S0520: BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN is a remote access Trojan that has been used by the North Korean government since at least early 2020 in cyber operations against defense, engineering, and government organizations in Western Europe and the US.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0520: BLINDINGCAN describes [BLINDINGCAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0520) is a remote access Trojan that has been used by the North Korean government since at least early 2020 in cyber operations against defense, engineering, and government organizations in Western Europe and the US.(Citation: US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)(Citation: NHS UK BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020)
Executive priority
S0520: BLINDINGCAN is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0520: BLINDINGCAN by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0520: BLINDINGCAN appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN is a remote access Trojan that has been used by the North Korean government since at least early 2020 in cyber operations against defense, engineering, and government organizations in Western Europe and the US.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | BLINDINGCAN has collected from a victim machine the system name, processor information, and OS version.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has executed commands via cmd.exe.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has used HTTPS over port 443 for command and control.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | BLINDINGCAN has downloaded files to a victim machine.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | BLINDINGCAN has uploaded files from victim machines.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has attempted to hide its payload by using legitimate file names such as "iconcache.db".[1] |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has encoded its C2 traffic with Base64.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has obfuscated code using Base64 encoding.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has been signed with code-signing certificates such as CodeRipper.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has deleted itself and associated artifacts from victim machines.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has been packed with the UPX packer.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | BLINDINGCAN has sent user and system information to a C2 server via HTTP POST requests.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | BLINDINGCAN has collected the victim machine's local IP address information and MAC address.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has modified file and directory timestamps.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1129 | Shared Modules | BLINDINGCAN has loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime on a victim machine.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has lured victims into executing malicious macros embedded within Microsoft Office documents.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32Sub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has used Rundll32 to load a malicious DLL.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | BLINDINGCAN has collected disk information, including type and free space available.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | BLINDINGCAN can search, read, write, move, and execute files.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has been delivered by phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office documents.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | BLINDINGCAN has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | BLINDINGCAN has used AES and XOR to decrypt its DLLs.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0032: Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | d2675cf38890… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | d2675cf38890… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]US-CERT BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020
US-CERT. (2020, August 19). MAR-10295134-1.v1 – North Korean Remote Access Trojan: BLINDINGCAN. Retrieved August 19, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]NHS UK BLINDINGCAN Aug 2020
NHS Digital . (2020, August 20). BLINDINGCAN Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved August 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS0520Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.