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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0091: Epic

Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla. [1]

EnterpriseS0091MalwareObject v1.4Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0091: Epic describes [Epic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0091) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)

Executive priority

S0091: Epic is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0091: Epic by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0091: Epic appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Epic

Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

22 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Epic uses the rem reg query command to obtain values from Registry keys.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Epic uses the tasklist /v command to obtain a list of processes.[1]CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Epic uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[1]CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Epic collects the user name from the victim’s machine.CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Epic uses the net time command to get the system time from the machine and collect the current date and time zone information.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Epic recursively searches for all .doc files on the system and collects a directory listing of the Desktop, %TEMP%, and %WINDOWS%\Temp directories.[1]CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Epic has a command to delete a file from the machine.CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Epic collects the OS version, hardware information, computer name, available system memory status, and system and user language settings.CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

Epic uses the net use, net session, and netstat commands to gather information on network connections.[1]CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Epic uses the net view command on the victim’s machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.002Archive via LibrarySub-technique

Epic compresses the collected data with bzip2 before sending it to the C2 server.CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1055.011Extra Window Memory InjectionSub-technique

Epic has overwritten the function pointer in the extra window memory of Explorer's Shell_TrayWnd in order to execute malicious code in the context of the explorer.exe process.CitationESET Recon Snake Nest

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

Turla has used valid digital certificates from Sysprint AG to sign its Epic dropper.[1]

EnterpriseT1087.001Local AccountSub-technique

Epic gathers a list of all user accounts, privilege classes, and time of last logon.CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1560Archive Collected Data

Epic encrypts collected data using a public key framework before sending it over the C2 channel.[1] Some variants encrypt the collected data with AES and encode it with base64 before transmitting it to the C2 server.CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1069.001Local GroupsSub-technique

Epic gathers information on local group names.CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Epic encrypts commands from the C2 server using a hardcoded key.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Epic uses the nbtstat -n and nbtstat -s commands on the victim’s machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Epic uses the tasklist /svc command to list the services on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Epic searches for anti-malware services running on the victim’s machine and terminates itself if it finds them.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Epic collects disk space information.CitationKaspersky Turla Aug 2014

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Epic heavily obfuscates its code to make analysis more difficult.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0010: TurlaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1018: Remote System DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560.002: Archive via LibraryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.011: Extra Window Memory InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1087.001: Local AccountEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560: Archive Collected DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1069.001: Local GroupsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1007: System Service DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
7760cd30b787c966...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.4Current bundle7760cd30b787…
19.11.4Older bundle7760cd30b787…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Kaspersky Turla

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Epic

    (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)

  3. [3]
    TadjMakhal

    (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)

  4. [4]
    Tavdig

    (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)

  5. [5]
    Wipbot

    (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)

  6. [6]
    WorldCupSec

    (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)

  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS0091
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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