credential theft, cryptomining, cryptotheft, and pre-ransomware actions.[1] DarkGate use increased significantly starting in 2022 and is under active development by its author, who provides it as a Malware-as-a-Service offering.[2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S1091: Pacu

Pacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.[1]

IaaS
MalwareEnterprise

S0373: Astaroth

Astaroth is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. [1][2][3]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S1131: NPPSPY

NPPSPY is an implementation of a theoretical mechanism first presented in 2004 for capturing credentials submitted to a Windows system via a rogue Network Provider API item. NPPSPY captures credentials following submission and writes them to a file on the victim system for follow-on exfiltration.[1][2]

Windows
CampaignEnterprise

C0049: Leviathan Australian Intrusions

Leviathan Australian Intrusions consisted of at least two long-term intrusions against victims in Australia by Leviathan, relying on similar tradecraft such as external service exploitation followed by extensive credential capture and re-use to enable privilege escalation and lateral movement. Leviathan Australian Intrusions were focused on exfiltrating sensitive data including valid credentials for the victim organizations.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.5
Created
Modified
Raw hash
5185d1606d39c3ca...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.5Current bundle5185d1606d39…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Brining MimiKatz to Unix

    Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL

    Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    MS14-025

    Microsoft. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: Vulnerability in Group Policy Preferences could allow elevation of privilege. Retrieved February 17, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    CISA Leviathan 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Microsoft MS14-025

    Microsoft. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: Vulnerability in Group Policy Preferences could allow elevation of privilege. Retrieved January 28, 2015.

  6. [6]
    Ensilo Darkgate 2018

    Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018

    Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    GitHub Pacu

    Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019

    Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024

    CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Huntress NPPSPY 2022

    Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Brining MimiKatz to Unix

    Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Brining MimiKatz to Unix

    Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    mitre-attackT1552
    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    mitre-attackT1552
    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    mitre-attackT1552
    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    ADSecurity Finding Passwords in SYSVOL

    Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    MS14-025

    Microsoft. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: Vulnerability in Group Policy Preferences could allow elevation of privilege. Retrieved February 17, 2020.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    CISA Leviathan 2024

    CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Microsoft MS14-025

    Microsoft. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: Vulnerability in Group Policy Preferences could allow elevation of privilege. Retrieved January 28, 2015.

  21. [21]
    Ensilo Darkgate 2018

    Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018

    Higashi, Michael. (2018, May 15). Instance Metadata API: A Modern Day Trojan Horse. Retrieved July 16, 2019.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    GitHub Pacu

    Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019

    Salem, E. (2019, February 13). ASTAROTH MALWARE USES LEGITIMATE OS AND ANTIVIRUS PROCESSES TO STEAL PASSWORDS AND PERSONAL DATA. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024

    CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.

    Open source URL
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