T1555.004: Windows Credential Manager
Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).[1][2]
The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of Credentials from Web Browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.
Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.[3][4]
Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as CredEnumerateA, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.[5][6]
Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.
Password recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.[4]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1555.004: Windows Credential Manager describes Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker) The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web B...
Executive priority
T1555.004: Windows Credential Manager is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1555.004: Windows Credential Manager by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (credential-access), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1555.004: Windows Credential Manager appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Windows Credential Manager
Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).[1][2]
The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of Credentials from Web Browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.
Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named Policy.vpol, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.[3][4]
Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. vaultcmd.exe is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as CredEnumerateA, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.[5][6]
Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.
Password recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.[4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | This object subtechnique of Credentials from Password Stores. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G0010: Turla
Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]
G0038: Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed. [1]
G0102: Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]
S0629: RainyDay
S0240: ROKRAT
S0526: KGH_SPY
S0476: Valak
S0681: Lizar
S0692: SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.[1][2]
S0194: PowerSploit
PowerSploit is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of PowerShell modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. [1] [2] [3]
S0002: Mimikatz
S0349: LaZagne
C0044: Juicy Mix
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | fa7df04c437d… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | fa7df04c437d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft Credential Manager store
Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Microsoft Credential Locker
Microsoft. (2013, October 23). Credential Locker Overview. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]passcape Windows Vault
Passcape. (n.d.). Windows Password Recovery - Vault Explorer and Decoder. Retrieved November 24, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]Malwarebytes The Windows Vault
Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). The Windows Vault . Retrieved November 23, 2020.
Open source URL - [5]Microsoft CredEnumerate
Microsoft. (2018, December 5). CredEnumarateA function (wincred.h). Retrieved November 24, 2020.
Open source URL - [6]Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager
Delpy, B. (2017, December 12). howto ~ credential manager saved credentials. Retrieved November 23, 2020.
Open source URL - [7]mitre-attackT1555.004Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.