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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0082: Emissary

Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.[1]

EnterpriseS0082MalwareObject v1.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0082: Emissary describes [Emissary](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0082) is a Trojan that has been used by [Lotus Blossom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030). It shares code with [Elise](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081), with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.(Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015)

Executive priority

S0082: Emissary is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0082: Emissary by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0082: Emissary appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Emissary

Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Variants of Emissary encrypt payloads using various XOR ciphers, as well as a custom algorithm that uses the "srand" and "rand" functions.[1]CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

Emissary injects its DLL file into a newly spawned Internet Explorer process.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Variants of Emissary have used rundll32.exe in Registry values added to establish persistence.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Emissary has the capability to execute the command ipconfig /all.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Emissary has the capability to create a remote shell and execute specified commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Emissary has the capability to execute ver and systeminfo commands.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

The C2 server response to a beacon sent by a variant of Emissary contains a 36-character GUID value that is used as an encryption key for subsequent network communications. Some variants of Emissary use various XOR operations to encrypt C2 data.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Emissary uses HTTP or HTTPS for C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Emissary has the capability to download files from the C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1615Group Policy Discovery

Emissary has the capability to execute gpresult.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1069.001Local GroupsSub-technique

Emissary has the capability to execute the command net localgroup administrators.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Emissary has the capability to execute the command net start to interact with services.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1027.001Binary PaddingSub-technique

A variant of Emissary appends junk data to the end of its DLL file to create a large file that may exceed the maximum size that anti-virus programs can scan.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

Emissary is capable of configuring itself as a service.CitationEmissary Trojan Feb 2016

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
2e3b46d583f94e03...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundle2e3b46d583f9…
19.11.3Older bundle2e3b46d583f9…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lotus Blossom Dec 2015

    Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2015, December 18). Attack on French Diplomat Linked to Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.

  2. [2]
    Emissary

    (Citation: Lotus Blossom Dec 2015)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0082
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.