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MITRE ATT&CK® Tool

S9009: TruffleHog

TruffleHog is an open-source secrets-discovery tool that is used to search for credentials, API keys, and encryption keys across a variety of data sources and environments.[1][2] TruffleHog has the ability to discover credentials and secrets stored in code repositories, git history, CI/CD pipelines, among other common storage locations to include filesystems and cloud storage buckets.[1][3][2] TruffleHog was first released by its author in 2016.[2]

EnterpriseS9009ToolObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

TruffleHog is a legitimate open-source secrets-discovery tool that can search for credentials, API keys, encryption keys, and other secrets across local systems, code repositories, CI/CD pipelines, cloud storage, and SaaS data sources. For defenders, its presence is material because the same capability used for security hygiene can also expose the credentials that enable cloud account abuse, token theft, and follow-on access to repositories, collaboration platforms, and cloud infrastructure.

Executive priority

Treat this behavior as an identity and cloud-risk signal, not just a tool sighting. Leaders should ask whether the organization can prove where secrets are stored, who can scan or access them, how exposed secrets are rotated, and whether cloud, repository, CI/CD, SharePoint, Confluence, messaging, and storage access is logged well enough for investigation. Budget and control priorities should focus on reducing hardcoded secrets, improving secrets-management adoption, enforcing least privilege, and ensuring incident response can rapidly revoke or rotate exposed credentials.

Technical view

SOC, detection, and IR teams should validate visibility across the supported environments: IaaS, Linux, SaaS, and Windows. The relationship context maps this tool to local data collection, file and directory discovery, code repository collection, SaaS repository mining, cloud service and infrastructure discovery, cloud storage object discovery, credential material in files, application token theft, cloud metadata access, and cloud secrets-management stores. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object, teams should build detections around observed execution, repository and SaaS access patterns, cloud API enumeration, unusual bulk reads of storage objects, and access to secrets or metadata services by identities or hosts that do not normally perform scanning.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process execution and command-line telemetry on Linux and Windows hosts where security or developer tooling may run
  • File system access events for bulk reads of configuration files, source trees, build artifacts, and other sensitive paths
  • Code repository audit logs for clone, fetch, search, and history access activity
  • CI/CD platform logs showing pipeline execution, repository access, and secret-scanning activity
  • Cloud audit logs for API calls related to service discovery, infrastructure discovery, storage listing, object reads, and secrets-management access

Detection direction

  • Separate authorized security scanning from suspicious use by maintaining an inventory of approved scanners, service accounts, hosts, repositories, schedules, and expected data sources.
  • Correlate tool execution or secret-scanning behavior with identity activity: new cloud sessions, unusual API calls, access to secrets stores, token use, or repository access outside normal patterns.
  • Prioritize detections where scanning is followed by credential use, cloud account activity, application token access, or data access from cloud storage and SaaS repositories.
  • Tune for likely false positives from developer workflows, CI/CD jobs, approved secret-scanning programs, and security assessments; require context such as caller identity, location, scope, and change ticket where possible.
  • Watch for blind spots in SaaS audit logging, repository history access, cloud object-level logging, metadata service visibility, and unmanaged developer workstations.

Mitigation priorities

  • Reduce exposed secrets first: remove credentials from code, files, documentation, messaging, and build artifacts where feasible.
  • Use centralized secrets-management stores and restrict read/list permissions to the minimum required identities and workloads.
  • Rotate or revoke exposed credentials, API keys, encryption keys, and application tokens when discovery or access is confirmed.
  • Harden cloud identities with least privilege, conditional access where applicable, and monitoring of cloud account and token activity.
  • Enable and retain audit logs for repositories, CI/CD systems, SaaS collaboration platforms, cloud APIs, cloud storage, and secrets managers so incidents can be scoped.
Additional notes and limits

This is a dual-use software object. The ATT&CK record describes TruffleHog’s capability to discover secrets across repositories, git history, CI/CD pipelines, filesystems, cloud storage, and other common locations. The strongest defensive value comes from combining this tool context with the related ATT&CK techniques for credential access, discovery, collection, cloud accounts, cloud APIs, SaaS repositories, and cloud storage.

ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance, no aliases, and no specified tactics directly on the tool object. Local detections require environment-specific baselines for approved scanning, developer behavior, repository access, CI/CD activity, SaaS audit coverage, and cloud logging. This summary does not assert active exploitation, attribution, or guaranteed detection coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

TruffleHog

TruffleHog is an open-source secrets-discovery tool that is used to search for credentials, API keys, and encryption keys across a variety of data sources and environments.[1][2] TruffleHog has the ability to discover credentials and secrets stored in code repositories, git history, CI/CD pipelines, among other common storage locations to include filesystems and cloud storage buckets.[1][3][2] TruffleHog was first released by its author in 2016.[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1213.002SharepointSub-technique

TruffleHog has searched SharePoint for data and credentials.[2]

EnterpriseT1213.005Messaging ApplicationsSub-technique

TruffleHog has obtained data and credentials associated with messaging applications to include Slack.[2]

EnterpriseT1619Cloud Storage Object Discovery

TruffleHog can enumerate cloud storage environments including Amazon Web Service (AWS) S3 buckets and Google Cloud Storage buckets.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059.009Cloud APISub-technique

TruffleHog has leveraged Cloud CLI in order to enumerate and gather credentials.[2]

EnterpriseT1526Cloud Service Discovery

TruffleHog has the ability to scan code repositories and CI/CD platforms.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1555.006Cloud Secrets Management StoresSub-technique

TruffleHog can obtain secrets from AWS Secrets and GCP Secret Manager.[1][2] TruffleHog has also gathered passwords, secrets and API keys from source repositories, .env files, and git history.[3]

EnterpriseT1580Cloud Infrastructure Discovery

TruffleHog can enumerate AWS Infrastructure to include EC2 instances.[2]

EnterpriseT1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata APISub-technique

TruffleHog can query the AWS and GCP metadata endpoints for instances and service credentials.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1528Steal Application Access Token

TruffleHog has gathered access tokens and API tokens from CI/CD pipeline solutions and repositories.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

TruffleHog has can browse and scan individual files and directories.[1][3][2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

TruffleHog has gathered data from home directories of the victim environment.[3]

EnterpriseT1078.004Cloud AccountsSub-technique

TruffleHog has used stolen credentials to log into cloud services to access cloud hosted repositories and other cloud storage solutions to discover sensitive data to include API Keys, tokens and credentials.[2]

EnterpriseT1552.001Credentials In FilesSub-technique

TruffleHog has obtained credentials stored in config files and credential files in victim environments.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1530Data from Cloud Storage

TruffleHog has the ability to scan cloud storage services for credentials to include Amazon (AWS) S3 and Google Cloud Storage.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1213.001ConfluenceSub-technique

TruffleHog has collected credentials and data associated with Confluence.[2]

EnterpriseT1213.003Code RepositoriesSub-technique

TruffleHog has gathered data and credentials from code repositories.[2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d7d1b1890c6b68d7...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.0Current bundled7d1b1890c6b…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attackS9009
    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attackS9009
    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    mitre-attackS9009
    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Netskope Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Gianpietro Cutolo. (2025, November 26). Shai-Hulud 2.0: Aggressive, Automated, and Fast Spreading. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Black Hills Information Security TruffleHog January 2024

    Chris Traynor. (2024, January 18). Rooting For Secrets with TruffleHog. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.