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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1142: LunarMail

LunarMail is a backdoor that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with LunarLoader and LunarWeb. LunarMail is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and Steganography in command and control.[1]

EnterpriseS1142MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

LunarMail matters because it is a Windows backdoor associated in ATT&CK with Turla and described as using email messages, steganography, and related command-and-control behavior. For leaders, the key issue is not just malware blocking; it is whether email, endpoint, and network monitoring can reveal a workstation using normal-looking mail traffic to receive commands, stage data, collect local email, and potentially exfiltrate over the same channel.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as an assurance question for high-value Windows workstations and diplomatic, government, or similarly sensitive environments where mailbox data and workstation access are business-critical. Executives should ask whether the organization can investigate suspicious mail-protocol use from endpoints, preserve mailbox evidence, and correlate endpoint behavior with email activity. Because MITRE provides no official detection guidance for LunarMail, coverage should be validated through control testing and incident response readiness rather than assumed from tool ownership.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists LunarMail as Windows malware and relates it to Turla, Steganography, Encrypted/Encoded File, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Visual Basic execution, file and mailbox data deletion, mail protocols, local data staging, system and file discovery, non-application-layer protocol C2, screen capture, local email collection, Office add-ins, deobfuscation, malicious file execution, and create/modify system process. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility across Windows endpoint process/file activity, Office and Outlook add-in persistence, mailbox artifacts, local email stores, mail protocol traffic, and evidence of data staging or cleanup. Treat email-based C2 and steganography as high-blind-spot areas because traffic may resemble legitimate mail workflows and encoded content may reduce signature value.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command/script execution events, including Visual Basic-related execution where available
  • File creation, modification, staging, deletion, and decode/deobfuscation activity on workstations
  • Office and Outlook add-in configuration, load events, and persistence-related registry or file artifacts
  • Local email data access, including Outlook cache or storage files where monitored
  • Mailbox audit logs and email metadata sufficient to investigate unusual deletion, export, or manipulation activity

Detection direction

  • Do not rely on a LunarMail-specific analytic from ATT&CK; no official detection is provided. Build validation around the related ATT&CK behaviors and local baselines.
  • Correlate workstation mail-protocol activity with process lineage, Office add-in loads, mailbox access, file staging, and deletion events to distinguish normal email client behavior from suspicious automation or post-compromise activity.
  • Tune carefully for false positives from legitimate Outlook, add-ins, administrative mailbox operations, backup/export workflows, and normal user file searches.
  • Assess blind spots in encrypted or encoded files, steganographic content, local mailbox access, and email traffic that bypasses central mail gateways or is not tied back to endpoint identity.
  • Use relationship context to enrich triage: behaviors involving email-based C2, local email collection, cleanup, and exfiltration over C2 should be treated as higher-value investigation pivots on Windows workstations.

Mitigation priorities

  • First confirm telemetry retention and auditability for Windows endpoints, mail systems, Office add-ins, and mail-protocol network flows.
  • Harden Office and Outlook add-in governance so unauthorized or unexpected add-ins can be prevented, reviewed, and investigated.
  • Reduce exposure from malicious files through user execution controls, attachment handling, and security awareness processes appropriate to the environment.
  • Limit unnecessary direct mail-protocol access from workstations and monitor exceptions, especially where centralized email access paths are expected.
  • Prepare IR playbooks for mailbox evidence preservation, endpoint isolation, staged-data collection, and investigation of file or mailbox deletion artifacts.
Additional notes and limits

This take is based on the ATT&CK S1142 LunarMail software object, its official description, the ESET external reference cited by ATT&CK, and supplied relationships. The strongest defensive value is in validating coverage for the related behaviors rather than searching only for a named malware family. The Turla relationship is relevant for threat intelligence context, but local prioritization should depend on the organization’s sector, Windows workstation population, email architecture, and sensitivity of local mailbox data.

MITRE does not provide official detection text, aliases, labels, or explicit tactics on the LunarMail object itself. The platform supplied for the malware is Windows, while several related techniques list broader platforms; this summary treats Windows as the supported LunarMail platform. No claims are made here about current activity, customer exposure, guaranteed detection, or exploitation beyond the supplied ATT&CK fields and relationships.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

LunarMail

LunarMail is a backdoor that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with LunarLoader and LunarWeb. LunarMail is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and Steganography in command and control.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1114.001Local Email CollectionSub-technique

LunarMail can capture the recipients of sent email messages from compromised accounts.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.008Clear Mailbox DataSub-technique

LunarMail can set the `PR_DELETE_AFTER_SUBMIT` flag to delete messages sent for data exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

LunarMail can use email image attachments with embedded data for receiving C2 commands and data exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

LunarMail can decrypt strings to retrieve configuration settings.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

LunarMail has been installed through a malicious macro in a Microsoft Word document.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

LunarMail has used RC4 and AES to encrypt strings and its exfiltration configuration respectively.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

LunarMail can search its staging directory for output files it has produced.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

LunarMail has been installed using a VBA macro.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

LunarMail can delete the previously used staging directory and files on subsequent rounds of exfiltration and replace it with a new one.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

LunarMail can capture environmental variables on compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

LunarMail can ping a specific C2 URL with the ID of a victim machine in the subdomain.[1]

EnterpriseT1001.002SteganographySub-technique

LunarMail can parse IDAT chunks from .png files to look for zlib-compressed and AES encrypted C2 commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

LunarMail can capture screenshots from compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1543Create or Modify System Process

LunarMail can create an arbitrary process with a specified command line and redirect its output to a staging directory.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.003Mail ProtocolsSub-technique

LunarMail can communicates with C2 using email messages via the Outlook Messaging API (MAPI).[1]

EnterpriseT1137.006Add-insSub-technique

LunarMail has the ability to use Outlook add-ins for persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

LunarMail can create a directory in `%TEMP%\` to stage data prior to exfilration.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1114.001: Local Email CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.008: Clear Mailbox DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1095: Non-Application Layer ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1001.002: SteganographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · GroupG0010: TurlaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543: Create or Modify System ProcessEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.003: Mail ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1137.006: Add-insEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1152dd469f6782aa...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.0Current bundle1152dd469f67…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS1142
    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS1142
    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS1142
    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
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