S0484: Carberp
Security context for executives and security teams
S0484: Carberp describes [Carberp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484) is a credential and information stealing malware that has been active since at least 2009. [Carberp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0484)'s source code was leaked online in 2013, and subsequently used as the foundation for the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) backdoor.(Citation: Trend Micro Carberp February 2014)(Citation: KasperskyCarbanak)(Citation: RSA Carbanak November 2017)
Executive priority
S0484: Carberp is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0484: Carberp by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0484: Carberp appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Carberp
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1542.003 | BootkitSub-technique | Carberp has installed a bootkit on the system to maintain persistence.CitationESET Carberp March 2012 |
| Enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | Carberp's passw.plug plugin can gather account information from multiple instant messaging, email, and social media services, as well as FTP, VNC, and VPN clients.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | Carberp has masqueraded as Windows system file names, as well as "chkntfs.exe" and "syscron.exe".CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011CitationTrusteer Carberp October 2010 |
| Enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit | Carberp has used user mode rootkit techniques to remain hidden on the system.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1056.004 | Credential API HookingSub-technique | Carberp has hooked several Windows API functions to steal credentials.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Carberp has maintained persistence by placing itself inside the current user's startup folder.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1497 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | Carberp has removed various hooks before installing the trojan or bootkit to evade sandbox analysis or other analysis software.CitationESET Carberp March 2012 |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Carberp has exfiltrated data via HTTP to already established C2 servers.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011CitationTrusteer Carberp October 2010 |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Carberp can download and execute new plugins from the C2 server. CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011CitationTrusteer Carberp October 2010 |
| Enterprise | T1021.005 | VNCSub-technique | Carberp can start a remote VNC session by downloading a new plugin.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1185 | Browser Session Hijacking | Carberp has captured credentials when a user performs login through a SSL session.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011CitationTrusteer Carberp October 2010 |
| Enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Carberp has exploited multiple Windows vulnerabilities (CVE-2010-2743, CVE-2010-3338, CVE-2010-4398, CVE-2008-1084) and a .NET Runtime Optimization vulnerability for privilege escalation.CitationESET Carberp March 2012CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure CallSub-technique | Carberp has queued an APC routine to explorer.exe by calling ZwQueueApcThread.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | Carberp has queried the infected system's registry searching for specific registry keys associated with antivirus products.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | Carberp has searched the Image File Execution Options registry key for "Debugger" within every subkey.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique | Carberp has created a hidden file in the Startup folder of the current user.CitationTrusteer Carberp October 2010 |
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | Carberp has attempted to disable security software by creating a suspended process for the security software and injecting code to delete antivirus core files when the process is resumed.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Carberp has connected to C2 servers via HTTP.CitationTrusteer Carberp October 2010 |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Carberp has used XOR-based encryption to mask C2 server locations within the trojan.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Carberp has used the NtQueryDirectoryFile and ZwQueryDirectoryFile functions to hide files and directories.CitationTrusteer Carberp October 2010 |
| Enterprise | T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique | Carberp's bootkit can inject a malicious DLL into the address space of running processes.CitationESET Carberp March 2012 |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Carberp has collected the operating system version from the infected system.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | Carberp can capture display screenshots with the screens_dll.dll plugin.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Carberp has collected a list of running processes.CitationTrusteer Carberp October 2010 |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | Carberp's passw.plug plugin can gather passwords saved in Opera, Internet Explorer, Safari, Firefox, and Chrome.CitationPrevx Carberp March 2011 |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | fb5aea22ca97… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | fb5aea22ca97… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Trend Micro Carberp February 2014
Trend Micro. (2014, February 27). CARBERP. Retrieved July 29, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]KasperskyCarbanak
Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved March 27, 2017.
Open source URL - [3]RSA Carbanak November 2017
RSA. (2017, November 21). THE CARBANAK/FIN7 SYNDICATE A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AN EVOLVING THREAT. Retrieved July 29, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS0484Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
