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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0201: JPIN

JPIN is a custom-built backdoor family used by PLATINUM. Evidence suggests developers of JPIN and Dipsind code bases were related in some way. [1]

EnterpriseS0201MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0201: JPIN describes [JPIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0201) is a custom-built backdoor family used by [PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068). Evidence suggests developers of [JPIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0201) and [Dipsind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0200) code bases were related in some way. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)

Executive priority

S0201: JPIN is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0201: JPIN by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0201: JPIN appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

JPIN

JPIN is a custom-built backdoor family used by PLATINUM. Evidence suggests developers of JPIN and Dipsind code bases were related in some way. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

20 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1222.001Windows PermissionsSub-technique

JPIN can use the command-line utility cacls.exe to change file permissions.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

JPIN can use the command-line utility cacls.exe to change file permissions.[1]

EnterpriseT1069.001Local GroupsSub-technique

JPIN can obtain the permissions of the victim user.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

JPIN can obtain network information, including DNS, IP, and proxies.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

JPIN can list running processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

JPIN's installer/uninstaller component deletes itself if it encounters a version of Windows earlier than Windows XP or identifies security-related processes running.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

JPIN can enumerate Registry keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1197BITS Jobs

A JPIN variant downloads the backdoor payload via the BITS service.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.003Mail ProtocolsSub-technique

JPIN can send email over SMTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

JPIN can enumerate drives and their types. It can also change file permissions using cacls.exe.[1]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

JPIN can inject content into lsass.exe to load a module.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

JPIN can download files and upgrade itself.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

JPIN contains a custom keylogger.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

JPIN can obtain the victim user name.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsSub-technique

JPIN can communicate over FTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

JPIN checks for the presence of certain security-related processes and deletes its installer/uninstaller component if it identifies any of them.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

JPIN can obtain system information such as OS version and disk space.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

A JPIN uses a encrypted and compressed payload that is disguised as a bitmap within the resource section of the installer.[1]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

JPIN can list running services.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0068: PLATINUM

PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. [1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
6b6faed376a315c7...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle6b6faed376a3…
19.11.1Older bundle6b6faed376a3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016

    Windows Defender Advanced Threat Hunting Team. (2016, April 29). PLATINUM: Targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia. Retrieved February 15, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    JPIN

    (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0201
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.