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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1546.011: Application Shimming

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. [1]

Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.

A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:

* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb and * hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb

Custom databases are stored in:

* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom and * hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom

To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).

Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. [2] Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.

EnterpriseT1546.011Sub-techniqueObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Application Shimming matters because it abuses a legitimate Windows compatibility feature to make malicious code run when affected applications execute. For leaders, the risk is not just malware persistence; it is the possibility that a trusted Windows mechanism can be used to regain access, elevate privileges, interfere with defenses, or hide inside normal application behavior.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a Windows persistence and privilege-escalation risk where administrators, legacy applications, or compatibility tooling are common. Security leaders should ask whether the organization can inventory custom shim databases, monitor shim installation activity, and preserve registry and file evidence during incidents. Because ATT&CK links this technique to financially motivated and malware activity, it is relevant to incident readiness, compliance evidence, and resilience of business-critical Windows endpoints and servers.

Technical view

This is a Windows sub-technique of Event Triggered Execution. ATT&CK identifies sdbinst.exe, shim database files, and AppCompat registry locations as key areas for validation. SOC and IR teams should confirm visibility into creation or modification of custom .sdb files under Windows AppPatch custom paths, registry changes under AppCompatFlags InstalledSDB and Custom keys, and execution of the Windows shim installer. DET0017 is specifically related as a detection strategy for Application Shimming via sdbinst.exe and registry artifacts. Since MITRE provides no official detection text for this object, detection engineering should be based on the supplied artifacts and tested against known legitimate compatibility use.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows process execution telemetry, especially sdbinst.exe activity
  • File creation and modification telemetry for .sdb files in %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom and %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom
  • Registry telemetry for HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB
  • Registry telemetry for HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom
  • Endpoint security alerts or logs showing DLL injection, UAC bypass attempts, or defense interference when correlated with shim artifacts

Detection direction

  • Validate DET0017-style coverage for sdbinst.exe execution and AppCompat registry artifacts.
  • Baseline legitimate shim usage, because compatibility shims can be created for valid software support reasons.
  • Alert on new or unexpected custom shim databases in Windows AppPatch custom locations, especially when followed by recurring execution of affected applications.
  • Correlate shim installation or registry changes with administrator logons, software deployment windows, and endpoint protection events to reduce false positives.
  • During IR, collect the listed registry keys and .sdb files before remediation so persistence evidence is not lost.

Mitigation priorities

  • Keep Windows and applications updated to reduce reliance on legacy compatibility workarounds, aligned with M1051 Update Software.
  • Maintain proper User Account Control configuration, aligned with M1052 User Account Control, because installing shims requires administrator privileges and some shims may be used in UAC bypass scenarios.
  • Restrict and review administrative rights on Windows systems where shim installation could create durable persistence.
  • Inventory approved application compatibility databases and investigate unmanaged custom entries.
  • Include shim artifacts in endpoint hardening, incident response collection, and compliance evidence procedures.
Additional notes and limits

Relationship context shows this technique is detected by DET0017 and mitigated by Update Software and User Account Control. ATT&CK also links usage to FIN7 and to Windows malware/software including ShimRat, SDBbot, and Pillowmint. These relationships support defensive prioritization, but they should not be treated as evidence of activity in a specific environment without local telemetry.

The supplied ATT&CK object does not include official detection guidance. The take is therefore based on the official description, listed Windows file and registry locations, and provided relationships. Local baselines are required to distinguish legitimate application compatibility activity from suspicious persistence.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Application Shimming

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. [1]

Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS.

A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:

* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb and * hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb

Custom databases are stored in:

* %WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom and * hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom

To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).

Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc. [2] Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1546Event Triggered ExecutionThis object subtechnique of Event Triggered Execution.
EnterpriseT1138Application ShimmingApplication Shimming revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0046: FIN7

FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

MalwareEnterprise

S0444: ShimRat

ShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name "ShimRat" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · MalwareS0517: PillowmintEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0461: SDBbotEnterpriseuses · GroupG0046: FIN7Enterprisemitigates · MitigationM1052: User Account ControlEnterprisesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1546: Event Triggered ExecutionEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0444: ShimRatEnterpriserevoked by · TechniqueT1138: Application ShimmingEnterprisedetects · Detection StrategyDET0017: Detection Strategy for Application Shimming via sdbinst.exe and Registry Artifacts (Windows)Enterprisemitigates · MitigationM1051: Update SoftwareEnterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationEnterprise

M1052: User Account Control

User Account Control (UAC) is a security feature in Microsoft Windows that prevents unauthorized changes to the operating system. UAC prompts users to confirm or provide administrator credentials when an action requires elevated privileges. Proper configuration of UAC reduces the risk of privilege escalation attacks. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enable UAC Globally:

- Ensure UAC is enabled through Group Policy by setting `User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode` to `Enabled`.

