T1137.001: Office Template Macros
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. [1]
Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros [2] can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[3][4] Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.[5]
Word Normal.dotm location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm
Excel Personal.xlsb location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB
Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.[5]
An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.
Security context for executives and security teams
Office Template Macros matter because they turn a common business tool into a persistence point: a modified Word or Excel template can cause code to run when the Office application starts. For leaders, the practical risk is not “macros” in the abstract; it is whether endpoint, Office, and registry monitoring can prove that user profile templates, trusted locations, and Office startup behavior have not been quietly altered after compromise.
Executive priority
Prioritize this where Windows endpoints and Microsoft Office are widely used, especially for users with sensitive access. The business decision is whether macro governance, endpoint behavior prevention, and monitoring of Office startup paths are strong enough to support incident response and audit evidence. Because this is a persistence technique, weak coverage can extend attacker dwell time and complicate containment after an initial compromise.
Technical view
This is a Windows and Office Suite persistence sub-technique under Office Application Startup. Validate monitoring for changes to Word Normal.dotm, Excel PERSONAL.XLSB under XLSTART, Office template directories, and registry-driven template redirection such as GlobalDotName. Also validate whether shared or remote template locations are visible to defenders. ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object, but relationship context includes detection strategy DET0519, Detect Persistence via Office Template Macro Injection or Registry Hijack, so detection engineering should focus on file modification, macro-bearing template creation, Office startup execution, and registry hijack evidence rather than relying on a single alert type.
Likely telemetry
- File creation and modification events for user Office template paths, including Normal.dotm and XLSTART/PERSONAL.XLSB
- Registry modification events for Office template configuration such as GlobalDotName
- Office process start events correlated with template loading or macro execution indicators
- Endpoint behavior-prevention events involving Office applications and child processes or suspicious file activity
- Inventory or configuration evidence for macro policy, trusted documents, and trusted locations
Detection direction
- Confirm coverage of both default user-profile template paths and alternate Office search-order locations described in the ATT&CK object.
- Create baselines for legitimate template updates, because normal user customization and Office configuration changes can otherwise create false positives.
- Tune for suspicious combinations: new or modified macro-capable templates plus subsequent Office startup activity, or registry changes that redirect template loading to unusual locations.
- Check visibility into trusted locations and trusted documents, since the technique may depend on macro execution being permitted by policy or trust state.
- Use relationship context from DET0519 to guide detection validation, but do not assume coverage exists without testing local telemetry collection and alert logic.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with macro governance: restrict unrestricted macro execution where business processes allow and review trusted locations/documents.
- Apply endpoint behavior prevention controls, aligned to M1040, to block or alert on suspicious Office-driven process, file, API, or endpoint behavior.
- Reduce attack surface, aligned to M1042, by disabling or removing unnecessary Office features, legacy components, or configurations that are not required for business use.
- Protect and monitor Office template paths and registry settings as controlled configuration items, especially for privileged or high-risk users.
- Include Office template persistence checks in incident response containment and eradication playbooks so responders do not remove only the initial payload.
Additional notes and limits
The relationships show this technique as a sub-technique of Office Application Startup and list use by Operation AkaiRyū, MuddyWater, Cobalt Strike, BackConfig, and ROAMINGHOUSE. Those relationships establish that the behavior is relevant across campaign, group, and software reporting, but they should not be read as evidence of current activity in any specific environment. The most actionable local questions are: who can modify Office template paths, where are trusted templates allowed, and can the SOC reconstruct Office startup persistence changes from endpoint and registry telemetry?
ATT&CK does not provide official detection text for this object, so the guidance depends on the supplied description, platforms, persistence tactic, and relationship to DET0519 and mitigations M1040/M1042. Local Office versions, macro policy, endpoint logging depth, and use of shared templates will determine practical detectability.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Office Template Macros
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. [1]
Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros [2] can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.[3][4] Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.[5]
Word Normal.dotm location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm
Excel Personal.xlsb location:
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB
Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.[5]
An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1137 | Office Application Startup | This object subtechnique of Office Application Startup. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0069: MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
S9026: ROAMINGHOUSE
ROAMINGHOUSE is a dropper malware used by MirrorFace to extract and execute embedded payloads including UPPERCUT components.[1]
S0475: BackConfig
BackConfig is a custom Trojan with a flexible plugin architecture that has been used by Patchwork.[1]
S0154: Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]
C0060: Operation AkaiRyū
Operation AkaiRyū (Japanese for RedDragon) was a cyberespionage spearphishing campaign conducted by MirrorFace between June and September 2024 against entities in Japan and Central Europe. Operation AkaiRyū notably included the first reported targeting of a European entity by MirrorFace, as well as their use of UPPERCUT, which was thought to be exclusive to menuPass.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 4161daa35036… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft Change Normal Template
Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [2]MSDN VBA in Office
Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [3]enigma0x3 normal.dotm
Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [4]Hexacorn Office Template Macros
Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
- [5]GlobalDotName Jun 2019
Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
Open source URL - [6]Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017
Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [7]Trend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024
Hiroaki, H. (2024, November 26). Guess Who’s Back - The Return of ANEL in the Recent Earth Kasha Spear-phishing Campaign in 2024. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [8]Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020
Hinchliffe, A. and Falcone, R. (2020, May 11). Updated BackConfig Malware Targeting Government and Military Organizations in South Asia. Retrieved June 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [9]win10_asr
Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [10]MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins
Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [11]ESET MirrorFace 2025
Dominik Breitenbacher. (2025, March 18). Operation AkaiRyū: MirrorFace invites Europe to Expo 2025 and revives ANEL backdoor. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
Open source URL - [12]Talos Cobalt Strike September 2020
Mavis, N. (2020, September 21). The Art and Science of Detecting Cobalt Strike. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL - [13]CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
Open source URL - [14]CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
Open source URL - [15]CrowdStrike Outlook Forms
Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
Open source URL - [16]GlobalDotName Jun 2019
Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
Open source URL - [17]GlobalDotName Jun 2019
Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
Open source URL - [18]Hexacorn Office Template Macros
Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
- [19]Hexacorn Office Template Macros
Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
- [20]MSDN VBA in Office
Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [21]MSDN VBA in Office
Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [22]Microsoft Change Normal Template
Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [23]Microsoft Change Normal Template
Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [24]Outlook Today Home Page
Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
Open source URL - [25]Outlook Today Home Page
Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
Open source URL - [26]Outlook Today Home Page
Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
Open source URL - [27]enigma0x3 normal.dotm
Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [28]enigma0x3 normal.dotm
Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
Open source URL - [29]mitre-attackT1137.001Open source URL
- [30]mitre-attackT1137.001Open source URL
- [31]mitre-attackT1137.001Open source URL
- [32]Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017
Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [33]Trend Micro Earth Kasha Anel NOV 2024
Hiroaki, H. (2024, November 26). Guess Who’s Back - The Return of ANEL in the Recent Earth Kasha Spear-phishing Campaign in 2024. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [34]Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020
Hinchliffe, A. and Falcone, R. (2020, May 11). Updated BackConfig Malware Targeting Government and Military Organizations in South Asia. Retrieved June 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [35]win10_asr
Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [36]MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins
Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [37]ESET MirrorFace 2025
Dominik Breitenbacher. (2025, March 18). Operation AkaiRyū: MirrorFace invites Europe to Expo 2025 and revives ANEL backdoor. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
Open source URL
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