M1002: Attestation
Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.
Security context for executives and security teams
M1002: Attestation describes Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.
Executive priority
M1002: Attestation is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate M1002: Attestation by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether M1002: Attestation appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Attestation
Enable remote attestation capabilities when available (such as Android SafetyNet or Samsung Knox TIMA Attestation) and prohibit devices that fail the attestation from accessing enterprise resources.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1404 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Device attestation can often detect jailbroken or rooted devices. |
| Mobile | T1634 | Credentials from Password Store | Device attestation can often detect jailbroken devices. |
| Mobile | T1617 | Hooking | Device attestation can often detect rooted devices. |
| Mobile | T1623.001 | Unix ShellSub-technique | Device attestation can often detect jailbroken or rooted devices. |
| Mobile | T1634.001 | KeychainSub-technique | Device attestation can often detect jailbroken devices. |
| Mobile | T1398 | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | Device attestation could detect devices with unauthorized or unsafe modifications. |
| Mobile | T1623 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Device attestation can often detect jailbroken or rooted devices. |
| Mobile | T1424 | Process Discovery | Attestation can typically detect rooted devices. For MDM-enrolled devices, action can be taken if a device fails an attestation check. |
| Mobile | T1625 | Hijack Execution Flow | Device attestation could detect unauthorized operating system modifications. |
| Mobile | T1645 | Compromise Client Software Binary | Device attestation could detect devices with unauthorized or unsafe modifications. |
| Mobile | T1625.001 | System Runtime API HijackingSub-technique | Device attestation could detect unauthorized operating system modifications. |
| Mobile | T1630 | Indicator Removal on Host | Attestation can detect unauthorized modifications to devices. Mobile security software can then use this information and take appropriate mitigation action. |
| Mobile | T1630.001 | Uninstall Malicious ApplicationSub-technique | Attestation can detect rooted devices. Mobile security software can then use this information and take appropriate mitigation action. Attestation can detect rooted devices. |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 42acf19ca7c4… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 42acf19ca7c4… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackM1002Open source URL
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