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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0678: Torisma

Torisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.[1]

EnterpriseS0678MalwareObject v1.2Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Torisma is a Windows second-stage implant described by ATT&CK as designed for specialized monitoring and used by Lazarus Group. Its business significance is not just the malware name: the related behaviors show a post-compromise toolset that can discover local/network context, hide artifacts, communicate over web protocols, encode/encrypt C2, and exfiltrate over that channel. For leaders, this makes Torisma relevant to resilience questions around sensitive Windows environments, especially where defense-sector-style espionage risk is a concern.

Executive priority

Prioritize evidence that the organization can detect and investigate stealthy second-stage activity after initial access. Ask whether SOC and IR teams can prove coverage for Windows endpoint visibility, outbound web traffic analysis, encoded/encrypted C2 patterns, and data movement over existing C2 channels. This is also useful audit evidence for logging, monitoring, egress control, and incident response readiness; ATT&CK does not provide active exploitation status or customer exposure.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists Torisma on Windows and relates it to discovery, stealth, execution, command-and-control, and exfiltration techniques including System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Time Discovery, Local Storage Discovery, Native API, Software Packing, Encrypted/Encoded File, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Execution Guardrails, Web Protocols, Standard Encoding, Symmetric Cryptography, and Exfiltration Over C2 Channel. SOC teams should validate detections around suspicious Windows process behavior, packed or encoded payloads, decode/deobfuscation activity, environment checks, web-based outbound communications, and data leaving through the same channel used for C2.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry
  • Endpoint file creation/modification metadata for packed, encoded, or unusual executable artifacts
  • EDR memory/process behavior telemetry where available, especially for native API-heavy behavior
  • Network proxy, firewall, DNS, and web gateway logs for outbound HTTP/S-style communications
  • TLS/session metadata and destination reputation/context where content inspection is unavailable

Detection direction

  • Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text, build coverage from the related technique cluster rather than a single malware signature.
  • Correlate Windows discovery activity with unusual outbound web communications and encoded/encrypted payload patterns.
  • Tune for false positives from legitimate administration tools, inventory agents, backup software, and normal encrypted web traffic.
  • Validate blind spots around packed binaries, encrypted files, TLS visibility limits, lack of command-line logging, and malware execution guardrails that may suppress behavior in sandboxes.
  • Use relationship context from Operation Dream Job and the cited Operation North Star reporting as intelligence context, not as proof of current activity in the environment.

Mitigation priorities

  • Ensure Windows endpoint monitoring and response controls are deployed on systems that handle sensitive operations or data.
  • Restrict and monitor outbound web traffic with egress controls, proxy logging, and allow/deny policy appropriate to business need.
  • Harden detection and response playbooks for second-stage implants: triage endpoint artifacts, preserve memory where needed, and investigate C2-linked data movement.
  • Use application control and malware prevention where feasible to reduce execution of unknown packed or encoded binaries.
  • Maintain logging retention and investigation procedures sufficient to demonstrate monitoring and response readiness for compliance or governance reviews.
Additional notes and limits

Torisma is linked by ATT&CK to Lazarus Group use and was discovered during investigation of the 2020 Operation North Star campaign targeting the defense sector. The relationship context also connects it to Operation Dream Job. The practical defensive value is in validating coverage across its related behaviors, especially stealth, discovery, web C2, and exfiltration over C2.

The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection guidance, no aliases, no labels, no explicit malware tactics, and only Windows as the listed platform. This take does not include IOCs, active exploitation claims, or guaranteed detection logic; local telemetry and environment-specific baselining are required.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Torisma

Torisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

13 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

Torisma has been Base64 encoded and AES encrypted.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Torisma has used various Windows API calls.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Torisma can use `GetlogicalDrives` to get a bitmask of all drives available on a compromised system. It can also use `GetDriveType` to determine if a new drive is a CD-ROM drive.[1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Torisma can collect the current time on a victim machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Torisma can send victim data to an actor-controlled C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Torisma has encoded C2 communications with Base64.[1]

EnterpriseT1480Execution Guardrails

Torisma is only delivered to a compromised host if the victim's IP address is on an allow-list.[1]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

Torisma can use `WTSEnumerateSessionsW` to monitor remote desktop connections.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Torisma has used XOR and Base64 to decode C2 data.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Torisma has been packed with Iz4 compression.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Torisma has encrypted its C2 communications using XOR and VEST-32.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Torisma can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Torisma can collect the local MAC address using `GetAdaptersInfo` as well as the system's IP address.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

CampaignEnterprise

C0022: Operation Dream Job

Operation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1124: System Time DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1480: Execution GuardrailsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1049: System Network Connections DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · CampaignC0022: Operation Dream JobEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
278d5fe2cc14f769...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.2Current bundle278d5fe2cc14…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    McAfee Lazarus Jul 2020

    Cashman, M. (2020, July 29). Operation North Star Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attackS0678
    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attackS0678
    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackS0678
    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    McAfee Lazarus Jul 2020

    Cashman, M. (2020, July 29). Operation North Star Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020

    Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.

    Open source URL
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Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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