G1005: POLONIUM

POLONIUM is a Lebanon-based group that has primarily targeted Israeli organizations, including critical manufacturing, information technology, and defense industry companies, since at least February 2022. Security researchers assess POLONIUM has coordinated their operations with multiple actors affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based on victim overlap as well as common techniques and tooling.[1]

EnterpriseG1005GroupObject v2.0ModifiedJul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)

G1005: POLONIUM describes [POLONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1005) is a Lebanon-based group that has primarily targeted Israeli organizations, including critical manufacturing, information technology, and defense industry companies, since at least February 2022. Security researchers assess [POLONIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1005) has coordinated their operations with multiple actors affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based on victim overlap as well as common techniques and tooling.(Citatio...

Executive priority

G1005: POLONIUM is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G1005: POLONIUM by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

Validate whether G1005: POLONIUM appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

POLONIUM

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques7 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1567.002	Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique	POLONIUM has exfiltrated stolen data to POLONIUM-owned OneDrive and Dropbox accounts.[1]
Enterprise	T1102.002	Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique	POLONIUM has used OneDrive and DropBox for C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1090	Proxy	POLONIUM has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.[1]
Enterprise	T1588.002	ToolSub-technique	POLONIUM has obtained and used tools such as AirVPN and plink in their operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1199	Trusted Relationship	POLONIUM has used compromised credentials from an IT company to target downstream customers including a law firm and aviation company.[1]
Enterprise	T1583.006	Web ServicesSub-technique	POLONIUM has created and used legitimate Microsoft OneDrive accounts for their operations.[1]
Enterprise	T1078	Valid Accounts	POLONIUM has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

S1023: CreepyDrive

CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.[1]

POLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.[1]

WindowsOffice Suite

S1024: CreepySnail

CreepySnail is a custom PowerShell implant that has been used by POLONIUM since at least 2022.[1]

Windows

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · MalwareS1023: CreepyDriveEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1567.002: Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1102.002: Bidirectional CommunicationEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1090: ProxyEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1588.002: ToolEnterprise uses · MalwareS1024: CreepySnailEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1199: Trusted RelationshipEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1583.006: Web ServicesEnterprise uses · TechniqueT1078: Valid AccountsEnterprise

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 2.0
Created: Jul 1, 2022, 19:07 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Jul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: f6cc5c9322ab39e3...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.0	Jul 31, 2026, 18:47 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`f6cc5c9322ab…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.0	Jan 8, 2024, 21:56 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`8ef1986491d2…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Microsoft POLONIUM June 2022
Microsoft. (2022, June 2). Exposing POLONIUM activity and infrastructure targeting Israeli organizations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
Open source URL
[2]
Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023
Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023.
Open source URL
[3]
Plaid Rain
(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)
[4]
mitre-attackG1005
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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