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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0068: PLATINUM

PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. [1]

EnterpriseG0068GroupObject v1.3Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0068: PLATINUM describes [PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068) is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)

Executive priority

G0068: PLATINUM is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0068: PLATINUM by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0068: PLATINUM appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

PLATINUM

PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

PLATINUM has sometimes used drive-by attacks against vulnerable browser plugins.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

PLATINUM has transferred files using the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel.CitationMicrosoft PLATINUM June 2017

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

PLATINUM has attempted to get users to open malicious files by sending spearphishing emails with attachments to victims.[1]

EnterpriseT1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

PLATINUM has leveraged a zero-day vulnerability to escalate privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.004Credential API HookingSub-technique

PLATINUM is capable of using Windows hook interfaces for information gathering such as credential access.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

PLATINUM has used several different keyloggers.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.001LSASS MemorySub-technique

PLATINUM has used keyloggers that are also capable of dumping credentials.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

PLATINUM has used the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for command and control.CitationMicrosoft PLATINUM June 2017

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

PLATINUM has used various methods of process injection including hot patching.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

PLATINUM has sent spearphishing emails with attachments to victims as its primary initial access vector.[1]

EnterpriseT1036Masquerading

PLATINUM has renamed rar.exe to avoid detection.CitationTwitter ItsReallyNick Platinum Masquerade

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0201: JPINEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1068: Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.004: Credential API HookingEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0200: DipsindEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003.001: LSASS MemoryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1095: Non-Application Layer ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0202: adbupdEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036: MasqueradingEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a748f2826064704d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundlea748f2826064…
19.11.3Older bundle73adbb21b1f5…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016

    Windows Defender Advanced Threat Hunting Team. (2016, April 29). PLATINUM: Targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia. Retrieved February 15, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    PLATINUM

    (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackG0068
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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