S1131: NPPSPY

NPPSPY is an implementation of a theoretical mechanism first presented in 2004 for capturing credentials submitted to a Windows system via a rogue Network Provider API item. NPPSPY captures credentials following submission and writes them to a file on the victim system for follow-on exfiltration.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1131ToolObject v1.0ModifiedOct 28, 2024, 19:00 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S1131: NPPSPY describes NPPSPY is an implementation of a theoretical mechanism first presented in 2004 for capturing credentials submitted to a Windows system via a rogue Network Provider API item. NPPSPY captures credentials following submission and writes them to a file on the victim system for follow-on exfiltration.(Citation: Huntress NPPSPY 2022)(Citation: Polak NPPSPY 2004)

Executive priority

S1131: NPPSPY is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1131: NPPSPY by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1131: NPPSPY appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

NPPSPY

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques7 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1684.001	ImpersonationSub-technique	NPPSPY creates a network listener using the misspelled label `logincontroll` recorded to the Registry key `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\NetworkProvider\\Order`.[1]
Enterprise	T1112	Modify Registry	NPPSPY modifies the Registry to record the malicious listener for output from the Winlogon process.[1]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	NPPSPY records data entered from the local system logon at Winlogon to capture credentials in cleartext.[1]
Enterprise	T1557	Adversary-in-the-Middle	NPPSPY opens a new network listener for the `mpnotify.exe` process that is typically contacted by the Winlogon process in Windows. A new, alternative RPC channel is set up with a malicious DLL recording plaintext credentials entered into Winlogon, effectively intercepting and redirecting the logon information.[1]
Enterprise	T1552	Unsecured Credentials	NPPSPY captures credentials by recording them through an alternative network listener registered to the `mpnotify.exe` process, allowing for cleartext recording of logon information.[1]
Enterprise	T1056	Input Capture	NPPSPY captures user input into the Winlogon process by redirecting RPC traffic from legitimate listening DLLs within the operating system to a newly registered malicious item that allows for recording logon information in cleartext.[1]
Enterprise	T1119	Automated Collection	NPPSPY collection is automatically recorded to a specified file on the victim machine.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1684.001: ImpersonationEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1557: Adversary-in-the-MiddleEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1552: Unsecured CredentialsEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1056: Input CaptureEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1119: Automated CollectionEnterprise

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: May 17, 2024, 18:49 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 28, 2024, 19:00 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: a83b88a44151c456...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 28, 2024, 19:00 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`a83b88a44151…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 28, 2024, 19:00 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`a83b88a44151…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Huntress NPPSPY 2022
Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
Polak NPPSPY 2004
Sergey Polak. (2004, August). Capturing Windows Passwords using the Network Provider API. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
Open source URL
[3]
mitre-attackS1131
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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