S9026: ROAMINGHOUSE
ROAMINGHOUSE is a dropper malware used by MirrorFace to extract and execute embedded payloads including UPPERCUT components.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S9026: ROAMINGHOUSE describes [ROAMINGHOUSE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9026) is a dropper malware used by [MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054) to extract and execute embedded payloads including [UPPERCUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0275) components.(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha Updates APR 2025)
Executive priority
S9026: ROAMINGHOUSE is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9026: ROAMINGHOUSE by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9026: ROAMINGHOUSE appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
ROAMINGHOUSE
ROAMINGHOUSE is a dropper malware used by MirrorFace to extract and execute embedded payloads including UPPERCUT components.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | ROAMINGHOUSE can decode and drop a malicious ZIP file prior to execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1137.001 | Office Template MacrosSub-technique | ROAMINGHOUSE has been loaded as a Word Template file when victims opened a decoy document placed in `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Templates` alongside a ROAMINGHOUSE macro.CitationTrend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | ROAMINGHOUSE has been distributed through phishing emails containing malicious OneDrive links.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used malicious files to drop ROAMINGHOUSE.CitationTrend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | ROAMINGHOUSE has been executed through luring victims into clicking links to download malicious ZIP files.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1497.002 | User Activity Based ChecksSub-technique | ROAMINGHOUSE can check for specific mouse movements and user activity before initiating malicious activity.CitationTrend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | ROAMINGHOUSE can change its execution method to create a batch file in the startup folder that executes a legitimate executable if a McAfee product is detected.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | ROAMINGHOUSE can embed a ZIP file containing UPPERCUT components into three base64 encoded parts.CitationTrend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | ROAMINGHOUSE can identify McAfee applications on compromised hosts and change its execution method if one is detected.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | ROAMINGHOUSE can use WMI to launch a legitimate executable later used to enable DLL sideloading.[1]CitationTrend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024 |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | ROAMINGHOUSE can use a legitimate EXE to sideload a malicious DLL named JSFC.dll.[1] ROAMINGHOUSE has also used ScnCfg32.exe to sideload vsodscpl.dll to enable UPPERCUT execution.CitationTrend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024 |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1054: MirrorFace
MirrorFace is a People's Republic of China (PRC)-aligned cyberespionage actor believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools, and infrastructure overlaps. MirrorFace has been active since at least 2019, at first exclusively targeting Japanese organizations across the media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing, and academic sectors. Subsequent MirrorFace operations included targets in Central Europe and featured use of LODEINFO, HiddenFace, and UPPERCUT malware.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
C0060: Operation AkaiRyū
Operation AkaiRyū (Japanese for RedDragon) was a cyberespionage spearphishing campaign conducted by MirrorFace between June and September 2024 against entities in Japan and Central Europe. Operation AkaiRyū notably included the first reported targeting of a European entity by MirrorFace, as well as their use of UPPERCUT, which was thought to be exclusive to menuPass.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 9f9affbe6868… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 9f9affbe6868… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Trend Micro Earth Kasha Updates APR 2025
Hiroaki, H. (2025, April 30). Earth Kasha Updates TTPs in Latest Campaign Targeting Taiwan and Japan. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS9026Open source URL
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