S0695: Donut

Donut is an open source framework used to generate position-independent shellcode.[1][2] Donut generated code has been used by multiple threat actors to inject and load malicious payloads into memory.[3]

EnterpriseS0695ToolObject v1.0ModifiedApr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0695: Donut describes [Donut](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695) is an open source framework used to generate position-independent shellcode.(Citation: Donut Github)(Citation: Introducing Donut) [Donut](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695) generated code has been used by multiple threat actors to inject and load malicious payloads into memory.(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)

Executive priority

S0695: Donut is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0695: Donut by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0695: Donut appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Donut

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques16 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1070	Indicator Removal	Donut can erase file references to payloads in-memory after being reflectively loaded and executed.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.006	PythonSub-technique	Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via Python.[1]
Enterprise	T1055	Process Injection	Donut includes a subproject `DonutTest` to inject shellcode into a target process.[1]
Enterprise	T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via Ruby.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.005	Visual BasicSub-technique	Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via VBScript.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	Donut can generate encrypted, compressed/encoded, or otherwise obfuscated code modules.[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	Donut includes subprojects that enumerate and identify information about Process Injection candidates.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.002	Software PackingSub-technique	Donut can generate packed code modules.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Donut can use HTTP to download previously staged shellcode payloads.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.007	JavaScriptSub-technique	Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via JavaScript or JScript.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	Donut code modules use various API functions to load and inject code.[1]
Enterprise	T1620	Reflective Code Loading	Donut can generate code modules that enable in-memory execution of VBScript, JScript, EXE, DLL, and dotNET payloads.[1]
Enterprise	T1685	Disable or Modify Tools	Donut can patch Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI), Windows Lockdown Policy (WLDP), as well as exit-related Native API functions to avoid process termination.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.015	CompressionSub-technique	Donut can generate encrypted, compressed/encoded, or otherwise obfuscated code modules.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.001	PowerShellSub-technique	Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via PowerShell.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Donut can download and execute previously staged shellcode payloads.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0119: Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. Indrik Spider initially started with the Dridex banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, Indrik Spider changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 20.0
Object version: 1.0
Created: Mar 25, 2022, 13:35 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 2cec1ba9d3226c53...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
20.0	Oct 18, 2026, 20:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`2cec1ba9d322…`
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`2cec1ba9d322…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`2cec1ba9d322…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Donut Github
TheWover. (2019, May 9). donut. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
Open source URL
[2]
Introducing Donut
The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021.
Open source URL
[3]
NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020
Antenucci, S., Pantazopoulos, N., Sandee, M. (2020, June 23). WastedLocker: A New Ransomware Variant Developed By The Evil Corp Group. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
Open source URL
[4]
mitre-attackS0695
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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