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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0678: Torisma

Torisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.[1]

EnterpriseS0678MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0678: Torisma describes [Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). [Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)

Executive priority

S0678: Torisma is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0678: Torisma by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0678: Torisma appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Torisma

Torisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

13 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Torisma has been Base64 encoded and AES encrypted.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Torisma has used various Windows API calls.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Torisma can use `GetlogicalDrives` to get a bitmask of all drives available on a compromised system. It can also use `GetDriveType` to determine if a new drive is a CD-ROM drive.[1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Torisma can collect the current time on a victim machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Torisma can send victim data to an actor-controlled C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Torisma has encoded C2 communications with Base64.[1]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

Torisma is only delivered to a compromised host if the victim's IP address is on an allow-list.[1]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

Torisma can use `WTSEnumerateSessionsW` to monitor remote desktop connections.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Torisma has used XOR and Base64 to decode C2 data.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Torisma has been packed with Iz4 compression.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Torisma has encrypted its C2 communications using XOR and VEST-32.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Torisma can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Torisma can collect the local MAC address using `GetAdaptersInfo` as well as the system's IP address.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

CampaignEnterprise

C0022: Operation Dream Job

Operation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · CampaignC0022: Operation Dream JobEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480: Execution GuardrailsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
278d5fe2cc14f769...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.2Current bundle278d5fe2cc14…
19.11.2Older bundle278d5fe2cc14…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0678
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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