Require Credential Prompt:

- Use Group Policy to configure UAC to prompt for administrative credentials instead of just confirmation (`User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt`).

Restrict Built-in Administrator Account:

Set `Admin Approval Mode` for the built-in Administrator account to `Enabled` in Group Policy.

Secure the UAC Prompt:

- Configure UAC prompts to display on the secure desktop (`User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation`).

Prevent UAC Bypass:

- Block untrusted applications from triggering UAC prompts by configuring `User Account Control: Only elevate executables that are signed and validated`. - Use EDR tools to detect and block known UAC bypass techniques.

Monitor UAC-Related Events:

- Use Windows Event Viewer to monitor for event ID 4688 (process creation) and look for suspicious processes attempting to invoke UAC elevation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Windows Tools:

- Group Policy Editor: Configure UAC settings centrally for enterprise environments. - Registry Editor: Modify UAC-related settings directly, such as `EnableLUA` and `ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin`.

Endpoint Security Solutions:

- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: Detects and blocks UAC bypass techniques. - Sysmon: Logs process creations and monitors UAC elevation attempts for suspicious activity.

Third-Party Security Tools:

- Process Monitor (Sysinternals): Tracks real-time processes interacting with UAC. - EventSentry: Monitors Windows Event Logs for UAC-related alerts.

MitigationEnterprise

M1051: Update Software

Software updates ensure systems are protected against known vulnerabilities by applying patches and upgrades provided by vendors. Regular updates reduce the attack surface and prevent adversaries from exploiting known security gaps. This includes patching operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Regular Operating System Updates

- Implementation: Apply the latest Windows security updates monthly using WSUS (Windows Server Update Services) or a similar patch management solution. Configure systems to check for updates automatically and schedule reboots during maintenance windows. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of OS vulnerabilities such as privilege escalation or remote code execution.

Application Patching

- Implementation: Monitor Apache's update release notes for security patches addressing vulnerabilities. Schedule updates for off-peak hours to avoid downtime while maintaining security compliance. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of web application vulnerabilities, such as those leading to unauthorized access or data breaches.

Firmware Updates

- Implementation: Regularly check the vendor’s website for firmware updates addressing vulnerabilities. Plan for update deployment during scheduled maintenance to minimize business disruption. - Use Case: Protects against vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit to gain access to network devices or inject malicious traffic.

Emergency Patch Deployment

- Implementation: Use the emergency patch deployment feature of the organization's patch management tool to apply updates to all affected Exchange servers within 24 hours. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of exploitation by rapidly addressing critical vulnerabilities.

Centralized Patch Management

- Implementation: Implement a centralized patch management system, such as SCCM or ManageEngine, to automate and track patch deployment across all environments. Generate regular compliance reports to ensure all systems are updated. - Use Case: Streamlines patching processes and ensures no critical systems are missed.

*Tools for Implementation*

Patch Management Tools:

- WSUS: Manage and deploy Microsoft updates across the organization. - ManageEngine Patch Manager Plus: Automate patch deployment for OS and third-party apps. - Ansible: Automate updates across multiple platforms, including Linux and Windows.

Vulnerability Scanning Tools:

- OpenVAS: Open-source vulnerability scanning to identify missing patches.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
221ff838fb8a0bb0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundle221ff838fb8a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Elastic Process Injection July 2017

    Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye Application Shimming

    Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.

  3. [3]
    Trustwave Pillowmint June 2020

    Trustwave SpiderLabs. (2020, June 22). Pillowmint: FIN7’s Monkey Thief . Retrieved July 27, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Proofpoint TA505 October 2019

    Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases

    Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang

    Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Black Hat 2015 App Shim

    Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Black Hat 2015 App Shim

    Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Black Hat 2015 App Shim

    Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Elastic Process Injection July 2017

    Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Elastic Process Injection July 2017

    Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    FireEye Application Shimming

    Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.

  13. [13]
    FireEye Application Shimming

    Ballenthin, W., Tomczak, J.. (2015). The Real Shim Shary. Retrieved May 4, 2020.

  14. [14]
    mitre-attackT1546.011
    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    mitre-attackT1546.011
    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    mitre-attackT1546.011
    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Trustwave Pillowmint June 2020

    Trustwave SpiderLabs. (2020, June 22). Pillowmint: FIN7’s Monkey Thief . Retrieved July 27, 2020.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Proofpoint TA505 October 2019

    Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    FireEye FIN7 Shim Databases

    Erickson, J., McWhirt, M., Palombo, D. (2017, May 3). To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence. Retrieved July 18, 2017.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang

    Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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