S1186: Line Dancer
Line Dancer is a memory-only Lua-based shellcode loader associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign. Line Dancer allows an adversary to upload and execute arbitrary shellcode on victim devices.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1186: Line Dancer describes [Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) is a memory-only Lua-based shellcode loader associated with the [ArcaneDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0046) campaign. [Line Dancer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1186) allows an adversary to upload and execute arbitrary shellcode on victim devices.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)
Executive priority
S1186: Line Dancer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1186: Line Dancer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Network Devices), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1186: Line Dancer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Line Dancer
Line Dancer is a memory-only Lua-based shellcode loader associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign. Line Dancer allows an adversary to upload and execute arbitrary shellcode on victim devices.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Line Dancer shellcode payloads are base64 encoded when transmitted to compromised devices.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1690 | Prevent Command History Logging | Line Dancer can disable syslog on compromised devices.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Line Dancer exfiltrates collected data via command and control channels.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Line Dancer uses HTTP POST requests to interact with compromised devices.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit | Line Dancer can hook both the crash dump process and the Autehntication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) functions on compromised machines to evade forensic analysis and authentication mechanisms.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1653 | Power Settings | Line Dancer can modify the crash dump process on infected machines to skip crash dump generation and proceed directly to device reboot for both persistence and forensic evasion purposes.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1040 | Network Sniffing | Line Dancer can create and exfiltrate packet captures from compromised environments.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.008 | Network Device CLISub-technique | Line Dancer can execute native commands in networking device command line interfaces.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Line Dancer can gather system configuration information by running the native `show configuration` command.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0046: ArcaneDoor
ArcaneDoor is a campaign targeting networking devices from Cisco and other vendors between July 2023 and April 2024, primarily focused on government and critical infrastructure networks. ArcaneDoor is associated with the deployment of the custom backdoors Line Runner and Line Dancer. ArcaneDoor is attributed to a group referred to as UAT4356 or STORM-1849, and is assessed to be a state-sponsored campaign.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | a1fae2aae43b… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | a1fae2aae43b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024
Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. (2024, April 24). Cyber Activity Impacting CISCO ASA VPNs. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS1186Open source URL
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