S1023: CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.[1]
POLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
CreepyDrive matters because it shows how an implant can blend command-and-control and data theft into normal-looking cloud activity, specifically actor-controlled OneDrive accounts, with a similar Dropbox-based implant noted by MITRE. For leaders, the key issue is not the malware name alone; it is whether the organization can distinguish legitimate Office Suite/cloud storage use from unauthorized C2, file discovery, token misuse, tool transfer, and exfiltration from Windows and Office Suite environments.
Executive priority
Prioritize validation of cloud storage governance, identity token controls, and SOC visibility for OneDrive/Office Suite activity. This behavior is material to business continuity and incident decision-making because exfiltration to common cloud services can bypass controls that only focus on unusual destinations. Risk owners should ask whether cloud access logs, endpoint PowerShell telemetry, file access evidence, and data movement records are retained well enough to support investigation, audit evidence, and rapid containment.
Technical view
MITRE does not provide object-specific detection text for CreepyDrive, so defenders should validate coverage through the related ATT&CK behaviors: PowerShell execution, file and directory discovery, data collection from local systems, web-protocol C2, bidirectional communication through web services, ingress tool transfer, application access token use, and exfiltration to cloud storage. SOC and IR teams should focus on Windows endpoint activity and Office Suite/cloud telemetry involving OneDrive, while considering the related note that a similar implant, CreepyBox, used actor-controlled Dropbox accounts.
Likely telemetry
- Windows process creation and command-line telemetry, especially PowerShell activity
- PowerShell script block, module, and operational logs where enabled
- Endpoint file system access, file enumeration, and staging indicators
- Network proxy, DNS, TLS, and web gateway logs for cloud storage and web protocol traffic
- Office Suite and OneDrive audit logs, including file upload/download and sharing activity
Detection direction
- Baseline legitimate OneDrive and Office Suite usage before alerting on volume alone; business processes can generate high cloud storage traffic.
- Correlate PowerShell execution with file discovery, local data access, cloud storage communication, and unusual upload behavior rather than relying on a single indicator.
- Review for suspicious application access token activity, including unexpected token use against Office Suite resources, because ATT&CK links the object to application access token abuse.
- Tune detections for web-service-based bidirectional communication where endpoints repeatedly poll or exchange data with cloud services in patterns inconsistent with normal user behavior.
- Include Dropbox-related monitoring where permitted, because MITRE notes a similar implant called CreepyBox relied on actor-controlled Dropbox accounts.
Mitigation priorities
- Ensure Office Suite and cloud storage audit logging is enabled and retained for investigations.
- Harden identity controls around application access tokens, including review of token grants, service principals, consent workflows, and anomalous SaaS access.
- Restrict or govern cloud storage use based on business need, with monitoring for uploads to unapproved or unusual accounts where feasible.
- Improve endpoint controls for PowerShell visibility and policy enforcement on Windows systems.
- Use data protection controls to identify and alert on sensitive data movement to cloud storage services.
Additional notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object identifies CreepyDrive as a custom implant used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts. Relationship context links the malware to collection, discovery, execution, C2, token abuse, tool transfer, and cloud exfiltration techniques. The group relationship notes POLONIUM’s reported targeting history, but this take does not infer current targeting or exposure for any specific organization.
MITRE provides no official detection guidance for this malware object, no explicit tactics on the object itself, and no aliases or labels. Coverage decisions require local evidence from endpoint, identity, Office Suite, SaaS, and network telemetry. Platform statements are limited to the supplied Windows and Office Suite fields plus related technique context.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.[1]
POLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use HTTPS for C2 using the Microsoft Graph API.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use cloud services including OneDrive for data exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1102.002 | Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use OneDrive for C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1550.001 | Application Access TokenSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate with OneDrive.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | CreepyDrive can specify the local file path to upload files from.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | CreepyDrive can download files to the compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use Powershell for execution, including the cmdlets `Invoke-WebRequest` and `Invoke-Expression`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | CreepyDrive can upload files to C2 from victim machines.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1005: POLONIUM
POLONIUM is a Lebanon-based group that has primarily targeted Israeli organizations, including critical manufacturing, information technology, and defense industry companies, since at least February 2022. Security researchers assess POLONIUM has coordinated their operations with multiple actors affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based on victim overlap as well as common techniques and tooling.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 3524d0c407d6… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS1023Open source URL
- [5]mitre-attackS1023Open source URL
- [6]mitre-attackS1023Open source URL
- [7]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [8]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [9]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [10]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [11]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [12]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [13]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [14]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [15]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [16]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [17]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [18]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [19]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [20]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [21]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [22]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [23]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [24]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL
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