M1046: Boot Integrity
Boot Integrity ensures that a system starts securely by verifying the integrity of its boot process, operating system, and associated components. This mitigation focuses on leveraging secure boot mechanisms, hardware-rooted trust, and runtime integrity checks to prevent tampering during the boot sequence. It is designed to thwart adversaries attempting to modify system firmware, bootloaders, or critical OS components. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:
Implementation of Secure Boot:
- Implementation: Enable UEFI Secure Boot on all systems and configure it to allow only signed bootloaders and operating systems. - Use Case: An adversary attempts to replace the system’s bootloader with a malicious version to gain persistence. Secure Boot prevents the untrusted bootloader from executing, halting the attack.
Utilization of TPMs:
- Implementation: Configure systems to use TPM-based attestation for boot integrity, ensuring that any modification to the firmware, bootloader, or OS is detected. - Use Case: A compromised firmware component alters the boot sequence. The TPM detects the change and triggers an alert, allowing the organization to respond before further damage.
Enable Bootloader Passwords:
- Implementation: Protect BIOS/UEFI settings with a strong password and limit physical access to devices. - Use Case: An attacker with physical access attempts to disable Secure Boot or modify the boot sequence. The password prevents unauthorized changes.
Runtime Integrity Monitoring:
- Implementation: Deploy solutions to verify the integrity of critical files and processes after boot. - Use Case: A malware infection modifies kernel modules post-boot. Runtime integrity monitoring detects the modification and prevents the malicious module from loading.
Security context for executives and security teams
M1046: Boot Integrity describes Boot Integrity ensures that a system starts securely by verifying the integrity of its boot process, operating system, and associated components. This mitigation focuses on leveraging secure boot mechanisms, hardware-rooted trust, and runtime integrity checks to prevent tampering during the boot sequence. It is designed to thwart adversaries attempting to modify system firmware, bootloaders, or critical OS components. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Implementation of Secure Boot: ...
Executive priority
M1046: Boot Integrity is an official MITRE ATT&CK mitigation. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate M1046: Boot Integrity by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether M1046: Boot Integrity appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Boot Integrity
Boot Integrity ensures that a system starts securely by verifying the integrity of its boot process, operating system, and associated components. This mitigation focuses on leveraging secure boot mechanisms, hardware-rooted trust, and runtime integrity checks to prevent tampering during the boot sequence. It is designed to thwart adversaries attempting to modify system firmware, bootloaders, or critical OS components. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:
Implementation of Secure Boot:
- Implementation: Enable UEFI Secure Boot on all systems and configure it to allow only signed bootloaders and operating systems. - Use Case: An adversary attempts to replace the system’s bootloader with a malicious version to gain persistence. Secure Boot prevents the untrusted bootloader from executing, halting the attack.
Utilization of TPMs:
- Implementation: Configure systems to use TPM-based attestation for boot integrity, ensuring that any modification to the firmware, bootloader, or OS is detected. - Use Case: A compromised firmware component alters the boot sequence. The TPM detects the change and triggers an alert, allowing the organization to respond before further damage.
Enable Bootloader Passwords:
- Implementation: Protect BIOS/UEFI settings with a strong password and limit physical access to devices. - Use Case: An attacker with physical access attempts to disable Secure Boot or modify the boot sequence. The password prevents unauthorized changes.
Runtime Integrity Monitoring:
- Implementation: Deploy solutions to verify the integrity of critical files and processes after boot. - Use Case: A malware infection modifies kernel modules post-boot. Runtime integrity monitoring detects the modification and prevents the malicious module from loading.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1195 | Supply Chain Compromise | Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms. |
| Enterprise | T1542.001 | System FirmwareSub-technique | Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. CitationTCG Trusted Platform Module Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory.CitationESET LoJax Sept 2018 Technologies such as Intel Boot Guard can assist with this. CitationIntel Hardware-based Security Technologies |
| Enterprise | T1542.003 | BootkitSub-technique | Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised.CitationTCG Trusted Platform ModuleCitationTechNet Secure Boot Process |
| Enterprise | T1601.001 | Patch System ImageSub-technique | Some vendors of embedded network devices provide cryptographic signing to ensure the integrity of operating system images at boot time. Implement where available, following vendor guidelines. CitationCisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot |
| Enterprise | T1542.004 | ROMMONkitSub-technique | Enable secure boot features to validate the digital signature of the boot environment and system image using a special purpose hardware device. If the validation check fails, the device will fail to boot preventing loading of unauthorized software. CitationCisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot |
| Enterprise | T1505 | Server Software Component | Enabling secure boot allows validation of software and drivers during initial system boot. |
| Enterprise | T1553.006 | Code Signing Policy ModificationSub-technique | Use of Secure Boot may prevent some implementations of modification to code signing policies.CitationMicrosoft TESTSIGNING Feb 2021 |
| Enterprise | T1601 | Modify System Image | Some vendors of embedded network devices provide cryptographic signing to ensure the integrity of operating system images at boot time. Implement where available, following vendor guidelines. CitationCisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot |
| Enterprise | T1505.006 | vSphere Installation BundlesSub-technique | Enabling secure boot allows ESXi to validate software and drivers during initial system boot.CitationGoogle Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi Hardening 2023 |
| Enterprise | T1601.002 | Downgrade System ImageSub-technique | Some vendors of embedded network devices provide cryptographic signing to ensure the integrity of operating system images at boot time. Implement where available, following vendor guidelines. CitationCisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot |
| Enterprise | T1542 | Pre-OS Boot | Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. CitationTCG Trusted Platform Module CitationTechNet Secure Boot Process |
| Enterprise | T1495 | Firmware Corruption | Check the integrity of the existing BIOS and device firmware to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. |
| Enterprise | T1542.005 | TFTP BootSub-technique | Enable secure boot features to validate the digital signature of the boot environment and system image using a special purpose hardware device. If the validation check fails, the device will fail to boot preventing loading of unauthorized software. CitationCisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Secure Boot |
| Enterprise | T1195.003 | Compromise Hardware Supply ChainSub-technique | Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification.CitationTCG Trusted Platform ModuleCitationTechNet Secure Boot Process |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 352038daac3d… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 352038daac3d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitre-attackM1046Open source URL
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