S1023: CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.[1]
POLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1023: CreepyDrive describes [CreepyDrive](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1023) is a custom implant has been used by [POLONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1005) since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022) [POLONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1005) has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.(Citation: Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022)
Executive priority
S1023: CreepyDrive is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1023: CreepyDrive by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, Office Suite), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1023: CreepyDrive appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.[1]
POLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use HTTPS for C2 using the Microsoft Graph API.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use cloud services including OneDrive for data exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1102.002 | Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use OneDrive for C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1550.001 | Application Access TokenSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate with OneDrive.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | CreepyDrive can specify the local file path to upload files from.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | CreepyDrive can download files to the compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | CreepyDrive can use Powershell for execution, including the cmdlets `Invoke-WebRequest` and `Invoke-Expression`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | CreepyDrive can upload files to C2 from victim machines.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1005: POLONIUM
POLONIUM is a Lebanon-based group that has primarily targeted Israeli organizations, including critical manufacturing, information technology, and defense industry companies, since at least February 2022. Security researchers assess POLONIUM has coordinated their operations with multiple actors affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based on victim overlap as well as common techniques and tooling.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 3524d0c407d6… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 3524d0c407d6… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1023Open source URL
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