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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1550.001: Application Access Token

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS).[1]

OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.[2]

For example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.[3] With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.[4]

Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.[5][6] The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.[7]

Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.[8] Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.

EnterpriseT1550.001Sub-techniqueObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Application access tokens matter because they can let an adversary use a trusted cloud, SaaS, identity, container, or office application session without repeating the normal login process. This can bypass password changes and second-factor prompts, especially when refresh tokens or short-lived cloud tokens remain valid. For leaders, the business issue is not just credential theft; it is whether API-based access to email, cloud accounts, service accounts, or SaaS data can continue unnoticed through legitimate-looking workflows.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where identity providers, SaaS platforms, office suites, IaaS, or container platforms support high-value operations. Executives should ask whether the organization can quickly identify risky token grants, revoke application access, audit API use, and prove to auditors that token lifecycle controls are reviewed. This technique is especially relevant to incident response readiness because changing a password may not remove an adversary’s access if application tokens, refresh tokens, or federated sessions remain active.

Technical view

ATT&CK maps this sub-technique to lateral movement across Containers, IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite, and SaaS. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility into token issuance, consent grants, refresh-token behavior, API access patterns, and cloud temporary credential requests. The supplied ATT&CK description highlights OAuth tokens, cloud email API access, AWS temporary security credentials including sts:GetFederationToken, GCP short-lived service account credentials, and Kubernetes service account token abuse through related software context. Official detection text is not provided, but ATT&CK links DET0185 as a behavioral detection strategy for this technique, so detection engineering should focus on behavior rather than static indicators.

Likely telemetry

  • Identity provider sign-in, OAuth consent, application grant, token issuance, refresh, and revocation logs
  • SaaS and Office Suite audit logs for API access, email search, contact enumeration, and application-based access to user data
  • Cloud control-plane audit logs for temporary credential requests, federated sessions, service account credential creation, and role/token use
  • Container and Kubernetes audit data showing service account token use and access to cluster resources
  • Application and API gateway logs showing authorized API calls made by applications or service identities

Detection direction

  • Validate DET0185-style behavioral coverage for unusual application token use, not only interactive logins.
  • Tune for token activity that diverges from normal user, service, application, location, time, or API usage patterns, while accounting for legitimate automation and integrations.
  • Correlate token grants and refresh activity with subsequent SaaS, cloud, and container API actions to identify access that persists after password resets or account deactivation.
  • Review high-risk events such as new OAuth application consent, unexpected refresh-token use, temporary cloud credential requests, or service account token use from unfamiliar contexts.
  • Treat lack of official ATT&CK detection guidance as a gap requiring local baselining; service-provider logs may show legitimate API workflows even when access is adversary-controlled.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with auditing: ensure identity, SaaS, cloud, and container token events are logged, retained, and reviewed as required by M1047.
  • Enforce account use policies for token lifetime, inactivity, scope, and revocation where supported, aligning with M1036.
  • Apply application developer guidance to reduce insecure token handling in applications, APIs, and SDLC practices, aligning with M1013.
  • Encrypt sensitive information at rest, in transit, and during processing to reduce exposure if tokens or related secrets are stored or transmitted, aligning with M1041.
  • Restrict risky web-based content and unauthorized browser behaviors where token theft or malicious OAuth consent paths are a concern, aligning with M1021.
Additional notes and limits

This object is a sub-technique of T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material and is tied to lateral movement. Relationship context includes use by the SolarWinds Compromise campaign, APT28, HAFNIUM, and software such as Peirates, CreepyDrive, and Shai-Hulud, but those relationships should be used for threat-informed prioritization rather than as evidence of activity in any specific environment.

