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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0653: xCaon

xCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0653MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0653: xCaon describes [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) is an HTTP variant of the [BoxCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0651) malware family that has used by [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) since at least 2014. [xCaon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0653) has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)

Executive priority

S0653: xCaon is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0653: xCaon by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0653: xCaon appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

xCaon

xCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

11 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

xCaon has uploaded files from victims' machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

xCaon has communicated with the C2 server by sending POST requests over HTTP.[1]

EnterpriseT1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

xCaon has added persistence via the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load which causes the malware to run each time any user logs in.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

xCaon has used the GetAdaptersInfo() API call to get the victim's MAC address.[1]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

xCaon has checked for the existence of Kaspersky antivirus software on the system.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

xCaon has encrypted data sent to the C2 server using a XOR key.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

xCaon has a command to download files to the victim's machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

xCaon has used Base64 to encode its C2 traffic.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

xCaon has a command to start an interactive shell.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

xCaon has leveraged native OS function calls to retrieve victim's network adapter's information using GetAdapterInfo() API.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

xCaon has decoded strings from the C2 server before executing commands.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0136: IndigoZebraEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547: Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1f9c5d0b560cef9f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle1f9c5d0b560c…
19.11.0Older bundle1f9c5d0b560c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021

    CheckPoint Research. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT continues to attack Central Asia with evolving tools. Retrieved September 24, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 8). APT Trends report Q2 2017. Retrieved February 15, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0653
    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    xCaon

    (Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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