S1188: Line Runner
Line Runner is a persistent backdoor and web shell allowing threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts. Line Runner is associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1188: Line Runner describes [Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) is a persistent backdoor and web shell allowing threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts. [Line Runner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1188) is associated with the [ArcaneDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0046) campaign.(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
Executive priority
S1188: Line Runner is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1188: Line Runner by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Network Devices), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1188: Line Runner appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Line Runner
Line Runner is a persistent backdoor and web shell allowing threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts. Line Runner is associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Line Runner utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using Line Dancer.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1027.015 | CompressionSub-technique | Line Runner uses a ZIP payload that is automatically extracted with its contents, a LUA script, executed for initial execution via CVE-2024-20359.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1653 | Power Settings | Line Runner used CVE-2024-20353 to trigger victim devices to reboot, in the process unzipping and installing the Line Dancer payload.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Line Runner utilizes an HTTP-based Lua backdoor on victim machines.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.011 | LuaSub-technique | Line Runner utilizes Lua scripts for command execution.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | Line Runner is a persistent Lua-based web shell.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Line Runner removes its initial ZIP delivery archive after processing the enclosed LUA script.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1557 | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Line Runner intercepts HTTP requests to the victim Cisco ASA, looking for a request with a 32-character, victim dependent parameter. If that parameter matches a value in the malware, a contained payload is then written to a Lua script and executed.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0046: ArcaneDoor
ArcaneDoor is a campaign targeting networking devices from Cisco and other vendors between July 2023 and April 2024, primarily focused on government and critical infrastructure networks. ArcaneDoor is associated with the deployment of the custom backdoors Line Runner and Line Dancer. ArcaneDoor is attributed to a group referred to as UAT4356 or STORM-1849, and is assessed to be a state-sponsored campaign.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b2a467a49e84… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | b2a467a49e84… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. (2024, April 24). Cyber Activity Impacting CISCO ASA VPNs. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024
Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS1188Open source URL
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