T1580: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.[1][2][3][4] Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project [5], and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.[6] In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through Wordlist Scanning.[7]
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.[8] The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.[9]An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. [10] Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in Cloud Service Discovery, this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1580: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery describes An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services. Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that ca...
Executive priority
T1580: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1580: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (discovery), supported platforms (IaaS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
- Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1580: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.[1][2][3][4] Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project [5], and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.[6] In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through Wordlist Scanning.[7]
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.[8] The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.[9]An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. [10] Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in Cloud Service Discovery, this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1015: Scattered Spider
Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]
G1053: Storm-0501
Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]
G1057: ShinyHunters
ShinyHunters is a cyber criminal collective that has been active since at least 2019 operating under the ShinyCorp persona. ShinyHunters has targeted multiple industries and geographic regions gathering legitimate credentials and personally identifiable information (PII) for resale or extortion of victims. ShinyHunters has been associated with the broader collective called The Community, also known as The Com whose members have also included Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$. Public reporting has mentioned a variety of names for operations ShinyHunters members have reportedly conducted with members of other groups, including “Scattered Lapsus Hunters,” “Scattered Lapsus Shiny Hunters,” and “SLSH.”[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
S1091: Pacu
Pacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.[1]
S9009: TruffleHog
TruffleHog is an open-source secrets-discovery tool that is used to search for credentials, API keys, and encryption keys across a variety of data sources and environments.[1][2] TruffleHog has the ability to discover credentials and secrets stored in code repositories, git history, CI/CD pipelines, among other common storage locations to include filesystems and cloud storage buckets.[1][3][2] TruffleHog was first released by its author in 2016.[2]
S9041: TeamPCP Cloud Stealer
The TeamPCP Cloud Stealer is a comprehensive filesystem credential stealer that can harvest, encrypt, and exfiltrate credentials from over 50 sensitive file paths across CI/CD, cloud, developer tooling, and container environments. The TeamPCP Cloud Stealer was the primary payload used by TeamPCP in March 2026 during early stages of a cascading supply chain campaign targeting CI/CD workflows.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.3 | Current bundle | aa33a4c9e71f… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.3 | Older bundle | aa33a4c9e71f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Amazon Describe Instance
Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Amazon Describe Instances API
Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]AWS Get Public Access Block
Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.
Open source URL - [4]AWS Head Bucket
Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS HeadBucket. Retrieved February 14, 2022.
Open source URL - [5]Google Compute Instances
Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
Open source URL - [6]Microsoft AZ CLI
Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.
Open source URL - [7]Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas
Vasilios Hioureas. (2019, September 13). Hacking with AWS: incorporating leaky buckets into your OSINT workflow. Retrieved February 14, 2022.
Open source URL - [8]Expel IO Evil in AWS
A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
Open source URL - [9]Mandiant M-Trends 2020
Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [10]AWS Describe DB Instances
Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021.
Open source URL - [11]mitre-attackT1580Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
