LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1142: LunarMail

LunarMail is a backdoor that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with LunarLoader and LunarWeb. LunarMail is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and Steganography in command and control.[1]

EnterpriseS1142MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1142: LunarMail describes [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) and [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141). [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and [Steganography](https://attack....

Executive priority

S1142: LunarMail is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1142: LunarMail by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1142: LunarMail appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

LunarMail

LunarMail is a backdoor that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with LunarLoader and LunarWeb. LunarMail is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and Steganography in command and control.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1114.001Local Email CollectionSub-technique

LunarMail can capture the recipients of sent email messages from compromised accounts.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.008Clear Mailbox DataSub-technique

LunarMail can set the `PR_DELETE_AFTER_SUBMIT` flag to delete messages sent for data exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

LunarMail can use email image attachments with embedded data for receiving C2 commands and data exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

LunarMail can decrypt strings to retrieve configuration settings.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

LunarMail has been installed through a malicious macro in a Microsoft Word document.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

LunarMail has used RC4 and AES to encrypt strings and its exfiltration configuration respectively.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

LunarMail can search its staging directory for output files it has produced.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

LunarMail has been installed using a VBA macro.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

LunarMail can delete the previously used staging directory and files on subsequent rounds of exfiltration and replace it with a new one.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

LunarMail can capture environmental variables on compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

LunarMail can ping a specific C2 URL with the ID of a victim machine in the subdomain.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

LunarMail can capture screenshots from compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1543Create or Modify System Process

LunarMail can create an arbitrary process with a specified command line and redirect its output to a staging directory.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.003Mail ProtocolsSub-technique

LunarMail can communicates with C2 using email messages via the Outlook Messaging API (MAPI).[1]

EnterpriseT1137.006Add-insSub-technique

LunarMail has the ability to use Outlook add-ins for persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

LunarMail can create a directory in `%TEMP%\` to stage data prior to exfilration.[1]

EnterpriseT1001.002SteganographySub-technique

LunarMail can parse IDAT chunks from .png files to look for zlib-compressed and AES encrypted C2 commands.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0010: TurlaEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1114.001: Local Email CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.008: Clear Mailbox DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1095: Non-Application Layer ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543: Create or Modify System ProcessEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.003: Mail ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1137.006: Add-insEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1001.002: SteganographyEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1152dd469f6782aa...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle1152dd469f67…
19.11.0Older bundle1152dd469f67…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1142
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use