S0453: Pony

Pony is a credential stealing malware, though has also been used among adversaries for its downloader capabilities. The source code for Pony Loader 1.0 and 2.0 were leaked online, leading to their use by various threat actors.[1]

EnterpriseS0453MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedApr 25, 2025, 14:42 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0453: Pony describes [Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) is a credential stealing malware, though has also been used among adversaries for its downloader capabilities. The source code for Pony Loader 1.0 and 2.0 were leaked online, leading to their use by various threat actors.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

Executive priority

S0453: Pony is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0453: Pony by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0453: Pony appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Pony

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques16 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Pony has used several Windows functions for various purposes.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious FileSub-technique	Pony has attempted to lure targets into downloading an attached executable (ZIP, RAR, or CAB archives) or document (PDF or other MS Office format).[1]
Enterprise	T1027.015	CompressionSub-technique	Pony attachments have been delivered via compressed archive files.[1]
Enterprise	T1036	Masquerading	Pony has used the Adobe Reader icon for the downloaded file to look more trustworthy.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Pony can download additional files onto the infected system.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	Pony has used batch scripts to delete itself after execution.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.016	Junk Code InsertionSub-technique	Pony obfuscates memory flow by adding junk instructions when executing to make analysis more difficult.[1]
Enterprise	T1566.002	Spearphishing LinkSub-technique	Pony has been delivered via spearphishing emails which contained malicious links.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Pony has collected the Service Pack, language, and region information to send to the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1497.003	Time Based ChecksSub-technique	Pony has delayed execution using a built-in function to avoid detection and analysis.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.001	Malicious LinkSub-technique	Pony has attempted to lure targets into clicking links in spoofed emails from legitimate banks.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Pony has sent collected information to the C2 via HTTP POST request.[1]
Enterprise	T1566.001	Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique	Pony has been delivered via spearphishing attachments.[1]
Enterprise	T1087.001	Local AccountSub-technique	Pony has used the `NetUserEnum` function to enumerate local accounts.[1]
Enterprise	T1110.001	Password GuessingSub-technique	Pony has used a small dictionary of common passwords against a collected list of local accounts.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	Pony has used scripts to delete itself after execution.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: May 21, 2020, 21:03 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 25, 2025, 14:42 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 11fd500ed2c3d5b7...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 25, 2025, 14:42 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`11fd500ed2c3…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 25, 2025, 14:42 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`11fd500ed2c3…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Malwarebytes Pony April 2016
hasherezade. (2016, April 11). No money, but Pony! From a mail to a trojan horse. Retrieved May 21, 2020.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS0453
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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