S0677: AADInternals
AADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0677: AADInternals describes [AADInternals](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677) is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: AADInternals Github)(Citation: AADInternals Documentation)
Executive priority
S0677: AADInternals is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0677: AADInternals by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, Office Suite, Identity Provider), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0677: AADInternals appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
AADInternals
AADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1526 | Cloud Service Discovery | AADInternals can enumerate information about a variety of cloud services, such as Office 365 and Sharepoint instances or OpenID Configurations.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1556.007 | Hybrid IdentitySub-technique | AADInternals can inject a malicious DLL (`PTASpy`) into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` to backdoor Azure AD Pass-Through Authentication.CitationAADInternals Azure AD On-Prem to Cloud |
| Enterprise | T1098.005 | Device RegistrationSub-technique | AADInternals can register a device to Azure AD.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1598.003 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | AADInternals can send phishing emails containing malicious links designed to collect users’ credentials.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1552.001 | Credentials In FilesSub-technique | AADInternals can gather unsecured credentials for Azure AD services, such as Azure AD Connect, from a local machine.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1484.002 | Trust ModificationSub-technique | AADInternals can create a backdoor by converting a domain to a federated domain which will be able to authenticate any user across the tenant. AADInternals can also modify DesktopSSO information.[2]CitationAzure AD Federation Vulnerability |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | AADInternals can send "consent phishing" emails containing malicious links designed to steal users’ access tokens.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1136.003 | Cloud AccountSub-technique | AADInternals can create new Azure AD users.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1606.002 | SAML TokensSub-technique | AADInternals can be used to create SAML tokens using the AD Federated Services token signing certificate.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1590.001 | Domain PropertiesSub-technique | AADInternals can gather information about a tenant’s domains using public Microsoft APIs.[2]CitationAzure AD Recon |
| Enterprise | T1589.002 | Email AddressesSub-technique | AADInternals can check for the existence of user email addresses using public Microsoft APIs.[2]CitationAzure AD Recon |
| Enterprise | T1558.002 | Silver TicketSub-technique | AADInternals can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using the password hash of the AZUREADSSOACC account.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1552.004 | Private KeysSub-technique | AADInternals can gather encryption keys from Azure AD services such as ADSync and Active Directory Federated Services servers.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | AADInternals can steal users’ access tokens via phishing emails containing malicious links.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1087.004 | Cloud AccountSub-technique | AADInternals can enumerate Azure AD users.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1003.004 | LSA SecretsSub-technique | AADInternals can dump secrets from the Local Security Authority.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1556.006 | Multi-Factor AuthenticationSub-technique | The AADInternals `Set-AADIntUserMFA` command can be used to disable MFA for a specified user. |
| Enterprise | T1651 | Cloud Administration Command | AADInternals can execute commands on Azure virtual machines using the VM agent.CitationAADInternals Root Access to Azure VMs |
| Enterprise | T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | AADInternals can collect files from a user’s OneDrive.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | AADInternals is written and executed via PowerShell.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | AADInternals can modify registry keys as part of setting a new pass-through authentication agent.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | AADInternals can directly download cloud user data such as OneDrive files.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1069.003 | Cloud GroupsSub-technique | AADInternals can enumerate Azure AD groups.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1649 | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | AADInternals can create and export various authentication certificates, including those associated with Azure AD joined/registered devices.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1053: Storm-0501
Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]
G0016: APT29
APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 996a7c42d426… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 996a7c42d426… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]AADInternals Github
Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2021, December 13). AADInternals. Retrieved February 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]AADInternals Documentation
Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]AADInternals
Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS0677Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.