MITRE does not provide official detection text for this object in the supplied fields. The practical detection approach depends heavily on which identity providers, SaaS applications, IaaS providers, container platforms, token lifetimes, consent models, and audit logs are present locally. This summary does not assert active exploitation or existing detection coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Application Access Token

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS).[1]

OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.[2]

For example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.[3] With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.[4]

Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.[5][6] The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.[7]

Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.[8] Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1527Application Access TokenApplication Access Token revoked by this object.
EnterpriseT1550Use Alternate Authentication MaterialThis object subtechnique of Use Alternate Authentication Material.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

GroupEnterprise

G0125: HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.[1][2][3]

ToolEnterprise

S0683: Peirates

Peirates is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.[1]

Containers
MalwareEnterprise

S1023: CreepyDrive

CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.[1]

POLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.[1]

WindowsOffice Suite
MalwareEnterprise

S9008: Shai-Hulud

Shai-Hulud is a supply chain worm, first reported in September 2025, that spreads through code repositories, including GitHub and NPM packages. It exploits CI/CD pipeline dependencies to propagate to victims and poisons the supply chain by publishing malicious packages. Once inside a victim environment, Shai-Hulud steals credentials and access tokens from compromised repository accounts and exfiltrates them to attacker-controlled servers via encoded GitHub Actions workflows.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

LinuxSaaSWindows
CampaignEnterprise

C0024: SolarWinds Compromise

The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e1314ba71f1971fc...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.12.0Current bundlee1314ba71f19…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019

    Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    okta

    okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019

    Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017

    Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Google Cloud Service Account Credentials

    Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    AWS Temporary Security Credentials

    AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles

    Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence

    Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Peirates GitHub

    InGuardians. (2022, January 5). Peirates GitHub. Retrieved February 8, 2022.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    AWS Data Perimeters

    AWS. (n.d.). Data perimeters on AWS. Retrieved October 16, 2024.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022

    Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022

    CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Microsoft Azure AD Admin Consent

    Baldwin, M., Flores, J., Kess, B.. (2018, June 17). Five steps to securing your identity infrastructure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Microsoft Token Protection 2023

    Microsoft. (2023, October 23). Conditional Access: Token protection (preview). Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Okta DPoP 2023

    Venkat Viswanathan. (2023, June 13). A leap forward in token security: Okta adds support for DPoP. Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017

    Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Microsoft Silk Typhoon MAR 2025

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence . (2025, March 5). Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chain. Retrieved March 20, 2025.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Aikido Shai-Hulud September 2025

    Charlie Eriksen. (2025, September 16). S1ngularity/nx attackers strike again. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Socket Shai-Hulud November 2025

    Socket Research Team. (2025, November 24). Shai Hulud Strikes Again (v2). Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Socket Shai-Hulud Trufflehog September 2025

    Socket Research Team. (2025, September 15). Popular Tinycolor npm Package Compromised in Supply Chain Attack Affecting 40+ Packages. Retrieved April 9, 2026.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    AWS Temporary Security Credentials

    AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    AWS Temporary Security Credentials

    AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019

    Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019

    Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence

    Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence

    Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Google Cloud Service Account Credentials

    Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Google Cloud Service Account Credentials

    Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019

    Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019

    Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles

    Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles

    Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017

    Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017

    Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    mitre-attackT1550.001
    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    mitre-attackT1550.001
    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    mitre-attackT1550.001
    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    okta

    okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    okta

    okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    Peirates GitHub

    InGuardians. (2022, January 5). Peirates GitHub. Retrieved February 8, 2022.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    AWS Data Perimeters

    AWS. (n.d.). Data perimeters on AWS. Retrieved October 16, 2024.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022

    Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022

    CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Microsoft Azure AD Admin Consent

    Baldwin, M., Flores, J., Kess, B.. (2018, June 17). Five steps to securing your identity infrastructure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Microsoft Token Protection 2023

    Microsoft. (2023, October 23). Conditional Access: Token protection (preview). Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Okta DPoP 2023

    Venkat Viswanathan. (2023, June 13). A leap forward in token security: Okta adds support for DPoP. Retrieved January 2, 2024.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017

    Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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