S9020: LODEINFO
LODEINFO is a fileless backdoor malware first identified in 2020 that has been used by actors including MirrorFace, primarily against media, diplomatic, governmental, and public sector organizations in Japan.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S9020: LODEINFO describes [LODEINFO](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9020) is a fileless backdoor malware first identified in 2020 that has been used by actors including [MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054), primarily against media, diplomatic, governmental, and public sector organizations in Japan.(Citation: Kaspersky LODEINFO OCT 2022)(Citation: ITOCHU LODEINFO JAN 2024)(Citation: ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022)
Executive priority
S9020: LODEINFO is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9020: LODEINFO by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9020: LODEINFO appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
LODEINFO
LODEINFO is a fileless backdoor malware first identified in 2020 that has been used by actors including MirrorFace, primarily against media, diplomatic, governmental, and public sector organizations in Japan.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1001.001 | Junk DataSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | LODEINFO can encrypt C2 communication with a hardcoded (NV4HDOeOVyL) Vigenere cipher key.CitationKaspersky LODEINFO Part II OCT 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | LODEINFO can halt execution if the “en_US” locale is identified on a victim's machine.CitationKaspersky LODEINFO Part II OCT 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1614.001 | System Language DiscoverySub-technique | LODEINFO can looks for the “en_US” locale on the victim’s machine.CitationKaspersky LODEINFO Part II OCT 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1027.015 | CompressionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.016 | Junk Code InsertionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027.007 | Dynamic API ResolutionSub-technique | LODEINFO can use a hashing algorithm to dynamically resolve API function addresses.CitationKaspersky LODEINFO Part II OCT 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery | LODEINFO can capture system time to send to the C2.CitationKaspersky LODEINFO Part II OCT 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | LODEINFO can use Windows APIs such as `VirtualAllocEx()`, `WriteProcessMemory()`, `CreateRemoteThread()`, `NtAllocateVirtualMemory()`, `NtWriteVirtualMemory()`, and `RtlCreateUserThread()` to enable memory injection of shellcode.CitationKaspersky LODEINFO Part II OCT 2022 |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1054: MirrorFace
MirrorFace is a People's Republic of China (PRC)-aligned cyberespionage actor believed to be a subgroup under the menuPass umbrella based on targeting, tools, and infrastructure overlaps. MirrorFace has been active since at least 2019, at first exclusively targeting Japanese organizations across the media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing, and academic sectors. Subsequent MirrorFace operations included targets in Central Europe and featured use of LODEINFO, HiddenFace, and UPPERCUT malware.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | e2cf2915db8e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | e2cf2915db8e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Kaspersky LODEINFO OCT 2022
Ishimaru, S. (2022, October 31). APT10: Tracking down LODEINFO 2022, part I. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]ITOCHU LODEINFO JAN 2024
ITOCHU. (2024, January 24). The Endless Struggle Against APT10: Insights from LODEINFO v0.6.6 - v0.7.3 Analysis. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [3]ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022
Breitenbacher, D. (2022, December 14). Unmasking MirrorFace: Operation LiberalFace targeting Japanese political entities. Retrieved April 17, 2026.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS9020Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
