S0353: NOKKI

NOKKI is a modular remote access tool. The earliest observed attack using NOKKI was in January 2018. NOKKI has significant code overlap with the KONNI malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking NOKKI to APT37.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0353MalwareObject v1.2ModifiedOct 22, 2025, 03:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S0353: NOKKI describes [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) is a modular remote access tool. The earliest observed attack using [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) was in January 2018. [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) has significant code overlap with the [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Cit...

Executive priority

S0353: NOKKI is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0353: NOKKI by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0353: NOKKI appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

NOKKI

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques16 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1124	System Time Discovery	NOKKI can collect the current timestamp of the victim's machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique	NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	NOKKI has downloaded a remote module for execution.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	NOKKI is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate folder and file.[1]
Enterprise	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	NOKKI uses Base64 encoding for strings.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	NOKKI can delete files to cover tracks.[1]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	NOKKI can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1218.011	Rundll32Sub-technique	NOKKI has used rundll32 for execution.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	NOKKI uses a unique, custom de-obfuscation technique.[1]
Enterprise	T1680	Local Storage Discovery	NOKKI can gather information on drives on the victim’s machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	NOKKI has used HTTP for C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1074.001	Local Data StagingSub-technique	NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in `LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp`.[1]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	NOKKI can gather information on the victim IP address.[1]
Enterprise	T1056.004	Credential API HookingSub-technique	NOKKI uses the Windows call SetWindowsHookEx and begins injecting it into every GUI process running on the victim's machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.002	File Transfer ProtocolsSub-technique	NOKKI has used FTP for C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	NOKKI can gather information on the operating system on the victim’s machine.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0094: Kimsuky

Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]

DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.2
Created: Jan 30, 2019, 19:50 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 22, 2025, 03:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 60c5b9506005847c...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Oct 22, 2025, 03:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`60c5b9506005…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Oct 22, 2025, 03:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`60c5b9506005…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018
Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2018, September 27). New KONNI Malware attacking Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
Open source URL
[2]
Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018
Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
Open source URL
[3]
NOKKI
(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)
[4]
mitre-attackS0353
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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