LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Campaign

C0007: FunnyDream

FunnyDream was a suspected Chinese cyber espionage campaign that targeted government and foreign organizations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Security researchers linked the FunnyDream campaign to possible Chinese-speaking threat actors through the use of the Chinoxy backdoor and noted infrastructure overlap with the TAG-16 threat group.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseC0007CampaignObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

C0007: FunnyDream describes [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0007) was a suspected Chinese cyber espionage campaign that targeted government and foreign organizations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Security researchers linked the [FunnyDream](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0007) campaign to possible Chinese-speaking threat actors through the use of the [Chinoxy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1041) backdoor and noted infrastructure overlap with the TAG-16 threat group...

Executive priority

C0007: FunnyDream is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate C0007: FunnyDream by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether C0007: FunnyDream appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

FunnyDream

FunnyDream was a suspected Chinese cyber espionage campaign that targeted government and foreign organizations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Security researchers linked the FunnyDream campaign to possible Chinese-speaking threat actors through the use of the Chinoxy backdoor and noted infrastructure overlap with the TAG-16 threat group.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used a Visual Basic script to run remote commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used several tools and batch files to map victims' internal networks.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used ipconfig for discovery on remote systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used 7zr.exe to add collected files to an archive.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used `cmd.exe` to execute the wmiexec.vbs script.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

During FunnyDream, the threat actors downloaded additional droppers and backdoors onto a compromised system.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.001MalwareSub-technique

For FunnyDream, the threat actors used a new backdoor named FunnyDream.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Tasklist on targeted systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1583.001DomainsSub-technique

For FunnyDream, the threat actors registered a variety of domains.[1]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used netstat to discover network connections on remote systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1585.002Email AccountsSub-technique

For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign.[1]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used `wmiexec.vbs` to run remote commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

For FunnyDream, the threat actors used a modified version of the open source PcShare remote administration tool.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Systeminfo to collect information on targeted hosts.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S1043: ccf32

ccf32 is data collection malware that has been used since at least February 2019, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign; there is also a similar x64 version.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0100: ipconfig

ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. [1]

ToolEnterprise

S0057: Tasklist

The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface. [1]

ToolEnterprise

S0104: netstat

netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics. [1]

MalwareEnterprise

S1041: Chinoxy

Chinoxy is a backdoor that has been used since at least November 2018, during the FunnyDream campaign, to gain persistence and drop additional payloads. According to security researchers, Chinoxy has been used by Chinese-speaking threat actors.[1]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S1050: PcShare

PcShare is an open source remote access tool that has been modified and used by Chinese threat actors, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign since late 2018.[1][2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
21a11bdd4f77926b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle21a11bdd4f77…
19.11.0Older bundle634cfc854be3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020

    Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kaspersky APT Trends Q1 2020

    Global Research and Analysis Team. (2020, April 30). APT trends report Q1 2020. Retrieved September 19, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Recorded Future Chinese Activity in Southeast Asia December 2021

    Insikt Group. (2021, December 8). Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage Activity Supports Expansion of Regional Power and Influence in Southeast Asia. Retrieved September 19, 2022.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attackC0007
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.