S0604: Industroyer
Industroyer is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.[1] Industroyer was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.[2] This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.[3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0604: Industroyer describes [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Industroyer) [Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604) was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017) This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operatio...
Executive priority
S0604: Industroyer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0604: Industroyer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0604: Industroyer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Industroyer
Industroyer is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations.[1] Industroyer was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.[2] This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.[3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | Industroyer can use an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence and replaces the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1485 | Data Destruction | Industroyer’s data wiper module clears registry keys and overwrites both ICS configuration and Windows files.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | Industroyer uses a custom port scanner to map out a network.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | Industroyer can use supplied user credentials to execute processes and stop services.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1554 | Compromise Host Software Binary | Industroyer has used a Trojanized version of the Windows Notepad application for an additional backdoor persistence mechanism.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Industroyer downloads a shellcode payload from a remote C2 server and loads it into memory.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | Industroyer can enumerate remote computers in the compromised network.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Industroyer’s data wiper component enumerates specific files on all the Windows drives.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | Industroyer attempts to perform an HTTP CONNECT via an internal proxy to establish a tunnel.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Industroyer’s 61850 payload component enumerates connected network adapters and their corresponding IP addresses.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1489 | Service Stop | Industroyer’s data wiper module writes zeros into the registry keys in |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Industroyer sends information about hardware profiles and previously-received commands back to the C2 server in a POST-request.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Industroyer’s main backdoor connected to a remote C2 server using HTTPS.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1090.003 | Multi-hop ProxySub-technique | Industroyer used Tor nodes for C2.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Industroyer collects the victim machine’s Windows GUID.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1499.004 | Application or System ExploitationSub-technique | Industroyer uses a custom DoS tool that leverages CVE-2015-5374 and targets hardcoded IP addresses of Siemens SIPROTEC devices.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Industroyer decrypts code to connect to a remote C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | Industroyer has a data wiper component that enumerates keys in the Registry |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Industroyer uses heavily obfuscated code in its Windows Notepad backdoor.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
C0025: 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used Industroyer malware to target and disrupt distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the second major public attack conducted against Ukraine by Sandworm Team.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 30f412bcf692… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | 30f412bcf692… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET Industroyer
Anton Cherepanov. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial controls systems. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Dragos Crashoverride 2017
Dragos Inc.. (2017, June 13). CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]Dragos Crashoverride 2018
Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]CRASHOVERRIDE
(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017)
- [5]Win32/Industroyer
(Citation: ESET Industroyer)
- [6]mitre-attackS0604Open source URL
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