T1653: Power Settings
Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.[1]
Adversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.[2][3]
For example, `powercfg` controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.[4] Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings.[5] Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.[6]
Aware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.[7]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1653: Power Settings describes Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.(Citation: Sleep, shut down, hibernate) Adversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.(Citation: Microsoft: Powercfg comman...
Executive priority
T1653: Power Settings is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1653: Power Settings by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence), supported platforms (Windows, Linux, macOS, Network Devices), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1653: Power Settings appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Power Settings
Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.[1]
Adversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.[2][3]
For example, `powercfg` controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.[4] Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings.[5] Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.[6]
Aware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.[7]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1186: Line Dancer
Line Dancer is a memory-only Lua-based shellcode loader associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign. Line Dancer allows an adversary to upload and execute arbitrary shellcode on victim devices.[1][2]
S1188: Line Runner
Line Runner is a persistent backdoor and web shell allowing threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts. Line Runner is associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign.[1][2]
C0046: ArcaneDoor
ArcaneDoor is a campaign targeting networking devices from Cisco and other vendors between July 2023 and April 2024, primarily focused on government and critical infrastructure networks. ArcaneDoor is associated with the deployment of the custom backdoors Line Runner and Line Dancer. ArcaneDoor is attributed to a group referred to as UAT4356 or STORM-1849, and is assessed to be a state-sponsored campaign.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 6b892b777e8b… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 6b892b777e8b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Sleep, shut down, hibernate
AVG. (n.d.). Should You Shut Down, Sleep or Hibernate Your PC or Mac Laptop?. Retrieved June 8, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]Microsoft: Powercfg command-line options
Microsoft. (2021, December 15). Powercfg command-line options. Retrieved June 5, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]systemdsleep Linux
Man7. (n.d.). systemd-sleep.conf(5) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 7, 2023.
Open source URL - [4]Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users
Douglas Bonderud. (2018, September 17). Two New Monero Malware Attacks Target Windows and Android Users. Retrieved June 5, 2023.
Open source URL - [5]BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware
Bethany Hardin, Lavine Oluoch, Tatiana Vollbrecht. (2022, November 14). BATLOADER: The Evasive Downloader Malware. Retrieved June 5, 2023.
Open source URL - [6]CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign
Avira. (2019, November 28). CoinLoader: A Sophisticated Malware Loader Campaign. Retrieved June 5, 2023.
Open source URL - [7]Condi-Botnet-binaries
Joie Salvio and Roy Tay. (2023, June 20). Condi DDoS Botnet Spreads via TP-Link's CVE-2023-1389. Retrieved September 5, 2023.
Open source URL - [8]mitre-attackT1653Open source URL
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