S0544: HenBox

HenBox matters because it represents Android malware with device and environment selectivity: MITRE notes it attempts to run only on Xiaomi devices using MIUI and has been reported as primarily targeting Uyghurs. For security leaders, the practical issue is not only malware removal; it is whether mobile security, privacy, and incident response programs can see malicious Android behavior that may hide from generic analysis, download code after installation, collect sensitive personal data, and abuse device sensors such as microphone, camera, and location.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a mobile risk and privacy-readiness validation item where Android devices, Xiaomi/MIUI devices, bring-your-own-device programs, or high-risk user populations are in scope. Leadership should ask whether the organization can inventory mobile platforms, assess app permissions, preserve mobile evidence during incidents, and demonstrate controls over access to contacts, SMS, call logs, location, audio, video, and local files. Because no official MITRE detection text is provided, confidence should come from local telemetry validation rather than assumptions about existing EDR or MDM coverage.

Technical view

HenBox is an Android malware object associated through ATT&CK relationships with obfuscation, runtime code download, software/process/system discovery, native API use, Unix shell execution, broadcast receiver persistence, system checks, masquerading by legitimate-looking names or locations, and collection from local data, call logs, contacts, SMS, audio, video, and location. SOC and IR teams should validate whether mobile telemetry can expose suspicious app permissions, dynamic code loading, broadcast receiver registration, native library use, shell command execution, device/OS checks, installed app and process enumeration, and access to sensitive Android content providers or sensors. Xiaomi/MIUI device visibility should be specifically checked where those devices exist.

Likely telemetry

Android device and OS inventory, including manufacturer/model and MIUI presence where available
Mobile app inventory, package names, app labels/icons, install source, version, and signing/certificate metadata
Android manifest permissions, especially microphone, camera, location, contacts, SMS, call log, storage, and background location permissions
Runtime behavioral telemetry for dynamic code download or execution after installation
Network telemetry from mobile devices or mobile security tooling showing app-initiated downloads or command-and-control-like communications

Detection direction

Validate coverage on Android specifically; do not assume desktop-focused EDR or network controls will see this behavior.
Use the relationship context to build behavioral detections around combinations: device/MIUI checks plus obfuscation, runtime code loading, sensitive permission use, and collection behavior are more meaningful than a single permission request alone.
Tune for false positives from legitimate apps that request contacts, location, camera, microphone, or background services; prioritize apps with suspicious naming/location mimicry, unusual install source, excessive permissions, dynamic code download, or unexpected shell/native execution.
Check whether sandboxing and malware analysis workflows account for system checks and execution guardrails, since behavior may vary by device model, OS, or analysis environment.
For IR, ensure mobile acquisition procedures preserve app packages, manifests, native libraries, downloaded payloads, relevant logs, network indicators, and sensitive data access artifacts where legally and technically permissible.

Mitigation priorities

Maintain accurate mobile asset inventory and identify whether Android, Xiaomi, or MIUI devices are in scope for corporate access or BYOD programs.
Apply mobile device management or equivalent policy controls to restrict untrusted app installation, enforce OS/app update posture, and review high-risk permissions.
Use app vetting and mobile threat defense processes that evaluate dynamic code loading, obfuscation, native code, broadcast receivers, masquerading, and sensitive data access rather than relying only on static reputation.
Limit business data exposure from mobile devices through least privilege, conditional access, and separation of corporate data from personal apps where feasible.
Prepare mobile incident response playbooks for privacy-sensitive collection scenarios involving contacts, SMS, call logs, audio, video, location, and local files.

Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object identifies HenBox as Android malware and states that it attempts to execute only on Xiaomi MIUI devices, with reporting that it has primarily targeted Uyghurs. The relationship set is rich and indicates a broad mobile behavior profile: evasion, discovery, execution, persistence, collection, and sensor/content-provider access. Defensive value comes from validating mobile visibility across those behaviors and from confirming whether high-risk device populations are actually represented in logs and management tooling.

MITRE provides no official detection text for this object, no tactics in the supplied fields, and no aliases or labels. This take does not assert current activity, attribution, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection. Local device inventory, mobile telemetry, app samples, legal constraints, and incident evidence are required to determine relevance and coverage in a specific environment.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

HenBox

HenBox is Android malware that attempts to only execute on Xiaomi devices running the MIUI operating system. HenBox has primarily been used to target Uyghurs, a minority Turkic ethnic group.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques17 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Mobile	T1636.002	Call LogSub-technique	HenBox has collected all outgoing phone numbers that start with “86”.[1]
Mobile	T1636.004	SMS MessagesSub-technique	HenBox can intercept SMS messages.[1]
Mobile	T1633.001	System ChecksSub-technique	HenBox can detect if the app is running on an emulator.[1]
Mobile	T1623.001	Unix ShellSub-technique	HenBox can run commands as root.[1]
Mobile	T1575	Native API	HenBox has contained native libraries.[1]
Mobile	T1418	Software Discovery	HenBox can obtain a list of running apps.[1]
Mobile	T1406	Obfuscated Files or Information	HenBox has obfuscated components using XOR, ZIP with a single-byte key or ZIP/Zlib compression wrapped with RC4 encryption.[1]
Mobile	T1624.001	Broadcast ReceiversSub-technique	HenBox has registered several broadcast receivers.[1]
Mobile	T1655.001	Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique	HenBox has masqueraded as VPN and Android system apps.[1]
Mobile	T1429	Audio Capture	HenBox can access the device’s microphone.[1]
Mobile	T1533	Data from Local System	HenBox can steal data from various sources, including chat, communication, and social media apps.[1]
Mobile	T1426	System Information Discovery	HenBox can collect device information and can check if the device is running MIUI on a Xiaomi device.[1]
Mobile	T1424	Process Discovery	HenBox can obtain a list of running processes.[1]
Mobile	T1512	Video Capture	HenBox can access the device’s camera.[1]
Mobile	T1430	Location Tracking	HenBox can track the device’s location.[1]
Mobile	T1636.003	Contact ListSub-technique	HenBox can access the device’s contact list.[1]
Mobile	T1407	Download New Code at Runtime	HenBox can load additional Dalvik code while running.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.0
Created: Dec 17, 2020, 20:15 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: f8ecce6c5f632cd3...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 25, 2025, 14:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`f8ecce6c5f63…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[2]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[3]
mitre-attackS0544
Open source URL
[4]
mitre-attackS0544
Open source URL
[5]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[6]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[7]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[8]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[9]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[10]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[11]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[12]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[13]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[14]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[15]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[16]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[17]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[18]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[19]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[20]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL
[21]
Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL

Source and licensing

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