T1059.011: Lua
Adversaries may abuse Lua commands and scripts for execution. Lua is a cross-platform scripting and programming language primarily designed for embedded use in applications. Lua can be executed on the command-line (through the stand-alone lua interpreter), via scripts (.lua), or from Lua-embedded programs (through the struct lua_State).[1][2]
Lua scripts may be executed by adversaries for malicious purposes. Adversaries may incorporate, abuse, or replace existing Lua interpreters to allow for malicious Lua command execution at runtime.[3][4][5][6]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1059.011: Lua describes Adversaries may abuse Lua commands and scripts for execution. Lua is a cross-platform scripting and programming language primarily designed for embedded use in applications. Lua can be executed on the command-line (through the stand-alone lua interpreter), via scripts ( .lua ), or from Lua-embedded programs (through the struct lua_State ).(Citation: Lua main page)(Citation: Lua state) Lua scripts may be executed by adversaries for malicious purposes. Adversaries may incorporate, abuse, or replace existing Lua inter...
Executive priority
T1059.011: Lua is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1059.011: Lua by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (execution), supported platforms (Linux, Network Devices, Windows, macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1059.011: Lua appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Lua
Adversaries may abuse Lua commands and scripts for execution. Lua is a cross-platform scripting and programming language primarily designed for embedded use in applications. Lua can be executed on the command-line (through the stand-alone lua interpreter), via scripts (.lua), or from Lua-embedded programs (through the struct lua_State).[1][2]
Lua scripts may be executed by adversaries for malicious purposes. Adversaries may incorporate, abuse, or replace existing Lua interpreters to allow for malicious Lua command execution at runtime.[3][4][5][6]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | This object subtechnique of Command and Scripting Interpreter. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1188: Line Runner
Line Runner is a persistent backdoor and web shell allowing threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts. Line Runner is associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign.[1][2]
S0125: Remsec
S1240: RedLine Stealer
RedLine Stealer is an information-stealer malware variant first identified in 2020.[1][2][3] RedLine Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) and was reportedly sold as either a one-time purchase or a monthly subscription service.[1][4] Information obtained from RedLine Stealer has been known to be sold on the deep and dark web to Initial Access Brokers (IABs), who use or resell the stolen credentials for further intrusions.[5][4]
S0396: EvilBunny
S0428: PoetRAT
PoetRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. PoetRAT has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. PoetRAT derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare. [1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 4ae5f4f107a5… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 4ae5f4f107a5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Lua main page
Lua. (2024, June 25). Getting started. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Lua state
Lua. (n.d.). lua_State. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]PoetRat Lua
Mercer, Warren. (2020, October 6). PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]Lua Proofpoint Sunseed
Raggi, Michael. Cass, Zydeca. The Proofpoint Threat Research Team.. (2022, March 1). Asylum Ambuscade: State Actor Uses Lua-based Sunseed Malware to Target European Governments and Refugee Movement. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]Cyphort EvilBunny
Marschalek, Marion. (2014, December 16). EvilBunny: Malware Instrumented By Lua. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [6]Kaspersky Lua
Global Research and Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
Open source URL - [7]mitre-attackT1059.011Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.