LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1609: Container Administration Command

Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.[1][2][3]

In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.[4][5] In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.[6]

EnterpriseT1609TechniqueObject v1.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1609: Container Administration Command describes Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.(Citation: Docker Daemon CLI)(Citation: Kubernetes API)(Citation: Kubernetes Kubelet) In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute ...

Executive priority

T1609: Container Administration Command is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1609: Container Administration Command by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (execution), supported platforms (Containers), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs
  • Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1609: Container Administration Command appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Container Administration Command

Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.[1][2][3]

In Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as docker exec to execute a command within a running container.[4][5] In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as kubectl exec.[6]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0139: TeamTNT

TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

ToolEnterprise

S0683: Peirates

Peirates is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.[1]

Containers
MalwareEnterprise

S0601: Hildegard

Hildegard is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind Hildegard. [1]

LinuxContainersIaaS
MalwareEnterprise

S9042: CanisterWorm

CanisterWorm is a self-propagating malware that has been used by TeamPCP in credential harvesting and software supply chain campaigns since at least 2026. CanisterWorm has used npm credentials to infect software packages and propagate across developer ecosystems. CanisterWorm has a targeted wiper component and can use decentralized C2 infrastructure implemented via an Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) blockchain canister.[1][2][3][4]

ContainersLinux
MalwareEnterprise

S9041: TeamPCP Cloud Stealer

The TeamPCP Cloud Stealer is a comprehensive filesystem credential stealer that can harvest, encrypt, and exfiltrate credentials from over 50 sensitive file paths across CI/CD, cloud, developer tooling, and container environments. The TeamPCP Cloud Stealer was the primary payload used by TeamPCP in March 2026 during early stages of a cascading supply chain campaign targeting CI/CD workflows.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]

ContainersLinuxmacOS
MalwareEnterprise

S9043: Mini Shai-Hulud

Mini Shai-Hulud is a credential stealer and self-replicating supply chain worm, derived from Shai-Hulud, that has been used by TeamPCP to target Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery/Deployment (CI/CD) workflows since at least 2026. Mini Shai-Hulud can compromise credentials across multiple cloud, container, and AI configuration file paths and can use stolen npm and GitHub OIDC tokens to spread to other packages maintained by the compromised user. Mini Shai-Hulud also has a targeted wiper component and has used multiple C2 and data exfiltration mechanisms.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

ContainersIaaSLinux
MalwareEnterprise

S0599: Kinsing

Kinsing is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment. [1][2][3]

ContainersLinux
MalwareEnterprise

S9045: BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR

BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR is a 49-module Python malware developed entirely by Anthropic’s Claude Code as part of the AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure campaign. BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR leverages publicly available techniques for network enumeration, credential harvesting, Active Directory interrogation, database access, privilege escalation, cloud metadata extraction, and lateral movement [1].

LinuxWindowsIaaS
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
5ae10424aa5f1158...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.3Current bundle5ae10424aa5f…
19.21.3Older bundle5ae10424aa5f…
19.11.3Older bundlef9674589a485…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Docker Daemon CLI

    Docker. (n.d.). DockerD CLI. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kubernetes API

    The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Kubernetes Kubelet

    The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubelet. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Docker Entrypoint

    Docker. (n.d.). Docker run reference. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Docker Exec

    Docker. (n.d.). Docker Exec. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Kubectl Exec Get Shell

    The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Get a Shell to a Running Container. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackT1609
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.